

# GREATER ITALY

WILLIAM KAY WALLACE



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**GREATER ITALY**



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BY

WILLIAM KAY WALLACE, M.A.

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## PREFACE

I WOULD attempt to trace in this volume the rise of the Kingdom of Italy among nations, with more particular emphasis on the part played by the people of Italy in the affairs of the world during the past three decades.

The share which Italy has had in shaping the history of Europe during this period is a great one. Careful analysis would lead one to conclude that the policy which Italy has pursued has been one of the chief final determinants in world affairs. Italy's open acknowledgment of her partnership in the Triple Alliance brought about the re-grouping of the European Powers which soon crystallised into the two groups of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, facing each other across the chessboard of international affairs. It was only when Germany, with overweening self-confidence, trumpeted loudly her defiant cry of *Weltmacht oder Niedergang*, that the people of Italy, perceiving the subservience of the position into which they had fallen, with indomitable courage set about to free themselves from German control.

In dealing with Italian affairs, I have sought to lay particular stress on the relations of Italy with the Central Powers, to trace the course of Italian policy in its dealings with Vienna and Berlin, and to show how the "*mariage forcé*" of Rome and Vienna, brought about by the arbitrariness of Berlin, could

not fail to end in disaster. However, it would be very short-sighted to disregard the immense material advantages and benefits which Italy received as a result of her intimate relations with Germany. It is only by a clear understanding of this intimacy, which, for a generation, existed between Rome and Berlin that we can gauge truthfully the present realist temper of the Italian people.

No history of present-day Italy would be complete without a mention of the occupant of the throne of St. Peter. I have endeavoured to recount briefly, though carefully, the relations between the Vatican and the Quirinal. In so doing I have concerned myself solely with the political aspect of the Papacy. The Papacy, viewed as a political organism, is a problem of immediate and vital importance to the Kingdom of Italy, which must be the object of concern to every student of history. Since the chapter on this subject was written news reaches me from Rome that during the past month there has been a decided change in Papal policy; that the Vatican is making serious efforts to conciliate the Allies; that the Pope has addressed severe remonstrances to the Central Powers regarding their policy of deportations and bombardment of open towns; that he has rid himself of certain pro-German personages of his entourage, and is endeavouring to show himself docile and conciliatory towards France.

Of all the Powers engaged in the European War none has more pressing problems, difficult of solution, confronting it, than Italy. The people of Italy believe that they have pre-eminent interests in the Trentino and the Eastern Adriatic, in the Ægean and Asia Minor, as well as in certain regions of northern

and eastern Africa. A stable peace in Europe cannot be guaranteed without the just satisfaction of the essential legitimate Italian aspirations. To insure a better understanding of these aspirations I have endeavoured to give to contemporary problems something of their historical setting.

I have had the privilege of being at and near the front with the Italian armies at different periods during this war. I was present on the field of battle during the stirring days when the Austrians launched their great invasion of Italy last May. I was there able to learn something of the intrepid valour of those brave sons of United Italy who marched to their death in the highlands with flowers garlanded about their dust-covered helmets, a smile on their lips, a song in their hearts. The precise efficiency, the calm demeanour, the stern restraint of officers and men alike, in the face of so grave a danger, gave me an insight into the new Italy; the Italy of dynamic, resourceful energy, of deep courage, of buoyant, optimistic vitality. It is to this Italy that I would direct your attention.

January, 1917



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**GREATER ITALY**



# GREATER ITALY

## CHAPTER I

### THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITY

NAPOLEON III AND CAVOUR. THE RISE OF PIEDMONT.  
STRUGGLES FOR INDEPENDENCE

It was in July, 1858, that Cavour, at the personal invitation of Napoleon III, came to Plombières, where the Emperor was at that time taking the baths. Here, between other diversions, feeling himself strong and vigorous as a result of his stay in the bracing air of the Vosges, Napoleon readily entered upon a secret understanding with the Italian Minister to assist the Piedmontese in driving out the Austrians from northern Italy, and agreed to the hegemony of the House of Savoy, of this new and much enlarged Italian Kingdom.

The meetings between Napoleon and Cavour lasted two days. Finally, after a long interview, Napoleon took Cavour for a drive into the country, he himself driving the light, high-wheeled gig. No one was present at this excursion, which lasted over three hours. It was while Napoleon was busied driving his horses along the mountain roads that Cavour poured forth his most astute and incisive arguments. This hour was to prove momentous in the history of modern Italy, for with foreign aid, of both men and money,

the plan of Cavour "for the self-government of all Italy by Italians" seemed assured.

It is impossible to conceive that Napoleon III had any idea of bringing about Italian unity in a broad sense, or that he took a very lively interest in Italian affairs. But circumstances had rendered him the arbiter of Europe, and he believed the moment opportune to freshen the lustre of the military laurels of France. Events proved that he was more interested in filling up the empty niches of the Invalides with new trophies than he was with Italian national aspirations.

However, Cavour returned well content to Italy and reported to his sovereign, Victor Emmanuel II, at Turin the results of his interview.

The terms of the agreement were vague. France was to furnish 200,000 men; Piedmont was to raise 100,000. The joint forces were to drive the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia, which, together with the Legations and the Marches of Ancona, were to be annexed to the States already under the sovereignty of Victor Emmanuel II. France was to receive the Duchy of Savoy in return for the cession of Lombardy, while Nice was to be given to France in case Venetia was acquired. Thus Cavour set to work to pave the way for the liberation and unification of Italy.

In those days the attitude of Austria towards Piedmont was, in many respects, identical with the attitude of the Dual Monarchy towards Serbia during the past decade. In 1859 Austria held the greater part of northern Italy in bondage, just as in our own times the Hapsburg Empire after annexing Bosnia, in 1908, held the great majority of the Jugo-Slavs within its

power. As Serbia, seeking to realise the national ambitions of the Southern Slavs, turned to Russia for help against the encroachments of Vienna, so Piedmont turned to France. For Cavour's arrangement for the co-operation of Napoleon was based solely on the contingency of an overt aggression on the part of Austria. The analogy is still more striking when it is recalled that as in 1914 England made every effort to avoid war, so in 1859 she tendered her good offices as mediator when the situation became acute in April, and Austria had despatched an ultimatum to Piedmont.

The attitude of France was obscure. Napoleon had made a personal agreement with Cavour, without informing his Ministers, who now flatly declared that there was no need of going to war for the aggrandisement of the House of Savoy. The future of Italy for a moment hung by a precarious thread. Cavour had made plans, so it is said, to leave for America in case Napoleon repudiated his word.

England called upon Austria and Piedmont to meet in conference. Cavour bowed to the inevitable, and agreed to the proposal. This was April 17. Two days later Austria sent an arrogant reply, stating that she could not agree to any mediation. This *coup de tête* on the part of Austria rallied France to the support of Italy, while the British Cabinet, incensed at the tone of the Austrian reply, was also openly favourable to Italy. Ten days later Austria declared war, and the Franco-Italian forces entered Lombardy.

Success accompanied the expedition. Magenta and Solferino were facile and brilliant, if not decisive, victories for the allied arms. The liberation of Lombardy

soon followed, and the hopes of all Italy ran high that at last the detested Austrian would be driven beyond the Brenner and the Quanero. Yet only nine weeks after the beginning of the campaign, when Venetia was still firmly held by Austria, Napoleon, fearing further complications at home, as reports had reached him that the Prussians were mobilising along the Rhine, agreed to an armistice, and on July 11, in a personal interview with the Emperor Francis Joseph at Villafranca, concluded the preliminaries of peace, which was later signed at Zürich on November 10, 1859. By its terms Lombardy was ceded to Napoleon, who in turn handed it over to Piedmont. This was the only tangible result of a campaign so auspiciously begun. Italy remained in as chaotic a state as before, and Italian unity seemed as remote as ever.

The Italians, deceived and disappointed by the action of Napoleon at Villafranca, were further infuriated against the French, when, in the next year, the Emperor demanded his "pound of flesh," and compelled Piedmont to cede Nice and Savoy to France, and at the same time called a halt to Italian ambitions by continuing to occupy Rome with French troops. Napoleon's short-sighted and slighting attitude towards Italy was to prove of grave consequence to France, not merely because of the neutral attitude adopted by Italy during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, but during the next half century the spectre of the wrongs inflicted at this time on Italy rose time and again to prevent a friendly understanding between the two countries.

Nevertheless, the first seeds of Italian unity had been sown in fertile soil. The princes of the House of


Savoy felt themselves the chosen leaders of Italian unity. Piedmont became the kernel of the new Italy. The flame of nationalism had spread throughout the peninsula. The national aspirations of a great race cannot be quenched by temporary reverses. In March, 1860, Emilia and Tuscany, by a plebiscite voted themselves a part of the new Kingdom, while Garibaldi, with his famous Thousand, set sail from Quarto, near Genoa, for the south. One by one, in rapid succession, Umbria, the Marches, Naples, and Sicily all voted their adherence to the growing Italian Kingdom. In November, 1866, the greater part of Venetia was wrested from Austria, while in 1870 the chief event of the nationalisation of the Italian peninsula was achieved when the Italian forces captured Rome, and the city became the capital of the country. Thus, briefly, are set forth the outlines of the struggle which brought into being modern Italy.

It is more than a mere coincidence that the year 1870 should have been marked by the appearance of two new states in the firmament of nations. The history of the rise of Prussia and of Piedmont is emphatically similar. The objects of both were the same: to group and weld into one united whole the motley members which formed each body politic. This was the aim of both Prussia and Piedmont. As in Prussia, so in Piedmont a landed aristocracy and an old military caste held the reins of government. As in Prussia, so in Piedmont a man was found equal to the task of driving out the cumbersome Austrian and of setting the seal of national independence on the united nations under the hegemony of their respective sovereigns. Cavour and Bismarck are the two nation-builders of modern

times. Under their guidance both Prussia and Piedmont assumed the leadership of their race, and consolidated their peoples into an organic whole. The constructive work of unification received its greatest immediate impetus when the two States, Prussia and Piedmont, became allies to drive out the Austrians. The victorious campaign of 1866, which ended in Sadowa, was conducted single-handed by the Prussians, for the Italians met with reverses during the first days of the struggle. But Bismarck, who was looking beyond the immediate present, foresaw the advantages to be gained by an unwonted leniency towards the humbled Austrian. A truce, followed by peace, was speedily arranged for, and Italy received Venetia as her share of the spoils; a brave step in advance in the programme of national unity.

But the crowning year of the rise of the two States was reached in 1870. Once again Prussia took up the cudgels for the cause of German expansion, and Italy, profiting by the embarrassment of France, entered Rome, which was forthwith proclaimed the capital of the new Kingdom of Italy, under the sovereignty of Victor Emmanuel II. When, three months later, Bismarck placed the Imperial crown upon the head of William I at Versailles, he was merely following the Italian example. The task was complete. The first cycle of the epic of nationalism had ended.

During the ensuing years Prussia and Piedmont, within their respective spheres, were busy endeavouring to make the smaller and weaker States of the union forget their particularist past, and to imbue the newly united peoples with a sense of national patriotism. But here the similarity ends. Prussia brought into



# THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY



being the German Empire by "blood and iron." From the very outset the principles of nationality were violated; first, in 1864, by the annexation of the Danish Duchies; then, in 1870, by the incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine. Piedmont, on the contrary, rose to leadership in response to the desire of a people of one tongue, tradition, and culture, who were ready for the great experiment in national unity.

The German Empire still remained a patchwork of unassimilated principalities, under the leadership of Prussia, whereas Piedmont, fused into the new Italy, soon lost her hegemony and much of her identity.

The further shaping of the destiny of the two new States was influenced by many internal factors. The confederation of German States, under Prussian leadership, as created by Bismarck, was an elastic organisation, capable of indefinite expansion. The Italian Kingdom, on the other hand, soon set itself in a mould of a certain rigidity. From a constructive point of view the early death of Cavour in 1861, before the work of unification was completed, left Italy without a strong and skilful leader, while Bismarck lived on for another thirty years, and was able to shape the destinies of the Empire he had created. Yet Prussia and Piedmont have always had a certain comradeship of spirit, which subsists to this day. This is only natural when viewed in the light of the many important crises which the two States endured in common, and of the remarkable similarity of the episodes in their national development.

No sooner had national unity in Italy been firmly achieved, no sooner did Italy feel her new national

strength, than she looked about her and discovered, for the first time, the weakness of her geographical position. Jutting out into the Mediterranean, the long, boot-shaped peninsula is unprotected by any natural coast defenses. Across the narrow Adriatic and along her northeastern boundary, holding the keys to all the valleys leading into the Venetian plain, Austria loomed menacingly. In the west, not thirty miles from the Italian coast, Corsica, in the hands of France, was a thorn in the side of the new Italy. The Mediterranean was rapidly becoming an English lake, as by the acquisition of the control of the Suez Canal by purchase in 1875, the British had succeeded in bottling up the States bordering on its shores. Though Italy had no reason to fear England, who had always taken a most friendly attitude on all matters concerning the new Kingdom, the Italians chafed at the patronising tone of British statesmen, who were in the habit of treating Italy in a romantic rather than in a realist spirit. Furthermore, the Italians thought that their national will would be continually thwarted by England in any sphere of colonial expansion.

To any one looking out on the world through Italian eyes, during the years immediately following the unification of Italy, Europe presented a sorry spectacle. The Italians, with their hearts still full of their great epic adventure in nation-building, beheld England busy rounding out her colonial domain, earmarking the few remaining "uncivilised" districts for her own uses, maintaining an attitude of "splendid isolation" which chilled the sensibilities of the Italian patriots. France, after the throes of the Commune, set about coura-

geously to repair the wastage of recent disasters, inaugurating the Third Republic under inauspicious circumstances. She was so busy setting her own house in order that she found no time for, what seemed to her, the childish enthusiasms of Italy. Furthermore, Italy openly mistrusted France, and feared that at any time France might take it into her head to set the Pope back on his temporal throne, or undertake some other quixotic expedition.

In 1876 the control of the Government at Rome passed from the Right; pragmatists in politics, followers of the Piedmontese tradition, they had patterned their parliamentary conduct on the English model and pursued a policy of exclusiveness and self-interest in foreign affairs, initiated and so successfully carried out by Cavour. Piedmont now lost its ascendancy in national affairs, and the reins of power passed to the South, where the Left dominated.

With the accession of the Depretis Ministry to office in March, 1876, Italian foreign relations follow a haphazard course. A spirit of visionary altruism, based on high-sounding phrases, seized hold of the Government. At a period when cold, hard-headed realism in the conduct of affairs was needed, Italian statesmen, or rather the politicians in power, were more concerned with retaining their parliamentary majority than with the real interests of their country. During the first years of Italian national existence the new State showed no singular aptitude to take advantage of its position as a force in European affairs. Timidity, combined with lassitude and a desire for peace, seemed to express the will of the people. Italy continued to maintain an attitude of aloofness as re-

gards international affairs of peculiar interest to her, which betrayed the fact that the strong current which had brought about national unity had not as yet been sufficiently channelled so as to permit a sane conception of Italy's international obligations and interests. Public men and public opinion were both nervous lest a foreign state should interfere in Italian home affairs.

In order to sound the Powers regarding their attitude towards Italy, Crispi, who later was to prove so ardent an exponent of the Triple Alliance, set out in August, 1877, on a tour of the various capitals to find out the temper of European statesmen. In Paris he was well, if coolly, received. He soon became convinced that France would not make any attempt to restore the temporal power of the Papacy; one of the chief fears which still lingered in Italian minds. Yet Crispi fancied that he discovered that France looked with no favourable eye on any further expansion of Italy, and he left Paris firmly believing that France and Italy could not be friends. Crispi then sought out Bismarck at Gastein. The Iron Chancellor told Crispi very frankly that though he would not be averse to assisting Italy in case of an aggressive attitude on the part of France he would in nowise intercede in Austria in behalf of a rectification of the Italo-Austrian boundary-line, which, drawn hastily in 1866, had left Italy very vulnerable from a strategic view-point, while many hundred thousand Italians in the Trentino and the Adriatic littoral still remained under Austrian rule. London, not wishing to meddle in Continental politics of no immediate concern to herself, took little notice of the Italian envoy. Count

Andrássy, in Vienna, very pointedly remarked that the question of the eventuality of a Hapsburg protectorate over Bosnia, which was at that time rumoured, was of no concern to Italy, and that compensations elsewhere, as suggested by Crispi, in regard to a rearrangement of the frontier would not be pacifically entertained. Crispi returned to Italy feeling, though without much foundation, that Bismarck, notwithstanding his gruff and uncompromising manner, was the only friend whom Italy could count on in Europe.

It was a year later that the Congress of Berlin (1878) met to undo the handiwork of the Treaty of San Stefano in an attempt to settle more equitably the Near Eastern Question, which at that time had come to the fore of international affairs as a result of the Russo-Turkish War. Italy's envoy, Count Corti, having no mandate, or programme of policy, maintained throughout the conference an attitude of lofty unconcern, allowing Austria to acquire the Bosnian protectorate, while England annexed Cyprus. Empty-handed the Italian delegate returned to Rome from an international gathering, where, by skilful negotiations and representations, Italy might readily have gained some substantial territorial compensation, as both Austria and England had succeeded in doing.

The repercussion in Italy of this diplomatic *débâcle* was wide-spread. The Italians keenly felt their weakness as a nation and the incompetence of their leaders to deal with international problems. The humiliation of the Italians at this juncture increased their national sensitiveness and made them realise their isolation in Europe. Their *amour-propre* had received a decided rebuff, and they fancied that they ap-

peared before the world in a ridiculous light. Thrown back on themselves, they turned towards the south and cast their eyes across the Mediterranean.

The Italians, owing to the central position of their country in the Mediterranean, believe that they will be naturally called upon to control its destiny. The heritage of ancient Rome, with its vast dominions, cannot be forgotten by a people who live on the seven hills of the Eternal City and to whom the pageantry of the past is a living reminder. But turning to more practical considerations, only one hundred and twenty miles of open sea separates Sicily from northern Africa. For centuries the Italians have gone forth and settled along the African shores of the Mediterranean, taking with them their culture and customs, and retaining in a large degree their Italian characteristics.

As France by the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, excluded from the direction of European affairs, focussed her attention on northern Africa and in 1830 achieved the conquest of Algeria, so Italy, rebuffed by the Powers in 1878, fixed her ambitions on the acquisition of Tunis. The Italian settlement at Tunis was the richest and most prosperous of any of the foreign settlements established there. The trade relations between Tunis and Italy were close and friendly. Italy, though hampered by her lack of resources, set to work eagerly to acquire this African domain, which was to offset her recent humiliation. Tunis, governed by a weak Bey, had already fallen into the hands of foreign exploitation. But if Italy was anxious to acquire this, her first colony, by the annexation of Tunis, she found in France a strong and determined rival. For France felt that she also had pre-eminent

interests in Tunis, though her settlement there was barely one-third as large as the Italian. Yet, owing to the fact that Tunis adjoins Algeria, France believed that she had special rights, and determined not to tolerate that another European Power should gain possession of this country.

It has been repeatedly stated that Bismarck, after the Berlin Conference, told both the French and Italian envoys separately that they might each aspire to the possession of Tunis,—Bismarck being desirous of further embittering Franco-Italian relations. This account, which is of French origin, has never been confirmed, though it is true that England, in return for France's acquiescence in the acquisition of Cyprus, expressed her willingness to countenance a French protectorate over Tunis. These negotiations were unknown to the Italians at large, who welcomed the prospect of a vast colonial domain as a symbol of power. All Italy was united in the project, which was widely discussed in the press, before any actual steps had been taken. Matters were brought to a head when in January, 1881, King Humbert visited Sicily. The occasion was used to have a deputation of Italians from Tunis wait upon the King. This deputation presented an address in which the ancient ties between Tunis and Rome were referred to in no veiled terms. France thereupon decided that her interests were in jeopardy. Profiting by a disturbance along the Tunisian border of Algeria, the French sent an expedition into Tunis, marched the troops to the capital, and on May 12 forced the Bey to sign a treaty placing Tunis under the protectorate of France. Italy was stunned by the news. She felt herself

helpless to vindicate what she believed to be her rights. The Italian people now realised that there was something radically wrong with the conduct of their international affairs. Italy must have friends, allies. Thwarted by Austria in 1878, now tricked by what they believed to be the deceit of France, the Italians turned first to England, who had always been a friend of the young Kingdom. However, England did not welcome the idea of being burdened with Italian affairs, so she gave an evasive reply. Russia lay too far out of the sphere of Italian relations. There remained only Germany.

It depends on the angle at which the arrangement which resulted in the Triple Alliance is looked upon to determine its value. The majority of foreign observers who have hitherto discussed the subject will tell you that Italy was blindly forced into an agreement totally devoid of advantages to herself, while conferring great benefits on the other two members of the alliance; that Italy was just another available army at the disposal of Prussia for the defense of Alsace-Lorraine, and, as an ally of the Hapsburgs, freed Austria from any worries regarding her southwestern boundary and gave her a free hand to play an active part in Balkan affairs. It is usually assigned to the credit of Bismarck, as one of his most masterly diplomatic strokes, that he forced Italy to pay for Germany's aid, while he in reality was most eager to secure the co-operation of the Italians. Bismarck's sudden *volte face* in his attitude towards the Papacy—which hitherto he had treated with much harshness—alarmed the Italians. Europe rang with reports, emanating from Germany, of the alleged difficulties

of the Pope's position at Rome, and Bismarck even went so far as to propose that the Papacy should move to Germany, where temporal asylum would be guaranteed. But Bismarck played his most astute rôle when he intimated to the Italian Government that the road to Berlin's friendship lay through Vienna. Only five months after the Tunisian catastrophe the King and Queen of Italy paid a visit of state to Vienna, where they were received with much ceremony. Though no political discussions were broached, it became evident that the way for an understanding was being paved. During the ensuing weeks no occasion was missed to impress upon Italy the precariousness of her existence as an independent State. This, we are told, was Bismarck's method of making Italy realise that she was a "negligible quantity," and that Prussia was to be the senior partner in any agreement entered into. But was this really necessary? The weakness of Italy, both from a military and financial standpoint, was patent to all. The country had great possibilities of development in the future, but at the time Italy was in no position to dictate terms. She would even have accepted far more onerous conditions than those of the agreement she entered into. Several projects were discussed, until a seemingly suitable agreement was drawn up which was signed at Vienna on May 20, 1882.

Though the full text of the treaty of the Triple Alliance has never been published,<sup>1</sup> whatever its exact terms may be, its main object was to create a defen-

<sup>1</sup> In 1915 Articles I, III, IV, VII of the treaty were for the first time revealed. Article I was disclosed in a Note transmitted by Baron Sonnino, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Italian diplomatic

sive military alliance between the contracting parties against foreign aggression for a period of five years. It is known that Italy agreed to relinquish her claims to the Italian districts still under Austrian rule, while both Germany and Austria refrained from any comment in regard to the Mediterranean, and left Italy a free hand to pursue whatever policy she deemed opportune. This was the weakest link of the treaty, when looked at from the Italian standpoint, as neither of Italy's new allies offered any guarantees in the event of an aggression directed against Italy in the Mediterranean. Though the material advantages gained by the Alliance were, for Italy, negligible, the signature of this treaty marks the beginning of a new epoch in

representatives abroad on May 24 for communication to the Powers. The remainder were published by the Austro-Hungarian Government during the same month in their *Diplomatische Aktenstücke* (Red Book). The clauses read as follows:

ARTICLE I.—The High Contracting Parties mutually promise to remain on terms of peace and friendship, and that they will not enter into any alliance or engagement directed against one of their States.

They pledge themselves to undertake an exchange of views regarding all general and political questions which may present themselves, and promise furthermore their mutual assistance, commensurate with their individual interests.

ARTICLE III.—In case one or two of the High Contracting Parties, without direct provocation on their part, should be attacked by one or more Great Powers not signatory of the present Treaty and should become involved in a war with them, the *casus fœderis* would arise simultaneously for all the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE IV.—In case a Great Power not signatory of the present Treaty should threaten the State security of one of the High Contracting Parties, and in case the threatened party should thereby be compelled to declare war against that Great Power, the two other Contracting Parties engage themselves to maintain benevolent neutrality towards their ally. Each of them reserves its right, in this case, to take part in the war if it thinks fit in order to make common cause with its ally.

ARTICLE VII.—Deals with Italo-Austrian agreement respecting the Balkans. See p. 125.

world politics. Italy, rescued from her position of obscure isolation, began to play a part in European affairs. The shaping of the whole course of world events was altered by Italy's step at this time. The "balance of power," that favorite British doctrine for the maintenance of world peace, was upset by the Triple Alliance. France now was isolated in Europe, and Italy entered upon a period of national development and unprecedented prosperity. Germany, under Prussian leadership, was rapidly forging to the front rank of power. Aside from the natural historical affinity of the rise to nationhood of Germany and Italy, Germany seemed the only State in Europe which did not directly in some manner cross the path of Italian development. At that time the *Drang nach Osten* had not as yet been evolved, and Bismarck still frowned upon colonial adventures as threatening the stability of the new Germany.

Two significant events occurred within a few months of the conclusion of the Triple Alliance which indicated clearly the advantages and disadvantages of Italy's new position. Two months after the signing of the treaty, England, whether she regretted her aloofness towards Italian affairs in the past, and the little regard she had had for the colonial ambitions of Italy, or whether she felt the need of condonation for her plans of territorial expansion in the Mediterranean, through the British Minister at Rome invited Italy to join in a contemplated expedition for the pacification of Egypt, which she proposed to undertake at this time. Italy was surprised at this offer from England and not a little gratified by the new attitude of this great Power. However, whether

from timidity or diffidence or lack of interest, the Italians refused to join the expedition, and England set about the Egyptian venture alone. Many Italians felt that they had already reaped the first-fruits of the Triple Alliance and that England's unwonted deference was due mainly to Italy's position as an ally of the Central European Powers. Suddenly a cloud appeared to darken their roseate dreams. The Emperor Francis Joseph visited Trieste in December of the same year (1882). A young native of Trieste, William Oberdank, who, in spite of his German name, was an ardent Italian patriot who had fled from Austria to escape military service, returned at this juncture and was arrested and found in possession of two bombs. Though no actual attempt against the life of the Emperor was made, or even a plot uncovered, Oberdank was convicted and hanged, in spite of official representations made in Vienna by the Italian Government. The people of Italy were aroused to anger by this event, which was seized upon and turned into political capital by certain nationalist elements to discredit the alliance. Here, within a few months, Italy had tasted the fruits of her new alliance. Bitter sweet was to be the fate of the relations of Italy with the Central Powers. Whereas Italian foreign prestige was greatly increased, her nationalist ambitions were constantly rubbed raw by the exasperating policy of Austria towards the Italians within the Hapsburg realm.

The days of timidity in politics were passing; a stern, almost ruthless realism, concerned only with immediate advantages to be gained, was becoming the guiding principle in public affairs. The ascendant

star of the Prussians was shining forth with an ever stronger and more brilliant light. Germany, through the added prestige of her new alliance came to be the chief, and at the same time the most menacing, figure in European politics. Under the Hohenzollern leadership, during the next thirty years, the German people seized upon Europe and proposed to make it a vassal to their will. The lust of power at home soon transformed itself into a lust for world power. The gigantic strides of German expansion—commercial, industrial, and technical—dragged along in their orbit the new Italy. In Germany, Germanism became pan-Germanism, nationalism soon became imperialism. Italy found herself adopting, almost unwittingly, this trend of thought. Plans of colonial expansion in Africa, and, above all, of nationalist expansion across the Alps and the Adriatic, took definite shape.

Thus closes the first epoch in the history of modern Italy. The same impulse of nationalism which brought Germany and Italy into being was still at work when the two countries once again linked their fortunes. It is certain that both felt that their tasks were still unfinished. Italy had at last, after three hundred and fifty years, accomplished the aims, so lucidly set forth by Machiavelli when he exclaimed:

“Italy without life waits for him who shall heal her wounds, and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy, the swindling and taxing of Tuscany, and cleanse those sores which have long festered.”

## CHAPTER II

### FORMATIVE FORCES

NATIONALISM. IRREDENTISM. FUTURISM

THE unification of Italy had been brought about by putting into practice a long-cherished theory that all men of the same language, customs, and traditions have the right to form a separate political entity. The Italians were the first to bring to a successful conclusion, on a large scale, this great experiment in statecraft, which was to become so impelling a force in nation-building during the ensuing years. In France and England national liberty and unity were, in the early days of their accomplishment, so inextricably confused with the idea of the King as State, that racial unity played but an unimportant part in their national development. In America, individual liberty was the sole aim of the signers of the Declaration of Independence. The Italians are the people who blazed the trail of national, racial unity, and set the world thinking along lines of nationality. This contribution to the historical evolution of Europe is one of the most important single factors of political progress during the nineteenth century. Nationalism had received at the hands of the Italians the sanction of authority which inspired the Rumanes, Bulgars, and Serbs to assert their right to nationhood. The growth of nationalism throughout the world can be traced to the same source. As France, a century

before, had lit the torch of individual liberty, so Italy first championed successfully the belief that national liberty, which is merely an extension of the idea of individual liberty to include all individuals of a kindred race, is the most valuable asset of mankind. The European War is a struggle for the preservation of this principle. The Allies are maintaining the right of national independence of smaller States against the encroachments of the Germanic idea of a State composed of a motley of races, marshalled in battalion formation under the hegemony of the strongest.

With so firm a faith in the creed of nationality, the Italians could not rest content as long as all the provinces bearing the imprint of Italian culture were not united to the mother country. For, under the stress of necessity, the boundary delimitations of the new Kingdom had been drawn in a manner which left outside the realm more than a million Italians. Thus arose the problem of "*Italia irredenta*," or "unredeemed Italy," as the districts inhabited by these Italians came to be called.

Beyond the boundary of present-day northern Italy are isolated groups of Italians who had gone forth as early as the time of the Roman Republic and settled along the western limits of Liguria and in certain favourable and warm Alpine valleys. Throughout the centuries which have elapsed they retained their civilisation. However, Nice and the surrounding territory, ceded to France as recently as 1859, has already lost much of its Italian character. The Ticino, to-day a Swiss canton and loyally Swiss, has nevertheless retained many typical Italian characteristics. These two districts are not usually held to be

a part of "unredeemed Italy" except by a few extremists, as their inhabitants are overwhelmingly in favour of their present allegiance. Moving farther eastward we come to a system of mild, fertile, Alpine valleys which compose the so-called Trentino. This province has an area of 3,950 square miles, and supports a population of 375,000 Italian inhabitants. An enclave between Lombardy and Venetia, stretching on both sides of the Adige from beyond Riva to Cortina d'Ampezzo, the Trentino was for centuries an independent Italian prince-bishopric, and was arbitrarily annexed to Austria on the fall of Napoleon. Notwithstanding the fact that for the past thirty years every effort has been made to denationalise the Italians of this district, and often by the most unscrupulous methods to force the inhabitants to abandon their racial allegiance, the Trentino remains an Italian province, and its people have striven valiantly and patiently to knit ever more closely the ties which bind them to Italy until such a time as the district may become an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy.

The other great settlement of Italians who live beyond the pale, and are eager to be joined with their mother country, live in "Venezia Giulia," with the great seaport of Trieste as its chief centre. As the name implies, this region, with the exception of Trieste,<sup>1</sup> was formerly under the dominion of Venice, whose colonial domain in the Eastern Adriatic in-

<sup>1</sup> In 1382 the city placed itself under the protection of Leopold III, of Austria, and except for a brief period during the Napoleonic *régime* Trieste has for over five centuries been continuously under Austrian rule.

cluded also Istria and Dalmatia. The irredentist problem in these regions is far more difficult of solution, for, though the coast towns of the Adriatic have retained their Italian character to a large extent, the districts inland, even up to the doors of the cities, are predominantly Slav; Slovene in the northern Adriatic, Serbo-Croat farther south.

To formulate a plan for the redemption of the Italians living outside the realm has preoccupied all Italy from the first day of national independence. Extremists went so far as to include the islands of Malta, Corsica, and even Corfu, besides the Eastern Adriatic mainland as far south as Avlona, in their scheme of *Italia irredenta*, while the more conservative lay claim only to such districts as, like the Trentino and Trieste, are patently Italian.

Even before national unity had been achieved, Garibaldi, in 1866, entered the Trentino with his army, and stood on the heights overlooking the city of Trent. But the fruits of his victorious campaign were snatched from the Italians by the timidity of their Government, who recalled the Garibaldian legions before the task had been completed, and renounced, for the time being, the acquisition of the Italian province.

As the years passed, the irredentist movement seemed to be lulled into quiescence. Exchanges of visits between the King of Italy and the Emperor of Austria took place. Victor Emmanuel II journeyed to Vienna in September, 1873, while Francis Joseph, though refusing to go to Rome in order not to give offense to the Pope, came to Venice in April, 1875. The relations between the two States seemed to be

improving. But at the most unexpected moments the passions of the Italian people, demanding the liberation of the *irredente* provinces, burst forth. Every important occasion, whether the anniversary of a battle, the opening of an exposition, at which the orator never failed to recall the ancient Italian culture of Trieste and of the Trentino, and the like, was seized upon to make a demonstration in favour of the coveted provinces. These in turn sent deputations to Italy and messages of loyalty to the Italian cause, and even went so far as to hail the King of Italy as their rightful sovereign. Such popular outbursts, which enkindled the imagination of the people, found an echo among the ruling classes, more especially in the north of Italy, not merely because of the memories of their own hardships under Austrian rule, but for the more practical reason that the unredeemed provinces are of strategic as well as sentimental value.

The Trentino valleys have, from the earliest times, been the pathway of the numerous invasions of Italy from the north. Held by Austria, these valleys constituted a continual menace to Italy, as Austria could at any time launch an attack into the Venetian plain. In the east the valley of the Isonzo in the hands of a foreign Power leaves the Friulian plain open to incursion. Thus along nearly all her northern boundary Italy was in a position of marked strategic inferiority.

While the Council of Ministers was busy endeavouring to solve the question of the *irredente* provinces by pacific measures, popular demonstrations in favour of armed intervention grew apace. In every public procession the flags of the Trentino and of Trieste

now occupied the chief position. Even in the Chamber of Deputies inflammatory speeches were made, demanding the annexation of the provinces. Crispi, during his European tour in 1877, it will be recalled, broached the subject of the Trentino and Trieste, but both in Berlin and Vienna he met with a categorical refusal even to discuss any change in the *status quo*. The agitation of the irredentists reached a fever pitch. The death of King Victor Emmanuel II, the liberator of Italy, in 1878, gave an opportunity for wide-spread agitation. Garibaldi, whose spiritual authority among the people of Italy was supreme, issued a manifesto in which he exclaimed:

“The call of the patriots of Trieste and Trent must find an echo in the hearts of all Italians, and the yoke of Austria, no better than that of the Turk, must once for all be broken from off the necks of our brethren.”

Popular enthusiasm for the war of redemption reached a white heat when, six months later, it was announced that Austria had received, at the hands of the Congress of Berlin, the permission to occupy Bosnia, while no compensations were offered to Italy. A mob gathered in front of the Austrian Consulate in Venice and could only be dispersed with difficulty. The movement began to take on alarming proportions. The Government fell as a result of its inability to cope with the situation. The position of the dynasty was imperilled, as there was still a large Republican party in Italy. A new Ministry formed under Depretis (1878), who had already occupied the post of Premier, was by skilful manipulation and great tact able to steer the ship of state safely through the crisis, but not with-

out arousing the animosity of Austria, who answered the threats of the irredentists by making formidable military preparations in the Trentino.

During the next two years the irredentist question was the chief topic in Italian public affairs, and the discussion was repeatedly aggravated by the irreconcilable attitude of Austria. In Italy bodies of volunteers were being enrolled. Garibaldi's son, who had now succeeded his father in his position of authority, formulated a plan to raise one hundred battalions to liberate the *irredente* provinces by force of arms. The whole of Italy was in a state of ferment, and it was feared that the slightest incident might precipitate a conflict, which, owing to the military unpreparedness of Italy, would almost certainly have resulted disastrously. To check the movement half measures would not avail. Italy, isolated in Europe, with France still a potential enemy, was passing through the most difficult crisis of her history since unity had been achieved. Heroic measures alone could save the country. "Italy and Austria can only be enemies or allies," was an acute and peculiarly clear-sighted summing up of the situation by Count Nigra, Italy's Ambassador at the Court of Austria. Italy was too weak to fight Austria single-handed; there remained only the alliance. Events in Germany seemed to pave the way for this understanding. The menacing attitude of France in the Tunisian crisis further contributed to drive Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria, and thus only a year after the most violent "irredentist" campaign, Italy had entered into a closely united alliance with her hated enemy, Austria.

Within a few years the anti-Austrian agitation

died down, and many of those who had played a leading part in the irredentist movement became convinced that the Triple Alliance was of greater benefit to Italy than the acquisition of the unredeemed provinces would be. It seems reasonable to suppose that had Austria adopted a liberal and enlightened policy towards her Italian subjects, had they been permitted to manifest openly their desire to retain their Italian culture, the irredentist movement would have finally died out, and the Italians under Austrian rule would have become reconciled to their fate. But Austria, instead of adopting this course, from the earliest days of the new *régime* showed her animosity towards her Italian peoples. With diabolical cunning she incited the Slav populations of the Adriatic, and the Germans of Tyrol, to penetrate the Italian regions, and by the force of numbers, by coercion and persecution, to crush out the Italianism of these districts.

As a result of the arbitrary privileges conferred on the Germans the relation of the Italian Trentino to German Tyrol became that of a vassal State. The Germans governed the Trentino, not merely without any regard for the Italian inhabitants, but ruthlessly repressed all attempts on their part towards economic development, so that, notwithstanding its abundant water-supply, suitable for the generation of valuable industrial motive power, and a dense population, providing a good and adequate labour market, the Trentino remained in a state of primitive agricultural development, while just south of the boundary, in Italy, wealthy and prosperous industrial centres everywhere sprang up.

As time passed the zeal and activity with which the Germans of Tyrol worked to crush the Italian population of the Trentino grew more bold. Every possible agency was mobilised throughout the Trentino to spread German influence, education, and culture. Such seemingly harmless organisations as the German-Austrian Alpine Club, the Hotel Keepers' Associations, and Tourist Bureaus were subventioned to assist in the Germanising programme. The task of the Germans of Tyrol soon became identified with the Pan-Germanic movement, and their campaign was organised with all the care, patience, and skill with which the Pan-Germans enter upon any undertaking. While Italy was busy protesting her friendship for Germany, and the relations of the two countries had for long been intimate, the Italians beyond the boundary, in the Trentino, were being subjected to all manner of persecution to compel them to renounce their Italian fealty. The *Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein*, the most virulently active and important protagonist of Germanic civilisation, including a membership of more than 200,000, had for its programme the establishment of German schools, libraries, orphan asylums, and other mediums of German propaganda, throughout the Trentino. This and other similar organisations, such as the *Südmark* and the *Tiroler Volksbund* strove to offer educational facilities of such distinct advantage that every ambitious Italian parent of the Trentino, wishing to improve the condition of his children, would send them to these German-speaking schools, where, by insidious teaching, the child would soon be influenced to abjure his Italian heritage. Economic advantages and favours

were lavished on the Italian peasantry of the Trentino, while by bribes and boycott, and other coercive measures, many of them were won over to the Germans. From year to year German influence extended more widely over the Trentino. The Germans already felicitated themselves on the success of their propaganda.

In the region of the Adriatic conditions were somewhat different. The race hatred of the Slavs for the Italians, who had always treated the Slavs rather indifferently, chiefly because the Jugo-Slavic peoples were peasants who had hitherto achieved only a very low stage of cultural development, had long been latent. Under the auspices of the Vienna Government, the Slovenes of the Northern Adriatic willingly lent themselves to the plans of Vienna to combat the growing irredentist movement of the Italians of the littoral. With enthusiasm the Slovenes entered upon their new rôle. This was the first time in their history that their expansion had been tolerated, and the opportunity was avidly seized upon by the more intelligent among them. Trieste became the goal of their ambitions, and the city was seemingly delivered up to them as their prey by the Austrians. The movement developed rapidly and soon embraced all the Italian cities of the Adriatic littoral. "The Italianism of Trieste is purely artificial," "Trieste must be Slav," and other similar watchwords became current, and found their way into the Slavic newspapers. The demands of the Slavs for educational and representative equality, and even control of cities predominantly Italian, to which the Slavs had but recently emigrated under Austrian subvention, embittered the struggle.

Clashes between the Slavs and the Italians in Trieste became every-day occurrences, instigated by the Slavs, whose agitators felt secure in the knowledge that they would not only not be prosecuted, but would even be recompensed by the Vienna authorities. This showering of benefits and privileges on the Slav elements of the population of the Adriatic and on the Germans in the Trentino drove the Italian inhabitants to call more desperately than ever for the help of their kinsmen of Italy.

The irredentist movement now took on a new aspect. It became a struggle for Italian cultural survival. Armed intervention from Italy was no longer hoped for. On the other hand, intellectual help was asked, to keep alive the Italian spirit of the *irredente* provinces, which were rapidly succumbing to the Slav and German encroachments. In the Trentino the Pan-Germans had become the dominating factor in local affairs, and their efforts to implant German culture by coercion and cajolery had met with no little success. Along the Adriatic, the Slavs, goaded by Vienna, grew more imperious. In Trieste and the other cities of the littoral, they increased so rapidly in numbers that even though they remained a foreign and unassimilated element, the Italians had good reason to fear that in time the Slavs would control the cities of the Eastern Adriatic.

The Italians no longer remained idle. They formed societies for the maintenance of the Italian culture of the *irredente* provinces. The *Lega Nazionale*, in the Trentino and Trieste, and the *Dante Alighieri* Society, in Italy, were organised, and with funds contributed largely from Italy they made it their pro-

gramme to support schools, libraries, and other social centres of Italian character in the unredeemed districts, while by official representations Italy endeavoured to obtain an amelioration of the condition of her nationals under Austrian rule. With the aid of these societies the Italians of the Trentino and Trieste, supported and encouraged by their brethren of Italy, organised a stubborn resistance to further propaganda.

Frequent outbursts which followed the harsh, repressive measures of Vienna, more especially in the Adriatic, such as the appointment of Slovene bishops to sees whose congregations were overwhelmingly Italian, showed that the temper of the *irredenti* Italians was still strongly separatist. As time passed, and the Italian predominance of the provinces became more menaced, the irredentist inhabitants came to disregard Vienna, and looked only to Rome. The municipal councils of the cities still predominantly Italian, such as Trent, Gorizia, and Trieste, busied themselves erecting monuments to Dante, Petrarch, and other great Italians of the past to remind the people of their Italian allegiance, and thus keep alive the Italianism of the provinces.

It is throughout this period, when materialism was making continually deeper inroads in Italy, that the great flame of nationalism was kept alive by the needs of the *irredente* provinces. The spiritual strength of Italy was forged on the anvil of irredentism. Carducci, the illustrious Italian poet-patriot, became the champion of Italian nationalism. His was not a romantic attachment for the provinces beyond an arbitrary boundary-line, but a stern conviction that

all Italians must some day be united with their mother country if Italy would but remain true to the pure flame of nationalism which had brought about her unity and independence. The irredentist movement thus became a literary, patriotic creed rather than a political design. It passed deep into the hearts of the Italian people. While Italian statesmen were engaged in protesting their sentiments of friendship to the Vienna Government, suppressing all outward signs of enmity towards Austria on the part of the Italian people, the zeal of the poets of Italy never flagged in keeping alive the picture of their oppressed brethren beyond the Alps. It was not "land greed" or a hunger for territorial expansion so much as a spirit like that of the Christian crusader, who set out to redeem the shrines of the Holy Land, which inspired the Italian people to look forward to the liberation of their nationals still under the Austrian yoke. For to the Italians racial independence had received the sanctification of a religious creed. This must be borne in mind in considering the attitude which Italy was to assume during the coming years.

If nationalism, as conceived by the Italians, brought forth "irredentism," "irredentism" in turn, by a circuitous path, brought into being what has been termed "futurism." Though of very recent growth, and at the present writing still a new and only half-revealed force, in the national life of the Italian people "futurism" must be taken into account in order to gain a clear conception of the formative forces of present-day Italy.

For twenty centuries Italy has been the cultural

focus of Western Europe. No other race of men can show so long a line of pre-eminent geniuses as can the inhabitants of the Italian peninsula. The civilisation of the West owes its present direction to the impulse received from Italy. In all fields of human endeavour Italy has stood forth the master; the Western world has listened obediently, learned, and then followed the current of the mighty stream of civilisation which rose beyond the Alps, among the hills of Rome, in Umbria, Tuscany, Lombardy, and Venetia, to spread over Europe and the world. Letters, arts, and science, religion, jurisprudence—all owe to Italy the tribute of their most luminous flowering. Cæsar the conqueror, Cicero the orator, Virgil the poet, and the long galaxy of Romans who were the first Italians, belong to the first era of Western history. Then, after a period of darkness, out of the night, in letters of indelible purity and beauty, shine the names of Dante and Petrarch, precursors of a new epoch. The art of painting is revived, and finds a Giotto, whose art is carried to a climax by a Leonardo and a Titian. Galileo revolutionises the accepted concepts of cosmography, and a Christopher Columbus discovers a new world. And this same race brought forth a Lucrezia Borgia, and a St. Catherine of Sienna, a Benvenuto Cellini, a Machiavelli, and a St. Francis of Assisi. Each as he passed across the stage of life left a work wrought with the highest perfection in its particular sphere.

There followed a period of relative decay, until from the North came a Winckelman and a Goethe, followed soon by a Shelley and a Browning. Italy still remained the teacher; the past became sanctified,

glorified by these new disciples. Then came the subsequent invasions of a Ruskin and his phalanx, who made of Italy a shrine. The new votaries from all parts of the world sang pæans of praise of the Italy of the past, and gave to the Italy of the present no thought. Like a race of servile pygmies, modern Italians trod among the Titan figures of the past. Men refused to consider Italy in any other light than as a treasure-house of ancient glory; the holders of a sacred trust, Italians must aspire to no other rôle.

The dank romanticism of the early nineteenth century, though swept aside by a ruthless realism in other countries, still lingered in association with the name of Italy. National independence in Italy had been achieved: by her new strength Italy had asserted her position as a World Power, but to the world at large Italy remained a museum. "We have made Italy, we must now make Italians," was the spontaneous outcry, after the great ordeal of unification had been achieved. Italy, so eager to redeem her *irredente* provinces, suddenly felt the need of self-redemption. Oppressed by the grandeur of the past, by their long and illustrious heritage, vexed at the condescension of foreigners towards their aspiration for modern development, already during the first days of national existence a few Italians realised that Italy, in order to develop nationally, must trample underfoot the ever-present past. Italy must become something more than a haven for dilettante art critics and artists, the birthplace of tenors, the refuge of idyllic lovers. The Italians were sick unto death of hearing the glories of the Renaissance discussed and commented upon by foreign observers; sated by the

universal and eternal repetition of the "Cinque-Cento," as though Italy had ceased to exist since the days of Michelangelo. While the world prattled on about Italian art, and thought of modern Italy in the same old romantic strain, the Italians by a dynamic realism, by closing their eyes to the past, by concerning themselves with the present, and by looking only to the future, rung by rung were winning their way up to recognition as a World Power. Though many refused to consider the Italians other than as an old, worn-out race, the people of Italy were daily more vigorously and lustily asserting their rejuvenescence. Germany, the most kindred in recent development of all the States of Europe, alone seemed to realise the potential strength of the new Italy, and it is perhaps from Germany that the inspiration of futurism was drawn.

Until the present decade, futurism remained in the background of men's minds—an ideal rather than a creed. With the opening years of the present century there arose in Italy a group of young men, ardent men, sincere men, who believed that if Italy was to take her place among nations, if she was to play a part in keeping with her real power, this dotage of the past must cease; this disregard of the present-day Italy must be stamped out. How could Italy subsist and grow with a world of men, both within and without her boundaries, engrossed only with the period of efflorescence of a golden age of genius already covered with the dust of four elapsed centuries? The Renaissance and its heritage must be relegated to a secondary position; the *Risorgimento* and its epic achievement must command the atten-

tion of the world. The futurists as their name implies, believed that Italy's destiny lay in the future; that looking backward is a sign of senility; that looking to the future is the privilege of youth. Italy felt herself young and vigorous now that she had been admitted to the comity of nations. But more than this, Italy felt the need of keeping for herself the fruits of her present genius. Hitherto she had lived for the world; an international forum, in the past she had given the free gift of her soul to the world, with the result that foreign armies—French, Spanish, Austrian—had despoiled her lands and borne off her treasures, the trophies of victory. Alien poets and philosophers, artists and historians, had stripped bare the tree of Italian culture, leaving but the empty symbols to inspire coming generations. Thus arose the demand for independence, liberty of action and self-reliance; that "sacred egoism" which, in the grave crisis of 1914 became a political watchword, an outgrowth of the older and more cogent *l'Italia fara da se*. These are a few of the manifestations of this same spirit of trusting to Italy's future, which this new group sought to formulate.

In order to gain a hearing for their programme the futurists very evidently overstepped the mark of moderation. Marinetti, the leader of a phase of this new movement for the glorification of the new and contempt for the old, gained an unpleasant notoriety rather than a serious consideration. But his work has not been without importance in that it expresses boisterously and exaggeratedly sentiments for a long time widely diffused, though latent, in Italy. His praise of the forge and the workshop, his exaltation

of the machine, his reiterated insistence on the banality of admiring only the works of the past, whether they be the canvases and marbles of the Renaissance or the ruins of a Roman aqueduct, have had a potent effect, even beyond the boundaries of Italy. Nor can we dismiss as the lucubrations of a maniac his proposal to fill in the canals at Venice, or at least abolish the use of gondolas, as unsuited to our epoch. For Venice is no longer, to the Italians, a golden-domed bauble, a background for honeymoons, as many foreigners are still wont to consider it, but an important commercial port, the only good harbour which Italy possesses along the whole length of the Italian shore-line of the Adriatic, a fortress and a naval base, besides being a chief city in Italy. Or, again, the more recent plan of selling to America the art treasures of the past, and with the great sums secured by this transaction providing for the maintenance, for many years to come, of a great navy and a powerful army, besides paying for the cost of her war, without undue burden to the Italian people, and at the same time getting rid of a cumbersome heritage and giving to America, which is without a past, a semblance of continuity in history, found throughout Italy many willing listeners.

But futurism has to it another side, which distinguishes it as a phenomenon singularly suggestive. While futurism preaches a cult of progress, it is a progress based on the strength to maintain itself, if need be, by the force of arms. Arbitration, pacifism, internationalism, the Utopian dreams of a world freed from racial conflicts and wars, programmes to provide for perpetually friendly relations between

the various States, based on treaties, so common in all other progressive platforms, find no place in Italian futurism. For it is essentially a belligerent doctrine. "War is the only hygiene of the world," was a main tenet enunciated by Italian futurists over a decade ago, when liberal pacifism was daily gaining more consideration from parliaments and the proletariat. "War is the culminating synthesis of progress, the school of ambition and heroism," was to be the cry of the futurists during the painful days of Italian neutrality. For present-day Italians dared not forget their struggles up from slavery; they still felt the lacerations of the fetters which bound them during their long period of captivity, when their genius was engrossed in the embellishments and the pleasures of life. Modern Italians must know how to handle a rifle as well as a paintbrush; the lathe and the motor as well as the sculptor's chisel. Nationalism, irredentism, futurism, were to be the leaven of modern Italy. They embody the doctrines of vigour, of aggressive strength, kindred to the German "might is right," yet tempered by a Latin geniality of twenty centuries of cultural tradition.

## CHAPTER III

### THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

THE RULE OF CRISPI. COLONIAL EXPANSION. THE ABYSSINIAN  
WAR

DURING the first lustrum of the Triple Alliance Italy derived little tangible profit from her new position. The Italians soon realised that they could only reap a benefit from the alliance commensurate with their own strength. They at once set about, to the limit of their resources, to imitate the Prussian military system by introducing sweeping reforms throughout their armies and bringing their *cadres* up to full strength.

The old dream of a colonial domain in Africa was again revived, and a motion was passed in the Chamber sanctioning the project of establishing an Italian colony along the shores of the Red Sea. Partly to wipe out the memory of the humiliations endured as a result of her thwarted ambitions in Tunis, partly because the Italians realised that unless they took immediate action all available territory suitable for colonial expansion would be occupied by other States, the Italian Government fitted out a small expedition to take possession of Massua, the centre of the district later known as Eritrea, on the southwestern shores of the Red Sea, previously opened up by Italian explorers and in a measure exploited by Italian merchants. The region selected for this enterprise was not propi-

tious. The coastland along this section of the Red Sea is a sun-scorched waste of sand, inhabited by wild nomad tribes and of value as a colony only in so far as it gives access to the rich and fertile high plateau of Abyssinia. This latter region, well suited for European colonisation, formed part of the Christian Kingdom of Abyssinia, the only strong independent State of Africa possessing an army worthy of the name, marshalled along European lines and armed with modern weapons. Whether the Italians expected the Negus of Abyssinia to submit meekly to the loss of this territory is not clear, no project for the conquest of the hinterland having been openly mentioned. However, the Italians deemed their enterprise easy. The landing of the expeditionary force was effected in February, 1885. The Italians met with little or no resistance as long as they remained along the coast. But soon Italian ambitions looked farther afield. The broad, sandy desert land was crossed, and the hopes of Italy ran high that at last a great colonial empire would be carved out of the heart of one of the most fertile regions of the African continent. But these hopes were soon to be doomed to disappointment. No sooner had the Italian troops entered the highlands than they met with strong resistance, and one section of the invading forces was later attacked by the Abyssinians and cut to pieces near Dogali in January, 1887. Thus the Italians had set forth on their adventurous colonial enterprise, and, though the shores of the Red Sea remained in Italian hands and Eritrea was proclaimed an Italian colony, the fruits of the undertaking were negligible.

As the time approached for the renewal of the

Triple Alliance a current of opinion made itself heard which announced in no uncertain terms that Italy could profit but little by her alliance with Austria and Germany, and pointed to the sterility of the first epoch of the alliance. The menace of France had been removed. The Italians no longer feared that any foreign Power would attempt to restore the Pope to his temporal throne, and the *raison d'être* of the Triple Alliance had thus vanished. On the other hand, the alliance kept Italy in an attitude of tension *vis-à-vis* the other Powers, while Germany and Austria seemed to have a free hand to promote their own particular interests. Bismarck had, by his famous "Re-Insurance Treaty"<sup>1</sup> with Russia (1884), entered into a separate and secret agreement with that Power for the purpose of protecting Germany from an attack in the East. Italy was not advised of this arrangement, though from the course of events the Italian Government could soon discern that the alliance with the Central Empires had lost much of its significance. This slighting conduct of Germany towards her Italian ally could not fail to awaken the doubts of the Italians as to any benefits which might accrue to them from a treaty so loosely interpreted by the other contracting parties. On the other hand, those in favour of the

<sup>1</sup> The existence of this secret agreement was not made known until on October 24, 1896, it was divulged in the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, Prince Bismarck's own organ, which stated: "Very soon after the change of throne (in Russia by the assassination of Alexander III) and the retirement of Gortchakoff, a good understanding was established between German and Russian policy and remained in force until 1890. Until then both Empires were completely in agreement that should either one of them be attacked the other would remain benevolently neutral, so that if, for example, Germany were attacked by France the friendly neutrality of Russia was expected, and the friendly neutrality of Germany if Russia were attacked without provocation."

renewal of the Triple Alliance were anxious to secure an addition to its clauses in order to be assured of the co-operation of Germany and Austria for the adequate protection of Italy's interests in the Mediterranean, of which no mention was made in the original treaty.

Count di Robilant, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was firmly opposed to any renewal of the treaty without definite additions. He believed that the subservient policy followed by Italy at the signature of the treaty in 1882 had been detrimental to Italian interests. He refused to take the initiative in the negotiations for the renewal of the alliance. Writing in July, 1886, to di Launay, Italian Ambassador at Berlin, he remarks:

"Decidedly Italy is tired of this sterile alliance, and I do not feel desirous of forcing her to renew it, because I feel too deeply that it will always be unproductive for us. It is probable that M. de Bismarck has made a mistake as regards myself, not knowing me at all, and imagines that I will feel the need of following his lead always, in spite of everything. If he thought that he is strangely mistaken. It is therefore more than probable that I shall not renew the alliance."<sup>1</sup>

Some months later di Robilant let it be known that Italy required definite guarantees against French expansion eastward in northern Africa, which might ultimately involve Tripoli, and that a plain discussion with Austria regarding the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans was desirable. Negotiations regarding these points were no doubt entered into. However, no understanding, definitely incorporated in

<sup>1</sup> Chiala: "Pagine di Storia Contemporanea, La Triplice e la Duplice," p. 471.

the text of the treaty, was reached. A semiofficial writer,<sup>1</sup> in April, 1887, declared, "that no innovation in the Mediterranean, and especially in Africa, will be possible without our consent. We are therefore insured against a possibility of events such as occurred at Tunis being repeated in Tripoli or elsewhere. This would be a *casus belli* which would involve our allies." At the same time, though the principle of the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans may have been conceded by Austria, and the way opened for the inclusion of Article VII in the treaty of alliance between Austria and Italy, it was not definitely agreed to until fifteen years later (1902). Referring to this question, the same writer states:<sup>2</sup> "Austria-Hungary will not take a step in this direction (Salonika or Albania) without previous agreement with us; whatever may happen, if Austria wishes to advance in the Near East she will do it with our consent, and as a result our interests find the broadest guarantee in the treaty."

The cause for the change of heart on the part of Italy can in part be explained by the defeat of the Italian colonial expedition at the hands of the natives at Dogali a few months before the alliance was to be renewed, which left Italy materially weakened. Afraid to find herself once again isolated in Europe, and unable to force Berlin or Vienna to consider any revision of, or addition to, the treaty clauses in a definite form,

<sup>1</sup> "Ex-Diplomat," in the *Nuova Antologia*, April 16, 1887, p. 733. This extract is quoted by Professor Salvemini in his series of interesting studies on the Triple Alliance, published in the *Revue des Nations Latines* (July, 1916), who adds: "The articles dealing with foreign politics published by 'Ex-Diplomat' in the *Nuova Antologia* during these years were written under the inspiration of the Premier, M. Depretis."

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*.

Italy placed her signature to the renewal of the alliance in its original form for a period of five years.

Though Italy was unable to secure the desired modifications embodied in the treaty of the Triple Alliance, she was able, probably through the good offices of Bismarck, to enter upon an understanding with England regarding the recognition of Italy's vital interests in the Mediterranean. No formal treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Italy; there was merely an exchange of Notes, yet it became known that Great Britain would defend Italy if the latter were attacked by sea, and that an alliance had been entered into between the two States to safeguard the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and the adjacent waters. Thus Italy found herself allied on the Continent with the Central Empires, the greatest military Powers; on the sea with Great Britain, the greatest naval Power, and her position and prestige greatly enhanced.

The ensuing decade was to witness the high-water mark of the Triple Alliance. Hitherto, Italy, while outwardly faithful to her treaty engagements with Germany and Austria, nevertheless had endeavoured to remain on friendliest terms with the other Powers. This difficult task was only partially successful, and Italy's relations, particularly with France, were marred by continual chicanery, followed by retaliatory measures of a commercial nature, which materially injured the interests of both countries.

The renewal of the Triple Alliance in May, 1887, was followed in a few months by the accession to the Premiership of Crispi, who for the next nine years was to hold this office almost uninterruptedly. He was to leave no stone unturned to cement the bonds of the

alliance which bound Italy to the Central Empires, more particularly to Germany. An ardent advocate of the Triplist agreement, as well as an avowed Germanophil, during his term of office he modelled Italian policy along Bismarckian lines, and became a zealous exponent of Germanic aims and ideals, content with the material benefits which accrued to Italy by this arrangement.

Next to Cavour the name of Crispi shines forth as that of the most important figure in Italian public affairs since the formation of the Kingdom of Italy. Cavour brought Italy into being as a united nation; Crispi raised Italy to the rank of a great Power. The contrast between the temper and character of the two men vividly illustrates how contradictory may be the qualities and qualifications of great statesmen. Cavour came from the most northern province of Italy, Piedmont. An aristocrat by birth, cold, shrewd, methodical, sincere, silent, a realist in politics, he lived and acted by the old maxim, "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." Crispi was a Sicilian of humble extraction, a former Republican conspirator, a follower of Mazzini, an exile who had rallied to the House of Savoy. Hot-headed, self-confident, a florid and facile orator, suspicious by nature, always looking for some hidden, underhand motives in the actions of others, yet endowed with an astonishing *flair* which enabled him to discount the future, though he very often was unable to gauge rightly a problem in hand, he possessed withal a remarkable capacity for government. Notwithstanding the faults imputed to him, he was inspired by a deep patriotism and a firm belief in the potential greatness of Italy.

Crispi was eager to see Italy enjoy her rights and privileges as a World Power. He believed that it was due chiefly to the timidity and vacillation of former Cabinets that Italy had not hitherto played an important part in world affairs. His admiration for the Prussian, or rather the Bismarckian *régime*, was very great, and he hoped, by following in the footsteps of the Iron Chancellor, to bring forth a greater Italy. That he paved the way for Pan-German expansion towards the Mediterranean would seem incontestable; that he delivered Italy up to Germany to be exploited commercially is also true; but it cannot be denied that his motives were high-minded, and that he sought to benefit his country by increasing her economic strength and industrial resources. He brought Italy from a position of inferiority and obscurity to a fuller enjoyment of her just privileges as an independent State, and in no small measure he made it possible for her to rely on her own strength in periods of crises which were to confront her later on.

Hitherto Italy's position had been equivocal. Although the Triple Alliance was known to exist, Italian Ministers had carefully refrained from making any public references thereto, and had endeavoured to remain on equally friendly terms with all the Powers. Crispi had not been in office two months when, in July, 1887, he paid a visit to Bismarck at Friedrichsruhe, which was in the nature of a profession of faith. Ten years before Crispi had visited the Imperial Chancellor; then his journey had seemed a pilgrimage, he had come as a suppliant, now he was received as an equal, the spokesman of the Kingdom of Italy.

Though this visit was of no immediate political im-

portance, and was merely intended by Crispi to proclaim boldly Italy's open adhesion to the Triple Alliance, its effects abroad were not long in making themselves felt. Italy now stood forth, a firm advocate of the alliance. Her intentions could no longer be doubted. The defensive policy of the alliance which had hitherto governed the relations between the allied States seemed to be drifting towards a more aggressive attitude. This impression was confirmed when Crispi, on his return from Germany, in his public utterances proclaimed that the Triple Alliance was the firmest safeguard of the peace of Europe.

Six months later two Emperors passed from the scene of German affairs. The nonagenarian William I was followed to his grave by his son, the Emperor Frederick, who had hastened from the health-giving shores of Liguria in March to the death-bed of his father, only himself to die three months later, in June, 1888. The sceptre of Imperial Germany passed into new and untried hands. The men who had created the German Empire and implanted in the character of its institutions and constitution the harsh rigour of the ordeal by fire, now made way for a young man of twenty-nine years of age, endowed with a boundless and restless energy, a strenuous desire to see all and do all by himself; an odd mixture of an intellect curious and alert to the new advantages of his time and age, yet blended though unassimilated with a temperament feudal, arbitrary, and arrogant. Such was the man called upon to occupy the throne of the Hohenzollerns, as he appeared to the Italians when, four months after his accession, William II visited Rome.

As the new ruler of Germany rode down the Corso

in an open landau the multitudes who lined the streets looked in vain, in the *cortège* of gala carriages, for the stern, shaggy-browed face of Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor had not been invited to accompany the new Emperor to Rome, and the Italians were quick to discover that a new era had opened in Germany, and they at once set about to reap the advantages of the situation. The ovation which William II received at Rome was the most sincere of any which he has since received during his numerous peregrinations through the capitals of Europe. He won the hearts of all Italy spontaneously by the mere fact that he was the first sovereign of a great State to come to Rome since the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy.

The Emperor's courteous and frank manner, the intense interest which he bestowed on all who approached him, and the success with which he played the part of Prince Charming delighted Italians of all classes, while William II himself found no little pleasure in playing the dramatic rôle of Emperor in the city of the Cæsars. The alliance with Italy seemed to offer more advantages in the eyes of the new sovereign than any one in Germany had hitherto realised. With keen perception the Emperor grasped the fact that here lay a vast domain needed by Germany for her growing commerce, and a fair field for industrial conquest. Italy, bound by alliance to Germany, would welcome Germans more warmly than any other foreigners; Italy would be an excellent market for German products, and no doubt German influence could shape the policy of this Mediterranean Power to its will. It was during this visit to Rome that the first seeds of the Emperor's *Weltpolitik* were sown.

William II, during his week's sojourn in Italy, was taken to Naples. There, amid the enchanting scenery of the blue waters and high-rising hills of Parthenope, with the bleak Vesuvius, vapour-crowned, cut clear against the morning sky, the German Emperor was present at the launching of a battleship. Here again the young sovereign seemed to find new food for thought, and the impression which this launching made on his mind at this time opened new vistas of world dominion.

Returning to Rome, the Emperor took it upon himself to pay his respects to the Pope, as the head of the church of his Catholic subjects. As a Protestant prince, he besought an interview, which was readily granted. A curious ceremonial was followed, by which the Emperor set out for his visit to the Vatican from the Prussian Legation—the fiction being that this was German soil—to the Papal Court. The Pope received the Hohenzollern Emperor alone, in audience. In the adjoining apartment Prince Henry of Prussia and Count Herbert Bismarck, who accompanied the Emperor, waited the return of their sovereign. Growing impatient and nervous as a result of the prolonged interview, Count Bismarck, notwithstanding the protests of the Papal Chamberlain, burst into the audience-chamber, and the colloquy of the Pope and William II was brought to an abrupt close. This incident, variously exploited as portraying the gruff manners of the Prussians and their slight regard for the Pope, nevertheless did not displease many Italians in official circles, who were not loath to applaud any event which might diminish the temporal prestige of the Papacy.

The voyage of the German Emperor to Italy had

proved a triumphant sanction of Crispi's programme. In order to convince Germany of the sincerity of Italy's desire to co-operate actively in the alliance, and to be worthy of the consideration of her allies, Crispi urged the vote of imposing credits for armaments, amounting, for the current year of 1888-9 to 553,000,000 lire (£22,120,000), an increase of 140,000,000 lire (£5,600,000) over the preceding year. At the same time Italy's attitude towards France became uncompromising. Already, before Crispi's accession to power, owing to the abrogation of commercial treaties with France, in 1886, the commerce between the two nations was slowly dwindling, and in 1888 a sharp decline in the imports from France was noticed. At the same time rumours were spread abroad in Italy of the hostile demeanour of France. The fact that Italy had openly joined hands with Austria, from whose yoke France had, thirty years before, spent her blood and treasure to liberate her, rankled in the minds of many Frenchmen when they realised that Italy was ranging herself on the side of France's enemies. The wound to the national pride and honour of France caused by the War of 1870 still bled. Alsace-Lorraine was first and foremost in the thoughts and plans of France. Italy was now, by her alliance, pledging her increased armed forces to Prussia for the defense of these ravished provinces. Is it to be wondered that France showed her ill humour at Italian conduct?

But Crispi was looking out only for Italian interests; he had little natural sympathy for France. Whether there was any foundation for his fear of an aggression on the part of France, or whether he be-

lieved himself to be playing a Bismarckian rôle, Crispi with much zeal and vigour feverishly pushed ahead the fortifications of the Piedmont frontier, while he invited a British squadron to visit Genoa in order to intimidate the French. The Italian Premier's Franco-phobia took on alarming dimensions. First, a rumour spread rapidly throughout Italy of a plan on the part of France to attack and destroy the Italian naval base at Spezia; then of a French project to land troops in Sicily. No sooner had this proved unfounded than it was replaced by the alleged plan of the occupation by the French of Tripoli, which had already been marked out as a field for future Italian colonial conquest. While these "events" were disturbing the Italian Government, minor incidents, such as race riots in Modane and other French towns, in which Italians were maltreated—their cause was to be sought solely in the fact that Italian workmen were willing to accept a lower scale of wages than the French—and a violation of the French Consulate at Florence by a local judge, aggravated the already strained relations between Rome and Paris.

In the meantime Italy had thrown in her lot even more whole-heartedly with the Triple Alliance. In May 1889, King Humbert, accompanied by Crispi, returned the visit of his German guest. He was entertained at Berlin by his Imperial host in the accustomed manner, with military pageants and reviews, gala performances at the Imperial Opera House, and all the trappings of a State visit. Crispi renewed his protestations of friendship for Germany, while his sovereign, King Humbert, convinced of the sincerity of German good-will, went so far as to de-

clare "Italians and Germans members of one and the same family."

In the early spring of the next year (March, 1890) Bismarck retired from the office of Chancellor. Crispi was eager to prove to the world that the Triple Alliance was in no manner weakened by this event. The newly appointed Imperial Chancellor, Count Caprivi, willingly lent himself to this idea, and shortly afterwards he visited Italy, where he was met by Crispi at Milan, and the two statesmen came to a complete understanding; while Caprivi, continuing his journey, was received by the King of Italy at Monza with every mark of esteem and consideration.

Nor did Crispi omit to endeavour to ameliorate existing relations with Austria. After having made several fruitless attempts to secure German aid for the settlement of the vexed question of the Trentino and Trieste, Crispi suddenly decided that all discussion of the matter must cease. In a well-worded speech in the Chamber, he set forth the fact that irredentist agitation was detrimental to the best interests of Italy, and that in order to strengthen the position of Italy abroad the question of the unredeemed provinces must be put out of mind. With an exemplary rigour he suppressed all irredentist propaganda, dissolved the societies which had supported the movement, and even went so far as to dismiss the Minister of Finance in his own Cabinet for having listened without protest to an irredentist harangue. He let Austria see plainly that he was in earnest in his endeavour to wipe the slate clean and begin anew the intercourse between the two countries. But Austria, unmindful of Italian advances, continued

her policy of repression and annoyance of her Italian subjects.

Under Crispi's guidance Italy's foreign relations had grown more complex. No longer isolated in Europe, insured of German assistance and Austrian acquiescence on the Continent, as well as of the help of England at sea, Italy found herself in a position of liberty of movement which she had not hitherto enjoyed. Crispi in the brief space of three years had raised Italy to a position of relative dominance in Europe, while he now assumed for himself the rôle of the spokesman of the Triple Alliance, which he proclaimed the chief factor of peace and stability in world affairs.

Leaving the gates of Italy open to German peaceful penetration, Crispi now turned his attention to Italy's colonial problem and entered upon a course of colonial adventure, which, brilliantly initiated, was to end in a disaster that dragged Crispi down in its partial collapse. Notwithstanding the inauspicious inauguration of the Italian colonial enterprise in Eritrea, and the successive defeats which the native forces had inflicted on the Italians, Crispi was determined to push forward vigorously the project of African colonisation. Here he hoped to reap the tangible reward and proclaim to the world the proof of the new greatness of Italy.

By means of negotiations with the native chiefs, and of a private understanding with Great Britain, Somaliland, an extensive tract of rocky and infertile coastland bordering the Indian Ocean and adjoining British East Africa, passed peacefully under Italian protectorate. Though the district itself is of little

value, yet its vast area of 139,430 square miles satisfied the growing megalomania of Crispi, and the new colony was annexed amid the loud applause of all Italy.

Not satisfied with this first success, Crispi took advantage of the death of the Negus of Abyssinia, and the disorders which had arisen, to push Italian conquest inland and wipe out the memory of recent reverses. These efforts were crowned with a victorious advance and the occupation of several important centres in the hinterland. Then Crispi, emboldened by his good fortune, successfully championed the cause of Menelek, one of the pretenders to the vacant throne of the Negus. When Menelek had been established firmly on his Abyssinian throne, by a treaty between himself and the Italian Government signed at Ucciali in May, 1889, a portion of the high plateau including Asmara was granted to Italy, and Italy further assumed what amounted to a quasi-protectorate over the empire of the Negus in the form of an alliance in perpetuity between Italy and Abyssinia, by which Italy reserved for herself the exclusive right to furnish arms and financial aid which the Negus might need. This treaty also contained a clause,<sup>1</sup> somewhat loosely drawn, which conferred upon Italy according to the Italian contention, the right to represent Abyssinian interests in Europe. The Negus contested the Italian interpretation of this article of the treaty, which, according to Roman

<sup>1</sup> This clause on which Italy based her claims to a protectorate over Abyssinia, reads: "His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia consents to make use of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy for treatment of all questions concerning other Powers and Governments."

opinion, was a definite obligation on the part of Abyssinia to be represented abroad by Italy, while the Negus contended that it merely conferred a privilege on Abyssinia to have recourse to Italian aid when she so desired, but in no way could be interpreted as a fixed obligation. Thus the question remained unsettled, and from the very outset the relations between Italy and her new Abyssinian "ally" were not as friendly as might be desired, and portended a conflict in a no distant future.

Meanwhile, not content with the astonishing success which he had achieved in the brief space of two years in affirming Italy's colonial conquests, Crispi turned his attention towards Tripoli, and began by gaining the friendship of the native chiefs, among them Hassuna Pasha Karamanli, whose loyalty and friendship was to prove valuable to Italy later on. This is as far as this undertaking developed at this time. For though Crispi earmarked Tripoli for future occupation by Italy, and blocked French advance into this territory, nothing further was done, as before Crispi could push the negotiations with his accustomed vigour an important event at home prevented him from carrying out his plan for the acquisition of Tripoli. To Crispi must be given the credit of having launched Italy on the Tripolitan campaign which twenty years later she was to bring to a successful conclusion.

Crispi's achievement had been brilliant. He had brought Italy from a position of subservient obscurity into the enjoyment of a sense of national self-reliance and strength. He had endowed his country with her much-desired colonial domain, and had af-

firmed the position of Italy as a great Power. Though his attitude towards France was taunting and aggressive, it is explained by his desire to proclaim the new power of Italy, in that Italy dared *tenir tête* with France, before whose menace all Italy had hitherto trembled. Crispi stood at the height of his fortunes. Never had his position, both at home and abroad, seemed stronger. Suddenly by one of those inexplicable caprices which have always prevailed in Italian politics, and are a chief disadvantage of the system of the responsibility of Ministers to Parliament, by an adverse vote of the Chamber on a matter of secondary importance, chiefly as the result of a violent speech on the part of Crispi, in which he accused "the Right" of having acted servilely in the interests of foreign Powers before 1876, he was compelled to retire from office in January, 1891.

Had Crispi ended his public career at this time, all his fellow countrymen would have retained an enthusiastic admiration for his ability and a sense of indebtedness for his accomplishment on behalf of a greater Italy. But fate deemed otherwise.

It would seem a strange conjunction of fortune that Crispi, the most sincere advocate of the Triple Alliance, should never have been called upon to consider the question of the terms of its renewal. Called to office after the treaty had been somewhat reluctantly renewed in 1887, Crispi was compelled to relinquish his post a few months before the question of its renewal again came up. However, the stamp given to Italian affairs during Crispi's long tenure of office, proved that, though he himself was no longer in power, the change of Ministers could not

mean a change of policy. His successor in office, the Marchese di Rudini, although he belonged to the Right and was known to be only a lukewarm Trip-list, did not dare to take it upon himself to weaken the bonds of the Triple Alliance. Crispi, it is true, had hoped for and laboured to secure the formation of a more closely knit coalition, which would include the three allies in an economic as well as military alliance. He had planned the foundation of a customs union along the lines of the German *Zollverein*, to include Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy, which would have rendered the strength of the Triple Alliance far more effective. However, these projects were not carried out, though in order to assert more patently the firm foundation of the alliance, the treaty was now drawn so as to bind the contracting parties for a period of six years, and it was understood that the treaty was to continue automatically in force for another six-year period unless specifically repudiated by one of the parties thereto one year before the expiration of the first period. At the same time Italy entered into private trade agreements with Germany and Austria which were to offset the damages to Italy resulting from the commercial war with France.

Crispi's action in avowedly placing Italy within the orbit of the Triple Alliance, and adhering to and even fostering its new aggressive policy, could not fail to find a repercussion in Europe. The same year which marked the renewal of the Triple Alliance by Crispi's successor, and thus proclaimed that the alliance had become Italy's national policy, and could no longer be considered the personal policy of Crispi,

is marked by the first signs of a *rapprochement* between France and Russia, which can be dated from the visit of the French fleet to Cronstadt in the summer of 1891. William II had seen fit not to continue the tradition of Bismarck, and had not renewed the "Re-Insurance Treaty" with Russia. The immediate result of this policy was the Franco-Russian understanding, which was soon to ripen into a formal alliance.

The Cabinet of the Marchese di Rudini, which had been hastily patched up on the fall of Crispi, was not destined to survive. Finding himself in a minority, di Rudini relinquished his office, and a new figure now for the first time appears on the horizon of Italian public affairs, who through later years was destined to play so important a part in Italian public life. It is Giovanni Giolitti. A Piedmontese, brought up in the Triplist tradition, who looked on foreign affairs merely as they might be reflected in the mirror of domestic requirements, an astute manipulator of parliamentary majorities, to whom a compromise was more dear than a fight, his *début* in the office of Premier in May, 1892, was fraught with difficulties which would have dismayed many a stronger man.

During the preceding years Crispi, engaged chiefly in affirming the growing power of Italy abroad, had left home affairs to drift. The ever-increasing expenditures for armaments and colonial enterprises had burdened Italian finances to the breaking-point. The day of reckoning, long-postponed, came during the first weeks of Giolitti's Ministry, accompanied by the uncovering of unsavoury scandals in the financial dealings of public men in high position, as well

as by agrarian difficulties in the south of Italy. Giolitti found himself faced by a series of seemingly insurmountable problems. Amid these trying circumstances, by devoting his entire energies to home affairs, by a shrewd policy of whitewashing and temporising, rather than by making any attempt to eradicate the evils of the situation root and branch, Giolitti was able to extricate himself, for the time being, from the quagmire, and at the same time gain a large personal following among public men in all parts of Italy by a judicious use of political patronage.

During Giolitti's first Ministry Italian foreign relations were allowed once again to follow a random course. There seemed to be a return to the old Depretis tradition of endeavouring to be on friendly terms both with the allies and with the other Powers, which well suited the character of Giolitti. The German Emperor, to prove his esteem for Italy and the House of Savoy, came to Rome on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the wedding of King Humbert, in April, 1893, accompanied this time by the Empress, and was welcomed with warmth, though with less enthusiasm than on his previous visit. Then a French squadron, bearing an autograph letter from the President of the French Republic to the King of Italy, was fêted at Genoa with much cordiality, and a few weeks later a French military mission fraternised with Italian officers on the occasion of the inauguration of a monument at Palestro, commemorating the battles in which the French had fought for Italian liberty.

But this policy of endeavouring to be on friendly terms with both sides was not destined to continue. In France the animosity towards Italy was steadily

growing. The French refused to accept one hand proffered in friendship while the other was a menacing mailed fist. A natural race jealousy between these two main branches of the Latin family subsisted. Misunderstandings, exaggerated and aggravated by wilful distortion, made amicable intercourse difficult. Italian-baiting and race riots were frequent in France, which aroused the hostility of the Italians, who moreover accused France of bad faith in not wishing to accept the advances of Italian friendliness, while France accused Italy of double-dealing. The situation became unbearable to the French when, at the personal invitation of the German Emperor, the heir to the throne of Italy was present at German Grand Manœuvres in the autumn of 1893, which were held in the neighbourhood of Metz. France felt herself personally insulted by this act of the House of Savoy in openly parading its name and fame through the conquered province under the ægis of the Prussians. Many Italians, it is said, deplored this thoughtless act on the part of their future sovereign, which had aroused the French unduly, and though the fact itself was of little significance, it well illustrates the lax Giolittian conception of foreign obligations.

The result of this act was immediately seen. The French believing it to be an overt affront which might lead to grave consequences, and even presaged war, liquidated their holdings of Italian securities to the extent of 1,000,000,000 lire (£40,000,000), which created a panic in Italy. Italy's position had become increasingly critical. The situation had been aggravated by Giolitti's temporising policy. He was

no longer able to cope with the situation. Though he maintained his majority at the elections, he resigned his office, and Crispi was called to the rescue as the one strong man capable of putting Italy's house in order.

The task was one requiring not merely strenuous energy and political insight, but deep courage. Italy had sunk to a lower level of economic depression and internal disorder than she had found herself in since the foundation of the united Kingdom. Crispi accepted the task thrust upon him, and in December, 1893, again forming a Cabinet, assumed the office of Premier. In Sicily disturbances which Giolitti had failed to combat had now assumed alarming proportions. The peasants in the country districts, as well as the workmen in the towns, had been organised by Socialist agitators into *fasci* or labour unions, which had multiplied throughout the island. They soon gained the upper hand in their contests with the local authorities, and a serious insurrection was now threatened. Crispi at once despatched a large body of troops to Sicily. Martial law was proclaimed; the *fasci* were suppressed, their leaders sentenced to imprisonment, and within a few weeks, by a firm policy order was restored.

Crispi was unable or unwilling to ameliorate relations with France, which had, if possible, become more embroiled than ever. As a result on the one hand of the assassination of the President of the French Republic, Carnot, at the hands of an Italian anarchist, and on the other of the arrest of a French officer in uniform on Italian territory near frontier fortifications, which caused him to be condemned

for espionage, the period of mutual suspicion and antagonism reached its culmination.

Having by the presence of William II at Venice again proven that the Triple Alliance held firm, notwithstanding the manifold internal difficulties, Crispi determined to seek in Africa fresh triumphs and re-awaken in the hearts of the Italian people confidence in their greatness as a nation.

The Negus Menelek had formally denounced the Ucciali treaty of alliance with Italy, and was known to be endeavouring to form a league of all the Ethiopian chieftains under his leadership to resist the further advance of the Italian forces. At the instigation of Crispi, General Baratieri, the Italian Governor of Eritrea, sent a column of Italian troops eastward into the Sudan, and reached Kassala, nearly three hundred miles inland, after a brilliantly conducted campaign. The news of this achievement was greeted with enthusiasm in Italy, and spurred Crispi on to demand still greater efforts.

Relations with the Ethiopian rulers meanwhile had become more and more strained, and, fearing an attack, General Baratieri then led his forces against the Ras Mangashà, the chief vassal of the Negus, and in January, 1895, in two separate encounters, at Coatit on the 13th and at Senafé two days later, he defeated the Abyssinians and occupied Adua, the capital of the district. The first phase of the African campaign had been brought to a successful conclusion. General Baratieri returned to Rome and was received with adulation.

While Crispi was sharing with the successful general the applause of the people of Italy, Menelek was pre-

paring to avenge the defeat of his vassal. General Baratieri returned to Eritrea. The first serious encounter occurred December 7, 1895, when the Abyssinian forces fell upon the Italians at Amba Alagi. The Italians, though they fought obstinately, were outnumbered and badly beaten, only a handful of their men being able to escape. The Negus, following up this first success, now attacked the Italians at the fort of Makallè. After a first bloody encounter in which they were repulsed, the Abyssinian commanders decided to besiege the fort in the conventional style. The lack of water compelled the Italians to surrender, and they filed out of their stronghold with the due honours of war.

Crispi now realised that the Italians were confronted by a military force of considerable magnitude. Reinforcements were at once ordered to be despatched to Africa, while the Premier did not refrain from expressing his disgust at the recent disasters, which he now attributed to the inefficiency of General Baratieri. Menelek, learning of the extensive preparations which the Italians were making to push their African campaign to a successful issue, was, now that his vassal had been avenged, ready to treat with the Italians regarding terms of peace. Crispi, however, confident in the ultimate success of the enterprise, insisted that if peace were to be made the treaty of alliance between Italy and Abyssinia, in its original form, which amounted to a virtual Italian protectorate over the Ethiopian domain, must be renewed, and that the Italians should occupy again all territory that they had conquered during the campaign of the preceding year. Menelek refused to consider these terms,

and both sides continued their preparations for war. Though in Italy there was a strong party opposed to the African campaign, volunteers in great numbers had enlisted for service in Africa. Early in February, 1896, the Italian forces, both native and white, in Eritrea, under the command of General Baratieri, numbered nearly 20,000 men, with twenty batteries of field artillery. The expedition had been hastily assembled and suffered from lack of organisation. The troops, arriving in Africa, found it difficult to become acclimatised; their equipment was defective, and, above all, the system of transport of supplies wholly inadequate, while the discipline of the native troops was bad and several detachments deserted and went over to the enemy in a body. The Abyssinian army numbered over 90,000 men, the largest force ever marshalled in one single army by an African ruler. The troops were of excellent fighting material, armed with automatic rifles, supplied with abundant ammunition, and with an artillery more modern than, and superior to, the Italian. There was, besides this, a reserve force of 20,000 men armed with shields and lances.

General Baratieri believed that to attack so large a force would be imprudent, and he telegraphed to Crispi, in answer to repeated inquiries, as to the cause of his delays: "If we are attacked we will conquer; if we attack we will lose." Crispi was impatient to wipe out the memory of the recent defeats of Italian arms. He had led the country into this African adventure, and he felt that he must push it through speedily, as both Parliament and the nation had grown restive. It was thereupon decided to supersede General Bara-

tieri. This step had been contemplated for some time past, and was at length secretly carried out, and General Baldissera set out to take command of the Italian forces in Africa.

General Baratieri, learning from private sources of the proposed change, decided to risk an action before the arrival of his successor. On February 29, he divided his forces into three columns and set out to attack the Abyssinian armies, which were encamped beyond Adua. The country is hilly, with abrupt rocks rising stark out of the soil, which is covered with rich tropical vegetation. There were no roads, and the columns had to advance through the gullies and along the stony beds of dry torrents, with no means of keeping in close communication. At dawn on March 1, the advance column on the left of the Italian forces came into contact with the main body of the enemy. A pitched battle was fought in which the Italians were driven from the field with heavy losses. The right wing of the Italian forces lost its way, and was unable to co-operate in the action, while the centre engaged the enemy near Abba Garima. After a brief encounter here it was evident that the enemy was in vastly superior numbers and was gaining ground. The native contingents of the Italian forces now rebelled, and amid scenes of indescribable cruelty and slaughter the Italians were literally hacked to pieces. An hour later the rout of the Italians was complete. General Baratieri became separated from his staff and only escaped with great difficulty. The victorious Abyssinians swarmed from all sides, and pursued the small remnant of the defeated Italians through the broken country, and captured or killed all who came within their

path. The Italians lost 5,000 white troops killed in action, with 250 officers and 2 generals, as well as their whole artillery. Never before had Europeans suffered such a defeat at the hands of native troops.

The news of the disaster at Adua reached Rome late in the evening of the same day, but was not known to the public until the next day. Many Italians, who had been opposed to Crispi's colonial plans, debased themselves so far as to express their unmixed delight at the failure of the African campaign, and cried "Long live Menelek," but the majority vented their rage against Crispi and loudly demanded retribution.

Three days later, on March 5, Parliament opened. The Chamber was in an uproar. Crispi entered; a tense silence fell upon the assembled deputies. "I have the honour to announce that the Cabinet has placed its resignation in the hands of the King." Crispi spoke slowly. "His Majesty has accepted the resignation," he added. Immediately, from all sides of the House loud cheering broke forth: "Long live the King! Long live the King!"

The aged Minister—Crispi at that time was nearly eighty—who had done so much for Italy, who had played so active a rôle in Italian public affairs from the earliest days of Italian unity, who had borne his part on the battlefield as well as in the political arena, who first raised Italy to a position of importance in world affairs, left his seat in the Chamber amid the hoots and jeers of his compatriots. Outside the Chamber the fury of the mob was even more violent. A hostile demonstration was made in front of Crispi's residence. "*Abbasso Crispi!*" "Death to

Crispi!" were the cries which rang through the streets of Rome during the ensuing days.

The crisis became more serious when it seemed that no one could be found who was willing to take upon himself the task of forming a Ministry. Finally, after several days of uncertainty, during which it is reported that King Humbert, despairing of the situation, had even thought of abdicating, the Marchese di Rudini undertook the task and succeeded in forming a Ministry.

Crispi thus disappeared from public life. He continued to frequent the Chamber, and never shirked his responsibility as a deputy, and though numbers of his friends and admirers, drawn from the most vigorous and healthy elements of Italian public life, rallied around the great Imperialist, he never regained his prestige, and his last days were clouded by many difficulties and by the infamous accusations heaped upon him by his political opponents.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE PERIOD OF RETRENCHMENT

1896-1903. INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES. THE HOUSE OF SAVOY

THE overthrow of Crispi had severely shaken Italy. The difficulty in finding a successor further discouraged the Italian people. Finally the Marchese di Rudini was able to constitute his Ministry. His first act, in order to win popular favour, was to declare a general amnesty on March 14, the birthday of the King. The prison doors were opened, and political and civil offenders, chiefly the victims of the repressive measures of the former Cabinet, were released.

On March 17, di Rudini presented his Ministry to the Chamber. He announced that General Baldissera, now commanding in Eritrea, had been given full powers to take such measures as he deemed expedient, and that the instructions sent on March 8, by the former Cabinet to treat for peace, had been confirmed. Di Rudini let it be plainly understood that he proposed to follow a colonial policy diametrically opposed to that pursued by Crispi. Though he was prepared to continue the war against Abyssinia if necessity compelled, and demanded a credit of 150,000,000 lire (£6,000,000) for this purpose, he declared that the period of colonial expansion had come to an end, that even if Italian arms should be victorious, he would not seek any increase in territory in Africa, and that he was going to pursue a policy of retrench-

ment as best suited to the interests of Italy. An order of the day, presented at this time, though not acted upon, gives a clear insight into the temper of the Chamber and the country:

"The Chamber, esteeming that the responsibility for the recent disaster in Africa rests solely with the Government, which, violating the constitution, and deceiving the country regarding its character and importance, has given to the plan of military enterprise an expansion not desired by Parliament, and has sacrificed to its policy the lives and vital interests of the nation, believing that the African expedition favours only militarists, speculators, and political adventurers, is contrary to humanity, and incompatible with the economic status of Italy, concludes to recall immediately the troops from Africa, and in accordance with Article 47 of the Statutes, to impeach the Ministry."<sup>1</sup>

Yet the defeat at Adua was not so disastrous to the Italians in Eritrea as was believed at home. General Baldissera showed himself to be an energetic and efficient officer. He opened up peace negotiations with Menelek, and despatched Major Salsa to discuss terms with the Negus. But the conditions imposed were deemed unacceptable, and General Baldissera continued his preparations for a renewal of the conflict. Three times Major Salsa returned with Italian counter-proposals and during the last interview, the terms still being deemed unsatisfactory, Menelek detained the Italian envoy. Impressed by the losses sustained by his troops in the battle of Adua, and learning of the arrival of Italian reinforce-

<sup>1</sup> P. Vigo: "Trent' Ultimi Anni del Secolo, XIX," vol. VII, Treves, Milan, 1915, p. 127.

ments, he broke camp, and marched southward towards Shoa.

The peace negotiations had failed, but General Baldissera did not remain inactive. His army was now reorganised. He thereupon detached a force to relieve Kassala, which was seriously threatened by the Dervishes. This difficult mission was successfully carried out, and on April 1, Kassala was safe, and the enemy put to flight. At the same time, Baldissera, with his main force, 16,000 strong, marched to the assistance of the Italian garrison, closely besieged at Adigrat, and here Italian arms were again victorious, and the garrison was relieved on May 4. It is not improbable that, owing to the skill of Baldissera, the Italians would have been able to defeat the main forces of the Negus, which had now become demoralised, but di Rudini was intent upon following his policy of retrenchment, and he did all in his power to hasten peace negotiations. Acting on instruction from his Government, Baldissera now turned over to the Ras Mangashà the fort of Adigrat, which had been so valiantly defended and so skilfully relieved. On May 19, the remaining stores and munitions were destroyed, and the Italian force withdrew from this hard-won post.

Crispi, though fallen from power, addressed a ringing appeal to the King to protest against the supine policy of the Government, and urged that the war against Menelek be prosecuted with vigour. But his voice was not heeded, and on June 5, the Italian plenipotentiary, Doctor Nerazzini, set sail from Naples for Adis Ababa, the Abyssinian capital. After many delays peace was finally concluded there on

October 26. By its terms, the Treaty of Ucciali was annulled; the absolute independence of Abyssinia was recognised; the final delineation of the boundary-line between Eritrea and Abyssinia was postponed (in the meantime the Italians held the line Nareb-Belesa-Muna), and the sum of £400,000 was paid as an indemnity by the Italians for the return of prisoners held by the Negus. After an attempt made by di Rudini to abandon the greater part of Eritrea, this frontier line was finally confirmed to Italy during the Ministry of his successor. Kassala was turned over to the Anglo-Egyptian forces on Christmas Day, 1897, and two other slight changes were made in the boundary between Eritrea and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Eritrea now passes from active discussion in Italian affairs. The cabal against Crispi had greatly exaggerated the magnitude of the Italian disaster in Africa. The majority of the Italians appeared satisfied with the treaty of Adis Ababa, and were loath to enter upon any further colonial undertakings. While the temporary reverse at Adua for the time being injured Italian prestige abroad, it in nowise prevented Italy from taking a leading part in important international events.

Only a few months after peace with Abyssinia was proclaimed, a fleet of the Powers, composed of Italian, French, British, Russian, and Austrian ships, under the command of an Italian admiral, Count Canevaro, appeared off the Island of Crete (February 16, 1897). Since the month of May of the preceding year, the island had been in a state of upheaval. Conflicts between the Christians and the Turkish troops had been frequent. To put an end to an intolerable situa-

tion the Greek Government had despatched a small squadron under the command of Prince George of Greece to the island in January, 1897, and a few weeks later (February 14) landed an expeditionary force to assist the insurgents. The day after the arrival of the international fleet a landing party under the command of an Italian officer occupied Canea. Though the policy of the Powers in ordering a bombardment of the encampment of the Greeks, when the latter refused to obey the summons given them to evacuate the island, was openly inveighed against throughout Italy, the fact that an Italian Admiral was in command of a fleet of all the Powers did much to restore public confidence.

Throughout di Rudini's administration his guiding passion was that of rancour against Crispi. To discredit the "Imperialist," to heap shame upon him, seemed to di Rudini to be of great political importance. In pursuing this vindictive personal policy he brought about a period of tension between Italy and Great Britain, by the publication (April, 1896) of a "Green Book" on the Abyssinian war, wherein he included, without the authorisation of the British Government, certain confidential documents concerning Anglo-Italian negotiations regarding Abyssinia. The incident was soon dismissed by Great Britain, but it weakened the Italian Premier's position in his attempt to initiate a new orientation in Italy's foreign intercourse. Di Rudini outlined this new policy when he declared in the Chamber on May 25:

"I intend to uphold the Triple Alliance, but I expect to interpret it in such a manner that it will not alter our friendly relations with France and Russia;

relations which I hope to render more cordially, sincerely, I would almost say affectionately, friendly.”<sup>1</sup>

Italy was now once again drifting into a policy of compromise in her foreign relations. The Crispian policy of militant “Triplism” was, as was to be expected, abandoned, and had it not been for the fact that, in the room of the Duke Caetani di Sermoneta, the Marchese Visconti Venosta, the most distinguished Italian diplomatist, after twenty years of retirement consented to take charge of the Italian Foreign Office (July, 1896), and by his astuteness and skill was able to direct and modify di Rudini’s rather incoherent policy, Italy would, in all likelihood have soon found herself in a difficult position.

If Italy was intent upon seeking new friends, Germany was more anxious than ever to retain her hold over Italy. German penetration was at this time only seriously beginning, and William II felt the need of consolidating the bonds which bound the people of Italy to Germany, even if the Italian Government should choose to follow a more eclectic policy. Therefore, on March 24, less than three weeks after Adua, the German Emperor arrived at Genoa, accompanied by the Empress, the Crown Prince, and his second son, Prince Eitel Frederick. Amid the cheers of the populace, he went on board the Imperial yacht *Hohenzollern*, cruised slowly down the coast to Naples, where the party landed, and remained for some days. Then after visiting Sicily, the voyage was continued up the Adriatic shore-line to Venice, where, in the company of his Ministers, William II had repeated

<sup>1</sup> Chiala: “Pagine di Storia Contemporanea: La Triplice e la Duplice,” Turin, 1898, p. 626.

interviews with King Humbert and his advisers. The Italian people were visibly impressed by this exuberant demonstration on the part of Germany that she was not merely a fair-weather friend. But di Rudini looked upon the matter in another light. A half-hearted supporter of the Triple Alliance, he had made it his chief aim to establish cordial relations with France and Russia, though he seemed to have no constructive programme of the course of action to be pursued in order to carry out his desire. The object of the Triple Alliance was to maintain the balance of power in Europe and the peace of the world. Italy, bound to Great Britain by her naval agreements, had in a measure attached Great Britain to the Triple Alliance. Yet Italy now sought to enter upon not merely *pacific* relations with France, which Berlin had always encouraged, but *cordial* relations, which Germany had hitherto studiously sought to prevent. The time was now approaching when the Triple Alliance again came up for discussion, regarding its prolongation or abrogation. The procedure adopted was peculiar. The month of May (1896), the normal date for the final discussion of the terms of the treaty, or for its renewal, passed by with no announcements regarding the decision taken. It was not until June that it was casually made known by a remark of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Goluchowski, that the treaty had not been "renewed," but merely "continued," and thus remained in force until 1903. Though there was no modification in the text of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, it soon became evident that full privilege was now conceded to Italy to cultivate cordial relations with Russia and France.

On June 20 the Italian Foreign Minister, the Duke Caetani di Sermoneta, speaking in the Chamber, declared:

“The Triple Alliance, a pact of mutual fidelity, in no way excludes, and on the contrary implies, that each of the allied states should remain on good and *cordial* terms with all the other Powers. Therefore, in so far as we are concerned, our friendly relations with Russia and our efforts to bring it about that our relations with France shall be imbued with that mutual sympathy and courtesy which are in accordance with our racial affinity, and the memory of unforgettable events, do not prevent that there should persist towards us the unlimited intimacy and confidence of the two allied Powers, Austria-Hungary and Germany.”<sup>1</sup>

Henceforth the bonds of the Triple Alliance were being imperceptibly loosened. Italy seemed by degrees to be regaining her independence of action abroad, though to maintain a nice balance in her relations towards both groups of Powers, and not to find herself suddenly isolated in Europe, required quick perception and sound judgment.

The results of this new trend of events soon made themselves felt. In September Italy concluded a treaty with France, concerning Tunis, and amicably settled this question, which had hitherto created much bitterness between the contracting parties. A month later the marriage of the Italian Heir Apparent, the future King Emmanuel III, to Princess Helen of Montenegro, took place on October 24. This alliance was, in the near future, to open a new sphere of Italian

<sup>1</sup> Camera dei Deputati: “Discussione XIX, Legislatura,” p. 6867.

influence, in that it again directed Italian attention to the Eastern Adriatic. At the time it was interpreted as cementing the growing friendship with Russia.

While di Rudini was courting Franco-Russian friendship, the Marchese Visconti Venosta prudently saw to it that the pact of the Triple Alliance was firmly maintained. He accompanied King Humbert and Queen Margherita on their visit to Germany in the autumn of 1897, where his sovereign again demonstrated his loyalty towards his German ally.

During this year Italy played an important part in co-operating with Great Britain in protecting the Greeks from the disastrous consequences of their unfortunate war against Turkey, and took an active part in the establishment of the autonomous government of Crete. The Italians were gratified at the increasing consideration in which Italy had come to be held by British statesmen. The words of Lord Salisbury, who, speaking in the House of Lords, declared that the "great and sincere sympathy" of England towards Italy "was dictated not by sentiment but by considerations of interest"<sup>1</sup> confirmed the fact that the Anglo-Italian Entente was a living factor in maintaining the stability of the peace of Europe.

While Italy was thus successfully conducting her foreign policy, at home affairs had lapsed into a lamentable state of chaos. Notwithstanding the fact that the finances of the country, owing to careful husbanding, were soon placed on a relatively sound footing, nothing was done to ameliorate the condition of the poor. Di Rudini's weakness was soon patent. Though a member of the Right he had attained office

<sup>1</sup> "Parliamentary Debates," LI, 935.

only by means of a secret coalition with the Radicals. Unable to maintain himself alone, he was compelled to bow to the demands of the Radical leader, Cavallotti, an unscrupulous, though brilliant, political agitator. Pursuing his policy of persecution towards Crispi, di Rudini lent the support of the Government in the prosecution of the former Premier on the charge of embezzlement, which dragged on for nearly two years, and finally ended in virtually clearing Crispi of the charge, though the Chamber voted to censure him for irregular procedure. Not content with hounding Crispi, di Rudini used the influence of the Government to crush Crispi's parliamentary partisans at the General Election, which was held in March, 1897. The result was that the number of Radicals and Republicans in the Chamber was greatly increased, and the country soon found itself at the mercy of the revolutionary elements. Di Rudini had promised much in the way of social reforms, and that he would cleanse the political life of the country. When fresh bank scandals were revealed and the guilty were still allowed to go unpunished, it became evident that not merely had the Premier repudiated his word, but that the Government was daily losing its control of the situation.

The economic condition of the country, more particularly in the South, was deplorable. To please the agrarians, di Rudini increased the duty on the cheaper grades of cereals, at a time when thousands were faced with starvation. Towards the end of 1897 food riots broke out in the south of Italy, as the result of the increase in the price of bread. These continued intermittently throughout the autumn and early win-

ter. By January they had spread all over the south of Italy and Sicily. The disturbances were readily suppressed by armed force, not without some loss of life. Though the movement was not revolutionary in its origin, it gathered strength from the fact that the Socialists and Republicans made use of the general dissatisfaction to further their interests. Di Rudini became alarmed; he ordered the temporary reduction of the corn duties, and even suspended them in the South, but otherwise no steps were taken to alleviate the sufferings of the people, which were very real. The Premier's feeble policy and his apparent indifference in the face of grave events, hastened the growth of the vast army of malcontents. Slowly the movement spread northward. In April there was a general strike near Bologna, then at Ravenna and Parma; in each case accompanied by serious disturbances and clashes between the civilians and the police. The unrest throughout the country had grown to vast proportions. The subversive elements had already gained the upper hand in the northern districts, centring around Milan. It seems improbable that there was any carefully framed revolutionary plot. A Milanese Radical Deputy had spoken of "the vote and the carbine" as the weapons of the people; but no steps were taken to organise or arm them. The Socialists were in the vanguard, and actively spread the discontent. At Milan there was much real distress and poverty, though no active outbreak would have resulted had the authorities acted with firmness and moderation. On May 7 a great crowd gathered to protest against the killing, on the previous day, of two workmen in a scuffle with the police. The crowd

was in an ugly mood. It was soon joined by groups of workmen and factory girls. Some employers closed their factories. The demonstrators now paraded the streets. Suddenly in the Corso Venezia a platoon of cavalry charged the crowd at a gallop. Though it was evident that the outbreak had not been planned, the pent-up fury of the mob burst forth. Barricades were thrown up; some of the demonstrators climbed to the roof tops and threw tiles and other missiles down on the police. The troops, having received no further instructions, looked on idly while the crowd continued its labours of barricade building. The mob was, for the most part, unarmed and without leadership, yet the Government, hearing of the outbreak, hastily despatched considerable reinforcements to Milan, and proceeded to suppress the "revolution" with ruthless violence. For two days the mob was hunted down by the soldiery and the police. Over one hundred persons were killed and several hundred wounded.

The Government tried in vain to fix the responsibility and find a scapegoat. Socialist, Republican, and Clerical leaders were brought into court, but the evidence against them collapsed. It would appear that the real responsibility lay with the di Rudini Government, which by its laxity and weakness had allowed the movement to get under way, and then repressed it with undue brutality. The Government did not long survive the eventful Milanese outbreak. On June 18, in order to appease popular indignation, di Rudini attempted to make over his Cabinet. During the two years that he had been in office he had already modified his Ministry three times, according to the exigencies of the moment. But this last attempt

failed, and ten days later the Ministry fell, and di Rudini retired from public affairs.

Though the authorities were unable to attach any blame for the riots at Milan to the Socialists, the more conservative elements of the population, the rich and the well-to-do, who had paid little heed to the outbreaks in the south of Italy, aroused by the outburst at Milan, loudly clamoured for repressive measures. Under di Rudini's successor, General Pelloux, martial law was proclaimed at Naples, where there had been no disturbance whatever, as well as at Florence, where there had been very little, and at Milan. Railway servants and all public employees were mobilised on a military basis. Two-thirds of the Catholic societies, many of them purely philanthropic, were dissolved on the ground of their being anti-dynastic. Republican associations were outlawed, newspapers were suspended, schoolmasters dismissed for discussing socialism out of school hours. The military court at Milan passed outrageous sentences on trumped-up charges. "Two well-known journalists were sentenced to six and four years' imprisonment respectively, 'for continually attacking the institutions and authorities,' 'exaggerating the sufferings of the people, and thus embittering the hatred of classes,' and 'creating the environment from which the disorders sprang.' A Catholic journalist was sentenced to three years for 'attacking the monarchy and institutions with subtle irony,' 'sowing class hatred between peasants and landlords,' and 'turning many of the clergy from their natural work of pacification.' There was hardly a pretense of decent legal procedure. The president of the court, General Bava-Beccaris, was as indifferent to equity as he was ignorant of law."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> King and Okey: "Italy To-day," London, 1909, p. 98.

Nor were the condemnations confined to Milan. Throughout Italy, on one charge or another, wholesale arrests were made. But a reaction soon set in against the arbitrary procedure of these courts. Petitions were widely circulated throughout Italy demanding the release of the prisoners. Before the end of the year over 2,700 prisoners were released, and within three years all those condemned at this time in connection with the events of those fateful May days were released by royal amnesty.

General Pelloux, supported by a majority of the Chamber which was strongly reactionary, now presented a bill concerning public safety which would, if passed, confer even more autocratic powers on the Government than it already possessed, regarding the right to prohibit public meetings and suppress associations, etc. Presented before the Chamber in November, 1898, the measure met with violent opposition on the part of the Republicans, Radicals, and Socialists. To prevent its passage every means of obstruction was made use of, until in June, 1899, despairing of securing the passage of the bill by the usual parliamentary procedure, in view of the violence of the obstruction—fist-fights and other disturbances had become every-day scenes in the Chamber—the Government announced that the measure was by royal decree declared a law. The following year (February, 1900) the Court of Cassation at Rome declared that the Public Safety Bill did not have the validity of a law. The whole matter was again brought before Parliament; again the Radicals resorted to their methods of obstruction. An attempt was made to alter the standing orders; scenes of unruly conduct were again

witnessed in the Chamber. New orders were finally drafted which were intended to empower the President to suspend disorderly members, etc. But the President of the Chamber found himself unable to cope with the concerted disturbance of the group of extreme members. The sitting broke up in confusion. The President of the Chamber resigned, and General Pelloux now determined to appeal to the country. The result of the election was an increase in the strength of the radical groups. General Pelloux thereupon resigned.

During Pelloux's administration Italy's foreign policy was largely opportunist. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was Admiral Canevaro, the former commander of the international fleet off Crete. His methods were those of the quarter deck rather than those of diplomacy. He despatched an Italian cruiser to South America to secure redress from Colombia for injuries done, thirteen years before, to an Italian subject. He joined Great Britain in preventing the Vatican from being invited to be represented at the Peace Conference convoked at The Hague by the Tsar of Russia. He endeavoured to secure for Italy the control of the San-Mun Bay in China, but his demand was rejected, and as a result of this diplomatic fiasco his resignation soon followed. He was succeeded by Visconti Venosta, who once again was willing to straighten out the tangles of Italy's foreign policy. Instead of abandoning altogether the project of securing a sphere of influence for Italy in China, he seized the opportunity to despatch an Italian contingent to join the Powers in suppressing the Boxer uprising (1900), and as a result Italy secured a foothold in China in the form of a concession at Tienstin.

On the fall of the Pelloux Cabinet, M. Saracco was called upon to form a Ministry of pacification (June, 1900), and he succeeded in a measure in reconciling the conservatives with the more moderate radicals. A little over a month later, on July 29, King Humbert, while leaving an outdoor festival at Monza, was assassinated by an anarchist.

The reign of the late King, though relatively quiet, had not been uneventful. Though he was unable to retain for the monarchy that loyalty and popularity which it had enjoyed under his father, he had consolidated the Kingdom into a coherent unit. He had adhered strictly to the constitution, and chose his Ministers in accordance with the will of the Chamber. However, he surrounded himself with a small coterie of persons who had little sympathy with popular reforms, and thus failed to remain in close touch with the country. Of distinct Germanophil tendencies, he was a staunch supporter of the Triple Alliance, and did much to bring about close and friendly relations between Italy and Germany. He exerted his energies to strengthen the army and navy, and approved of the programme of colonial expansion. A man of fearless courage and great good-will, he had won popular esteem by his personal assistance rendered freely at the time of any national disaster, such as the earthquake at Ischia, where with his own hands he rescued several persons from beneath the ruins. His presence at Naples and Busca, during the cholera epidemic in 1884, did much to restore confidence in the community. He was furthermore extremely generous, and distributed over £100,000 annually in relieving the wants of the poor. It is not

surprising that he was surnamed "Humbert the Good."

In 1868 King Humbert married his first cousin, Princess Margherita of Savoy, the daughter of the Duke of Genoa. The niece of the first King of Italy, the wife of the second, she had lived through the heroic days when the men of her House fought for and won Italian liberty. A woman of great personal beauty, high accomplishments, and intense patriotism, she was to exert a considerable influence in Italy, though without actively interfering in public affairs. It is reported that in later years she remarked: "In the House of Savoy only one person rules at a time." On her only child, Victor Emmanuel, Prince of Naples, the Queen lavished her affection and care. Though delicate in his youth, Victor Emmanuel outgrew his weakness, and while still young entered the army. He early showed great capacity for military administration. Devoted to outdoor living, he has combined his love for hunting and yachting with studious habits. He is a recognised authority on numismatics, and has gathered together one of the most important collections of Italian coins now extant. Liberal in his politics, progressive in his opinions, he soon became an ardent advocate of economic improvements and social reforms. Thoroughly alive to the needs and interests of commercial development, a believer in the need of industrial expansion to foster the power of the State, he has sought to place the greatness of Italy before his own. He has effaced himself to allow the Italy, which he loves with flaming patriotism, to grow greater, richer, more powerful. He looks upon Italy as on a great corpora-

tion, over which he has been appointed Managing Director. The prerogative of sovereignty is, to him, that of directing and increasing the efficiency and output of this "Corporation-State." Yet he was never to forget that he is descended from a long line of soldier-kings, and that the honour and greatness of Italy must, if occasion demanded, be asserted by the force of arms. Such was the man who, as Victor Emmanuel III, adapting himself to the needs and conditions of his time, assumed the sceptre of the House of Savoy, and undertook conscientiously the difficult *métier de roi*.

ONE of the most singular phenomena of the creation of United Italy is the part played therein by the House of Savoy. The Italian patriots, who during the early years of the *Risorgimento* struggled for the freedom and unity of Italy, sought to establish a republic. Mazzini at Rome, Manin at Venice, Garibaldi were stalwart Republicans. The thought of a monarchy was distasteful to all Italians. In seeking to create United Italy their chief incentive was the overthrowing of the seven despotic princes who ruled over Italy, not least among them the Princes of Savoy. For after their re-establishment at Turin in 1814, they had made a clean sweep of all reforms instituted by the French and re-established a reactionary government. Yet there was a young prince of the House, Charles Albert by name, who had inherited in a measure the capacity for sagaciously gauging the significance of the events that were taking place. Though not in direct line of succession, he was soon to be called to the throne, and though a

weak and vacillating ruler whose qualms of conscience forbade him to take a firm stand, he made possible the reconciliation between reaction and revolution, between democracy and aristocracy, which took place during the reign of his son, Victor Emmanuel II, the first King of United Italy. Thus at a crucial moment in their history the Princes of Savoy once again accommodated themselves to the temper of their times, and followed the oldest tradition of the House.

This in a measure explains the present-day vigour of the most ancient ruling dynasty in Europe, which traces its lineage clearly in the male line to Humbert the Whitehanded, whose domains in the first years of the eleventh century were situated on the Lake of Geneva, and later included all of Savoy and the chief passes over the Alps—the Mont Cenis and the Greater and Lesser St. Bernard. His son Oddone added Piedmont.

During the centuries which elapsed the counts, and later the dukes of the House conformed their policy to the needs of their day. Defending themselves, sword in hand, they were Guelphs and Ghibelines in turn. They took a prominent part in the Crusades, and were ever ready to fight in a just cause, more particularly if the occasion offered an opportunity to extend their domain and sway.

It was not until towards the end of the fourteenth century that the princes of the House of Savoy inaugurated the policy of paying more attention to their Italian than to their Savoyard possessions, and thus became identified with Italian affairs. They succeeded in extending their power and estates by

co-ordinating policy with opportunity. Their vigorous realism is well shown by the conduct of Duke Amadeus VIII, who though not a priest, was elected Pope by the Council of Basel in 1439. While never travelling to Rome, he assumed the Papal tiara, and as Felix V reigned for nine years, recognised by half Christendom. Through fortune and misfortune the Savoyard princes understood the secret of adapting themselves to the conditions and circumstances of their times, so that though repeatedly driven out of their estates by more powerful foes, they were invariably reinstated in their ancient domains.

During the eighteenth century they continued their policy of accommodation. It is not surprising therefore, that when in the ensuing century the revolutionary societies, which had sprung up throughout Italy, gained in strength and importance, and enlisted the support of the most energetic and intelligent men of the epoch who were eager to bring about the unity of the Italian people, the House of Savoy, realising that a progressive policy was the one best suited to their own interests, as well as those of Italy, should have taken an active part in the movement. Victor Emmanuel, ably advised by Count Cavour, who was himself of old aristocratic lineage, understood that the destiny of his House depended upon the policy to be pursued. It so came about that the world witnessed the extraordinary sight of a King taking into his service red-shirted Garibaldians, and placing himself at the head of armed revolutionaries, in order to compass the overthrow of the other sovereign princes of Italy, including the Pope. United Italy, long the dream of Italian Republican patriots, owed its ac-

complishment to the strong hand and the daring enterprise of the royal House of Savoy. It was the princes of this ruling House who were able to bring the question of Italian unity to the attention of Europe. It is owing to their initiative that foreign aid was secured, without which the undertaking would have failed. It was the forces of Piedmont, pledged by Victor Emmanuel to co-operate with the French, which secured Napoleon's assistance. Step by step as the task of union was being carried out, Victor Emmanuel undertook to reconcile the peoples of Italy with the idea of accepting a new sovereign, rather than a republican form of government. It is unquestionable that had it not been for the fact that national sentiment and the desire for unity were more profound than the movement towards democratic government, the task would have been impossible. But Italian revolutionary leaders, whose unselfish patriotism was so strikingly set forth by Garibaldi himself when he declared, "I have never been a partisan of Kings, but, inasmuch as Charles Albert has made himself the defender of the cause of the people, it is my duty to offer him my sword," soon recognised that the aims of the House of Savoy were as legitimate as they were useful to the cause of United Italy. Without a strong leadership, without a closely welded, unified State, Italy as a nation could not have survived. Not even federalism would have been practical, had it been possible. The future prosperity of Italy depended on the successful accomplishment of the task of union. The same laws and regulations, even down to the minutest detail; the same flag and uniform in Piedmont as in Sicily, in Venetia as in Romagna

or Calabria, could alone bring it about that the Italian people would feel themselves racially as well as nationally one.

The star of Piedmont rose high on the horizon as the task of unification was methodically proceeding. It reached its zenith when, shortly after the occupation of Rome, Victor Emmanuel, in opening the first Italian Parliament at Florence, on December 5, 1870, exclaimed: "With Rome, the capital of Italy, I have carried out my promise, and crowned the enterprise begun by my illustrious father twenty-three years ago. My heart of a sovereign and of a son feels a solemn joy in welcoming, here assembled for the first time, the representatives of our beloved country, and in pronouncing these words: Italy is free and united, it is for us to make her great and happy." Henceforth the Kingdom of Italy was the sole thought and preoccupation of this prince of the House of Savoy. Piedmont and the narrower needs of his native kingdom were forgotten. Instead of ruling Italy from Piedmont as the Hohenzollerns proceeded to rule Germany through Prussia, Victor Emmanuel with the subtle flexibility which has always characterised the princes of this House, adapted himself to the new conditions which had arisen, and in the brief eight years which remained until his death, succeeded in proving to the people of Italy that he was worthy to be their King, and at the same time rendered the Monarchy popular throughout the peninsula.

The House of Savoy owes to Italian unity its present greatness, but it is not an exaggeration to say that without the leadership of its princes the unification of Italy would have been long postponed. Yet there

remained among a not inconsiderable section of the community the regret that Italy, when united, had not cast off the yoke of Kings.

During the reign of King Humbert the popularity of the monarchy waned, though the old Republican spirit cannot be said to have grown stronger. Italy was passing through a period of transition; social and economic questions came to the fore. The coercive measures adopted to quell parliamentary disturbances, as well as popular uprisings which marked the closing years of his reign, showed that King Humbert had failed to appreciate the true significance of the prevailing unrest. The situation had become increasingly difficult when the King was removed by the bullet of an anarchist. In view of this event, it would have been reasonable to expect that a period of reaction would be initiated by his successor. But Victor Emmanuel III refused to consent to such a policy. With his reign an era of liberalism opened, and within a very brief space of years Socialists and Radicals no longer considered any change in the Government as a necessary part of their programme; even Clericals, who were for so long active anti-dynastic agents, appeared to have become reconciled to the Monarchy. Victor Emmanuel had taken the lead in the new trend of events. He removed the Monarchy from the sphere of controversy and originated the democracy of kingship. In pursuing this policy of liberalism he left the task of governing too much in the hands of parliamentary leaders, and allowed the country to be ruled by a parliamentary dictator, while he bent his energies on improving the social and economic conditions of his subjects. Yet, when

in later years the Italian people rose to vindicate their independence as a World Power, Victor Emmanuel III was ready to lead them. Then the soldiers of Italy, Socialists, Republicans, Royalists, Clericals, peasants, bourgeois, and aristocracy, from Sicily and Naples, from Rome, Tuscany and the Marches, from Venetia, Lombardy as well as Piedmont, were to go into battle with the cry "*Avanti Savoia*" on their lips, proclaiming the unity of the Kingdom of Italy under the sceptre of the House of Savoy.

## CHAPTER V

### THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI

POLITICAL CORRUPTION. THE EROSION OF PARTIES. ALGECIRAS  
AND AGADIR

THE year 1903 marks a turning-point in the history of Italy. Up to this time the benefits of national existence had been but vaguely sensed by the majority of the Italian people. National unity, achieved by foreign aid, had failed to arouse the Italians to a realisation of their obligations in the realm of world politics. Concerned with domestic dissensions, the despised, silent, subservient partner of the Triple Alliance, Italy, during recent years had wallowed in a slough of political despondency.

The history of the ensuing decade of Italian public affairs is largely that of one man, Giovanni Giolitti, "the dictator." To estimate fairly the capacity and character of a man who, by the use or rather abuse of power, was able to control the destiny of a great people through a long period of years, requires patient analysis. Few men have experienced such marked tokens of loyalty and public favour; few have been accused of such baseness, corruption, and crime.

Born at Mondovì in Piedmont on October 27, 1842, the son of a minor government official, Giolitti, after having completed his university training, entered the civil service, first in the Ministry of Justice, later in that of Finance. During the stormy days of 1860-

70, when Italy was struggling to be free, when the youth of the land loyally gave their lives for the cause of national unity and independence, Giolitti was never moved to enlist in any such enterprise. The intrinsically dramatic drama of nation-building failed to awaken any enthusiasm in the mind of the plodding bureaucrat. Giolitti remained quietly at his fireside. He read the news of the victories of Solferino and Magenta, of the expeditions of Garibaldi and the Thousand to Sicily, of the liberation of Venetia, and the conquest of Rome with seeming unconcern. A zealous and devoted civil servant, he remained at his desk, and his careful, methodically prepared reports won for him the commendation of his chiefs and rapid promotion.

When in 1882 Italy, on her entry into the Triple Alliance, had firmly established her position among nations, Giolitti, abandoning his career, succeeded in securing a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. He brought with him an intimate acquaintance with the bureaucratic machine, a skilled perception of how this machine might be used to control an electorate and even a Government, as well as a profound knowledge of matters of finance. Supple, pliant, unhampered by any political or ethical principles, totally devoid of any lofty ideals of patriotism, moved to action only by the expediency of the moment, giving what was wanted rather than what was needed, Giolitti found himself after ten years of active politics, called to the Premiership in 1892. His first Ministry, as will be recalled, ended disastrously<sup>1</sup>. His name was covered with opprobrium. For several years he dared not rise

<sup>1</sup> See p. 58 *et seq.*

to speak in Parliament. Then, by degrees, the past was]forgotten. In 1900 we find Giolitti accepting the portfolio of Minister of the Interior in the Zanardelli Cabinet.

His political resurrection did not pass unnoticed, though few voices were raised against him. From this time onward Giolitti's influence in the Chamber grew rapidly. His bold programme of social reform, which in reality amounted to little more than a policy of non-interference on the part of the Government, in the struggle between capital and labour, won for him wide support. In comparison with the repressive policy towards labour resorted to by his predecessors, the new Giolittian *régime* must be looked upon as a step forward. The right to strike, the right to hold public meetings, the freedom of the Press, were now conceded to the delight of the Socialists, while other less extreme liberal members of the Chamber, eagerly courting the favour of the new leader, flocked to his standard. It was only natural, therefore, that when Zanardelli resigned Giolitti should have been called upon to form a Ministry. He accepted the offer, and on November 3, 1903, constituted his Cabinet, calling M. Tittoni, a Prefect of Naples, to the Foreign Office.

Giolitti, as long as it served his purpose, was in the vanguard of all liberal movements. But though he apparently concerned himself with problems of public policy, his real and unquestioned ability as a ruler of men was consumed in affirming his parliamentary dominance and in subjecting the members of the Chamber to his will. Owing to the peculiarities of the Italian parliamentary system, the Government in power at the time of a General Election is able to

exert such pressure that the governmental candidate is almost invariably elected. As the Minister of the Interior appoints the Prefects and other local officials who are in a position to exercise absolute control over all elections, he is able to create for himself a personal following of Deputies who owe their election to the support given to them by the Government "machine." During the three General Elections which took place in 1904, 1909, 1913, Giolitti was each time in power. He saw to it that only docile candidates were elected. Bribery, corruption, and coercion, were resorted to when needed to secure the desired results. The Giolittian system of exercising parliamentary control is without precedent in contemporary Europe. As soon as the Chamber was elected, and had entered upon its legislative duties, Giolitti, after a brief delay, was in the habit of resigning from office with the majority still loyal to him. He would retire from public affairs content to allow some faithful follower or weak opponent to assume the burden of office. Then when the situation became involved, owing to the lack of cohesion in the Chamber, when the Deputies turned once again their thoughts to their re-election, Giolitti would upset the Ministry, return to office and, assured of the personal support of the majority of the Deputies, lead the Chamber and the country through the toils of a fresh General Election. Within a few years he succeeded in breaking down completely the already feeble barriers of political parties; and thus freed from the trammels of party allegiance or political programmes, Giolitti was in a position to rule Italy as befitted his fancy. His despotism was, however, enlightened. His methods were

simple. He endeavoured to satisfy, in so far as possible, every one. On the one hand, he redressed labour grievances, on the other he satisfied the capitalists in their demands for privileges and protection. He held his sway over the landowners and large farmers by maintaining the customs duties on wheat. He raised the salaries of the clergy and encouraged the efforts of the Church to extend its influence in the schools, while appointing notorious Freemasons to posts in the Ministry of Education. To satisfy the masses he reduced the length of the period of service of conscripts, and at the same time increased the effectives of the army and navy to satisfy the upper classes. His maxim of government was to grant immediately every demand which was made upon him by insistent public clamour; to give way to all active currents of public opinion.<sup>1</sup>

After a protracted period of economic crises, the country was now entering upon an era of prosperity and expansion. Politics no longer engrossed the attention of the multitude, and it became evident that Giolitti, while not brooking any interference with his methods of government, was eager to keep the ship

<sup>1</sup> Cf. G. Ferrero: "La Guerre Européenne," Payot & Cie., Paris, 1916. Writing on the Giolittian *régime*, page 207, he remarks:

"This Government will seem strange to many. It is, in fact, a system of government which has almost entirely disappeared in Europe. Cæsar and Augustus used two such governments: the one to conquer Gaul, the other to reorganise the Empire. Interesting analogies could be found in the history of Florence and in the republics of South America. It is the kind of government which is found everywhere, where the electoral system is not dominated by strongly organised parties. Sooner or later a man or a family or a family group gains control of the electoral machine, and uses it to his own advantage. This system, moreover, put into practice for ten years in Italy by an intelligent, dexterous, adroit man, a clear-thinking, strong-willed man,

of state riding on an even keel. As a result of agrarian and industrial difficulties, in September, 1904, Italy was confronted with a general strike of unprecedented magnitude, promoted by the extreme Socialists with the avowed object of upsetting the Giolittian Ministry. For two days the normal life of northern Italy was paralysed. Serious disorders broke out in Rome and Naples. Giolitti, while maintaining order, determined not to interfere except in the event of flagrant violence. The disorders soon died down, and at the General Elections, held two months later, the entire country, indignant at the attempts made to wreck the Government by resorting to force, swept the Socialist Deputies who had fomented the strike from office. Even the Vatican suspended the *non expedit* so that Catholics might vote. The Giolittians were everywhere returned by large majorities.

Soon afterwards (March, 1905) Giolitti, in accord with his policy, retired from office. A vain attempt was made to form a stable Ministry under Giolitti's faithful lieutenant, Tittoni. Finally M. Fortis, an old Garibaldian legionary, patched up a short-lived

did not fail to produce remarkable results. It allowed Italy to profit by the period of prosperity which the world has enjoyed since 1900. . . . Whatever may have been its merits, this personal Government exercised its functions under the cloak of being a parliamentary institution. This contradiction between the substance and the form could not fail to produce grave consequences: debates, voting, parties, the formation and overthrow of Ministries, the interplay of majorities and minorities, elections; everything which goes to make up the essence of a parliamentary system could be nothing more than fictions, more or less concealed. . . . One phenomenon above all irritated many—the decadence of Parliament. It is impossible to deny that the Chamber and the Senate stand for much less than they did twenty years ago . . . and it must not be forgotten that governments which endeavour to satisfy everybody often satisfy no one."

Ministry. The new Premier, forbidden to carry out any measure which might offend Giolitti, above all to tamper with the dictator's political machine, found his position burdensome, and it was a surprise to no one when he resigned in February of the following year. Giolitti, not yet ready to take up the reins of power, deemed it expedient to intrust the leadership of the Cabinet to the leader of a small group, the feeble remnant of the Opposition, Baron Sidney Sonnino.<sup>1</sup> Sonnino's Ministry was a Cabinet such as had been rarely constituted in Italy, made up of men drawn from all ranks and all parties, imbued with a deep patriotism, and united in their desire to serve their country. This Ministry at once set about to grapple with urgent reforms. The reorganisation of the railways which had recently been nationalised, the conversion of the national debt, and measures to improve the deplorable economic conditions in the South of Italy were the chief items of their programme.

Baron Sonnino was temperamentally unfit to control an Italian Chamber. His bad parliamentary tactics, his total lack of political adroitness created the *impasse* which Giolitti had no doubt foreseen. On a simple technicality the Sonnino Ministry was over-

<sup>1</sup> Sonnino was born at Florence in 1847, of Anglo-Jewish extraction. He served for some years in the Italian diplomatic service, but resigned to devote himself to the study of Italian social conditions. On entering Parliament his ability attracted attention. A recluse, cold, shy, diffident, he has ever remained a lonesome figure in Italian politics. Totally devoid of an understanding of parliamentary intrigue, and an indifferent speaker, he has been unable to hold together a following. A man of great moral rectitude and sincere patriotism, he was in later years to be called upon to guide Italy through the most difficult crisis of her history.

thrown, little more than two months after its creation, and Giolitti, now ready to re-enter the field, again took up the reins of government. He at once adopted the most popular features of Sonnino's proposed reforms, and with a docile House ready to execute his commands, the dictator, for the ensuing three years, ruled Italy, while the country enjoyed an era of ever-increasing prosperity and material well-being.

In the realm of foreign affairs Giolitti endeavoured to apply those principles which had so well succeeded at home. A faithful adherent of the Triple Alliance, he, nevertheless, made friendly advances to the other Powers. Giolitti cared little for Italy's international relations and remained blind to her position as a World Power. Yet by the force of circumstances Italy was called upon to play a considerable rôle in world affairs. The ever-increasing expansion of the Pan-Germanic movement, the pretensions of Prussia to European hegemony, the reawakening of irredentism, and, above all, the growth of nationalism were essential contributing factors.

Italy had already entered into a more friendly understanding with France, and after the visit of President Loubet in the autumn of 1904,<sup>1</sup> steps were taken to put an end to the commercial warfare which had been waged between the two countries for many years past. The Italian *Rente* was once again listed on the Paris Bourse, much to the benefit of Italian credit abroad.

Italian official apathy in the domain of foreign relations was rudely aroused when, on March 31,

<sup>1</sup> See p. 170.

1905, the German Emperor visited Tangier. This *coup de théâtre* was to have far-reaching effects. William II, so it was alleged, asserted that he had come to protect Moroccan independence from further French aggression, as well as to safeguard German commercial interests in Morocco. This active interference on the part of Germany in the affairs of the Mediterranean would, if permitted to continue, have upset the nicely balanced equilibrium which had at last been arrived at in these waters.

Nine months later, on January 16, 1906, an international conference met at Algeciras to settle the questions raised by this Imperial visit. The shadow of war which, for a brief period had overspread Europe during the preceding summer, had not altogether been dissipated. When the delegates assembled it was found that Great Britain firmly supported the French thesis which asserted the exclusive priority of French interests in Morocco. Austria in her zealous advocacy of German claims earned the title of "a brilliant second," which William II grandiloquently bestowed on the Foreign Minister of the Dual Monarchy. The course which Italy was to pursue at the conference was of necessity complex. Bound to the Central Empires in all matters concerning Continental policy, Italy had entered into agreements with Great Britain regarding the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Italy was bound by a recent understanding<sup>1</sup> with France not to oppose French expansion in Morocco, in return for the recognition of Italian pre-eminence in Tripoli. Italy chose to regard her agreements with France and Great Britain

<sup>1</sup> See p. 116.

as more important than her alliance with Germany, so that in principle the Italian delegates supported the French thesis at the conference, and Italy was thus instrumental in bringing about the triumph of France and the exclusion of Germany from Mediterranean affairs. The anger of Germany on learning of the independent attitude which Italy had dared to assume in opposing her all-powerful German ally was very great, and for the year following the conference in both Berlin and Rome there was an exchange of official visits, and an endeavour on the part of prominent Triplists to efface the unpleasant memory of the Algeiras Conference. It was no surprise, therefore, that the Triple Alliance, notwithstanding the fact that it had lost all but formal significance, was not denounced in the summer of 1907, and thus automatically remained in force until 1914.

Relations with Austria were far from friendly. In Vienna the conviction was gaining ground that the Italians could not be relied upon in a crisis, while it was evident to many Italians that the yoke of the alliance with the Dual Monarchy had become unbearable. Austria, as early as 1904, took steps which could only be interpreted as overtly hostile acts by Italy. Along the Italo-Austrian boundary the Austrian General Staff initiated at great cost an elaborate system of fortifications, manned with heavy-calibre guns. Fresh troops from remote confines of the Hapsburg Empire were now garrisoned here. The Emperor Francis Joseph attended in person the Grand Manœuvres held in Tyrol in 1905. In November of the same year the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Heir Apparent to the throne, the recognised leader of the

anti-Italian party, approved the vote of a Catholic congress, held under his presidency, in favour of the re-establishment of the temporal power of the Papacy. The advent of a "strong man," Baron von Aehrenthal, in October, 1906, at the Foreign Office, in Vienna, was to put to severe test the cohesive strength of the Triple Alliance. Reverting at first to a more friendly policy towards Italy in order to allay Italian suspicions, the new Austrian Foreign Minister after a reasonable delay in January, 1908, announced that he had obtained from the Ottoman Government a concession to build a railway across the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, uniting the Bosnian lines with the Vardar road running from Mitrovitza to Salonika. This project aroused the apprehensions of the Italians. The Roman Cabinet was accused of weakness in permitting Austria to upset the *status quo* in the Balkans as stipulated by Article VII of their treaty of alliance. Giolitti, to escape further recriminations, through his Foreign Minister declared that Italy had not given her consent to the Austrian project, but on the contrary favoured the counter-proposal presented by Russia, which was to link Serbia with the Adriatic. This announcement, as was to be expected, brought about a period of tension between the Austro-Italian allies, which was only relieved by the energetic intervention on the part of Berlin. Yet this episode has a wider significance in that it marks the first active co-operation on the part of Italy and Russia. The friendly relations between the two countries were further strengthened by the visit of M. Isvolsky the Russian Foreign Minister, to the King of Italy at Racconigi, on September 29. Thus a new orientation in Italian foreign policy was inaugurated.

A week later, on October 5, 1908, Austria proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Giolittian *laissez-aller* policy in foreign affairs had exposed Italy to so many humiliations, both within and without the Triple Alliance, and guaranteed so little the security of the Kingdom that the more enlightened elements of the nation were loudly indignant at this fresh affront, by so flagrant a disturbance of the *status quo* in the Balkans, the cornerstone of the alliance with Austria. Popular exasperation reached its culmination in Italy when it was learned that, in spite of the declaration made at Carate the next day, October 6, by M. Tittoni, that "Italy might await events with serenity"—words interpreted to mean that Italy was to receive adequate compensation—instead of the rectification of the Austro-Italian frontier, which was confidently expected, Austria merely agreed to evacuate the Sanjak of Novi Bazar which she had formerly policed. In Rome, when the news became generally known, disorders broke out. The Austrian Embassy was assaulted, the windows smashed, and popular disapproval was loudly voiced in the Chamber. The international situation was acute. War, again conjured up by the Central Empires was menacingly near. For a moment it seemed as though Russia would come to the support of Serbia and protect the interests of the Jugo-Slavs. But the bellicose attitude of Germany, who made Austria's quarrel her own, prevented armed intervention, as neither France nor Great Britain were in a position to act in concert. Once again Italy found herself on the brink of a great European war, in an ambiguous position in which her unnatural alliance with the

Central Empires placed her. In the midst of the crisis a terrible national calamity overwhelmed the Italian people and plunged the country into mourning.

On the 28th of December an earthquake of unprecedented intensity destroyed Messina, Reggio di Calabre, and the towns and villages of the surrounding territory, causing desolation and ruin unequalled in modern times. According to carefully compiled official records 77,283 persons perished. The disaster was rendered more terrible by the fact that for twelve hours no help arrived, as all the local authorities had perished and the few survivors had no means of communicating with the outside world. Sailors from British and Russian battleships, which happened to be in the neighbourhood, were the first to render aid. The King and Queen of Italy arrived soon afterwards and personally took part in the work of salvage and rescue, which continued for two full weeks, while all Italy united in providing for the homeless and destitute.

This national disaster had a political influence of no small import to Italy. Distracted from any consideration of foreign affairs, Italy for the time being forgot the European crisis, and the Italians from all parts of the peninsula proved the solidarity of the Kingdom in their efforts to help their hapless brethren of Sicily and Calabria.

The events of October, 1908, were in the nature of a dress-rehearsal for the great drama, staged by the Central Empires, on which they were to ring up the curtain in August, 1914. In 1908 the Powers, who were later to form the Triple Entente, were not yet

ready to act in concert to oppose the Pan-German *Drang nach Osten*. But it was plainly evident that henceforth Italy did not consider herself as part of the Triple Alliance in any campaign of aggression which the Central Empires might see fit to undertake, and that in the event of a European war, such as had been threatened in 1905 and 1908, Italy could be expected to pursue a policy which her best interests alone would dictate, regardless of treaty agreements.

It is not surprising that Austria took full advantage of the circumstances which had rendered Italy helpless. When the Italians were once again able to consider their position in international affairs they had to acknowledge that their prestige had suffered greatly at the hands of Austria. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 19,696 square miles of territory, with a population of over 1,800,000 inhabitants, was added to the realm of the Hapsburgs. Yet after prolonged negotiations, Italy was only able to obtain the abolition of the privilege granted to Austria by the Treaty of Berlin to police Montenegrin waters and the promise of the establishment of an Italian university at Vienna. Baron Sonnino, speaking in February, 1909, stated: "It behooves the country to recognise that it has lost weight and influence in the world, and to study how best to repair the damage done."

The crisis was thus passed, but it left in the hearts of the Italian people the profound conviction that Austria had ridden rough-shod over Italian national aspirations. It was clear to all Italy that, after endeavouring loyally for nearly thirty years to live on terms of friendship with the Dual Monarchy, the

solution of their difficulties must of necessity be sought on the field of battle. To prepare for this eventuality must henceforth be the single purpose of Italy's foreign relations. In March, 1909, Giolitti dissolved the Chamber, and, notwithstanding the discontent of the country with his foreign policy, by means of coercive measures he was able to control the elections and was returned with a good majority.

An era of more careful consideration of Italy's foreign policy is now entered upon. The period of what has come to be known as the "interpenetration of alliances" had begun. Though no official announcements were made, and the Triple Alliance remained in force as in the past, the friendship of the Entente Powers was again openly courted. On April 12, 1909, a British squadron visited Genoa. On the 29th, the King and Queen of Italy entertained very cordially King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra at Baia. A fortnight later the German Emperor was received at Brindisi, while the newly appointed German Ambassador to Italy, M. von Jagow, who was believed in Italy to be strongly pro-Italian, arrived at Rome to counteract the tendency of Italy to "flirt" with the other Powers, and announced that it was admitted in Italy that "the Triple Alliance is best for the peace of Europe." A month later a delegation of French officers was sent to Italy to take part in the celebrations commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the battles of Magenta and Solferino. But the most important visitor of this eventful year was the Tsar of all the Russias. In 1903, Nicholas II had already contemplated paying an official visit to Italy, but was prevented from carrying out his project by the op-

position of Italian Socialists. This opposition had since died down. The Tsar now arrived in Italy, and was received by Victor Emmanuel at Racconigi on October 23. Nicholas II during his journey from Russia to Italy had made it a point carefully to avoid entering Austrian territory. The warmth of his reception and the friendly nature of the toasts exchanged was the source of great satisfaction to all Italians, and created a deep impression throughout Europe. In France public opinion was gratified to find that Italy was daily becoming more detached from the Central Empires. In Austria the news of the visit of the Tsar was received with marked ill-humour, and in official circles an excuse was eagerly sought to humiliate Italy for her boldness in daring to initiate an independent policy. The occasion was not long in arising. Shortly after the Russian Imperial visit, the Vienna Government peremptorily demanded the dismissal from the Italian army of one of Italy's most distinguished superior officers, General Asinari di Bernezzo, the commander of an army corps, who, in the course of a speech, in presenting the flag to a body of recruits, remarked that he hoped that they would see it float over the *irredente* provinces. Italy, in order to keep the peace, complied with the Austrian demand, and on November 11, the general was placed on the retired list. Italian national pride was deeply wounded by this summary interference on the part of Austria, and while the Vienna Government gloated over the success of the browbeating which it had administered to Italy, the incident added fuel to the fire of hatred smouldering in the hearts of the Italian people.

In December, Giolitti, following his now well-established custom, resigned from office, and in order to give a semblance of reality to the parliamentary system of responsible government, the leader of the Opposition was again called upon to take office. Baron Sonnino accepted the offer, and constituted his Cabinet, but owing to the Giolittian methods of party erosion which had won over nearly all the members of the Chamber, the Opposition represented only 30 members out of a total of 508 Deputies. Baron Sonnino, in spite of his moral courage and good intentions, was, owing to his uncompromising attitude, unable to win the good-will of the Chamber. In the face of the hostility of a majority which frankly despised him, Sonnino's Cabinet could not be expected to survive, and after another brief rule lasting three months, he was overthrown. Giolitti chose as his successor M. Luzzatti, a distinguished authority on finances, who had held a portfolio in previous Cabinets. M. Luzzatti, who was the direct opposite of Baron Sonnino in temperament, desired to please everybody. He promised many reforms, among them universal suffrage, which had been loudly demanded by the Socialists, in spite of the fact that Giolitti had declared himself opposed to it. However, he succeeded no better than Sonnino in conciliating the Chamber, so that the majority would have eagerly seized the first opportunity to overthrow him but for the fact that Giolitti bade them refrain, as he wished to enjoy a period of rest in the country, freed from the worries of political life. The Luzzatti Ministry thus dragged on its feeble existence through the summer and autumn of 1910. No untoward event disturbed

the even tenor of world affairs. Relations with Austria resumed, outwardly at least, a more friendly course. The Marchese di San Giuliano, the new Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was imbued with a deep admiration for all things German, made every endeavour to smooth over the strained relations between Italy and Austria. In August he journeyed to Salzburg to confer with Count Aehrenthal, and later to Ischl to pay his respects to Emperor Francis Joseph. His visit was promptly returned by the Austrian Foreign Minister. As a result of these visits it was announced that the two countries were in perfect accord regarding the *status quo* in the Balkans, and that the maintenance of the Triple Alliance in its full strength and vigour was the ardent wish of its signatories. Meanwhile the discontent of the Chamber with the Luzzatti Cabinet was steadily growing. Even the country felt that it was being weakly governed.

The crash came in March, 1911. Giolitti, with his usual dexterity, presented himself to all Italy as the man of the hour. He was welcomed by the Chamber and the country as the only man who could not merely rule, but govern. He thus again took up the duties of Premier on March 29, 1911. The question of universal suffrage brought before the country by Luzzatti in a complicated form was now advocated by Giolitti as zealously as he had hitherto opposed it. He proposed a much broader enfranchisement than had hitherto been considered advisable. At the same time he introduced a bill for the creation of a Government monopoly for life insurance. This latter measure was badly drawn, in flagrant violation of

existing provisions of the law, so that it amounted almost to a confiscatory measure. These proposals aroused wide-spread opposition in the Lower House. The dictator found that the Chamber, hitherto so docile, was preparing to dispute with its maker the right of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the recalcitrant temper of Parliament, Giolitti stubbornly persisted in forcing the insurance bill through. The discontent of the Deputies increased daily. The despotism of the Giolittian *régime* was at last beginning to bear fruit. Yet few were found who dared to attack the dictator, for all knew that he might at any time dissolve the Chamber, and as his electoral machine was still in perfect working order he would see to it that the "rebels" were not returned at the next elections. This was the situation when Parliament rose at the end of June.

On July 1, the German gunboat *Panther*, appeared off Agadir. For a third time within the brief space of five years a European war was threatened by the "mailed-fist" policy of the Central Empires. The Moroccan question had, to all intents and purposes, been settled at the Algeciras Conference, which was further confirmed by the Franco-German convention of 1909. When France was compelled to extend the sphere of her operations in Morocco, Berlin, believing that the opportunity was propitious to reopen the whole question *de novo*, despatched the *Panther*, followed by the cruiser *Berlin*, to Agadir ostensibly to protect German trading interests in southern Morocco. Once again Great Britain stood shoulder to shoulder with France. Germany thereupon (July 15) demanded territorial compensations in Mo-

rocco itself. This demand was firmly declined by France.<sup>1</sup>

The Moroccan question, which had been one of the most thorny problems in international politics, was now tending towards a solution, and it was evident that the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco would not be long delayed. Suddenly Italy remembered the engagements entered into by France and Great Britain regarding Italian rights in Tripoli.

In the dismal, confused twilight of Italian public opinion, depressed by long years of political servitude and by a system of government which had enfeebled and enslaved even the more vigorous intellects of the community, there flared forth a flame which now burned brightly, illuminating the darkened corners of Italian life and, in its fierce, white heat, sought to amalgamate the struggling elements [of a people endeavouring to find itself. Such was the mission of Italian nationalism a half century after the founding of the Kingdom as expressed by M. Corradini and the small group which had gathered around him. This newer nationalism was in the nature of a revival of the older, virile spirit which had made the *Risorgimento* possible. In the words of its leader:<sup>2</sup>

"Patriotism is altruistic. Nationalism is egoistic. When we want to express our love for Italy let us say 'our country' (*patria*); when we wish to affirm the power of Italy, let us say 'nation' (*nazione*)."

<sup>1</sup>The matter was finally settled by the Franco-German treaties, signed November 4, 1911. Germany agreed to recognise a French protectorate over Morocco; France ceded to Germany approximately 100,000 square miles of territory in the Congo.

<sup>2</sup>E. Corradini: "Il Nationalismo Italiano," Treves, Milan, 1914, p. 28.

To assert the strength and vigour of Italy as a nation, to arouse the Italians to a sense of their position as a World Power, was the chief aim of the nationalist propaganda which was now carried on actively throughout Italy. It was not until 1911 that the new movement came out openly with a definite, political programme, and ardently advocated the Tripolitan enterprise. The prospect of the conquest of Tripoli was a concrete fact which could easily be built upon. The propaganda of the Nationalists gained numberless willing proselytes. Few Italians recalled the fact that Tripoli belonged to Turkey, and that the Porte at the time ruled over a vast empire potentially powerful, the integrity of which was zealously watched over by the Powers. Fewer still concerned themselves with the fact that to assault Turkey, and to wrest from her her last remaining African possessions, would inevitably be the signal for a general assault on the Ottoman Empire, which would upset the balance of power of Europe, on which the peace of the world depended. Even the better informed, who had resisted all attempts to drag Italy into a war to redeem the *irredente* provinces, on the ground that it would lead to a general European conflict, light-heartedly gave their support to the Tripolitan expedition. Many, perhaps, confidently believed that the Porte would offer no armed resistance, and would give way to the pressure of Italian demands.

The causes of this change must be sought in the fact that the Italian people, worn out and enervated by the long debilitating rule of Giolitti, were ready to plunge into any enterprise which they thought would simultaneously increase their national wealth

and strength as a World Power, and bring about a change in government. Above all, Italy through the great expansion of her resources, and the increase in her material wealth, was eager to assert the growth of her power as a nation. A victorious campaign, so the Nationalists believed, alone could proclaim this growth. The clamour for war grew insistently. Many believed that Giolitti would never dare to undertake a foreign campaign. It was not expected that he would willingly permit Italy to enter into any enterprise which might jeopardise his hold over Parliament and the country. Already it was whispered that he again would betray the best interests of Italy.

Giolitti did not want war, yet he could find no way out of the crisis. His power had been so badly shaken as a result of his attempts to force unpopular measures through the Chamber during the spring session, that the dictator realised that he would be unable to withstand the ever-increasing clamour of public opinion, tutored by the Nationalists, demanding the acquisition of Tripoli. Tripoli had been promised to Italy by the Powers. The subject had been thrashed out both in and out of Parliament for many years past. The conditions stipulated by the Powers had been fulfilled and, above all, the shadow of the German eagle had spread suddenly over the Tripolitan coastland which all Italians had been brought up to consider their rightful heritage. The time for action had come. Giolitti, after vain attempts to resist the popular outcry, unwilling to surrender his dictatorship, gave way to the demand of the multitude, and led Italy into the Libyan War.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE LIBYAN WAR

AIMS AND ASPIRATIONS. ACCOUNT OF THE CONFLICT. THE WAR  
AND AFTER

ITALIAN aspirations to a share of the lands of Northern Africa, bordering on the Mediterranean, date back to the chaotic days before unity was achieved. Even as early as 1838, only three years after Tripoli had been declared a Turkish vilayet, Mazzini and other Italian patriots, looking to the future, asserted that Tripoli must become an Italian colony. In 1866 Bismarck, writing to Mazzini, declared:

"Italy and France cannot be associated to their common benefit in the Mediterranean. That sea is a heritage which it is impossible to divide among relatives. The empire of the Mediterranean incontestably belongs to Italy, who possesses there coastlands twice as long as those of France. Marseilles and Toulon cannot be compared with Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, Palermo, Ancona, and Venice. The empire of the Mediterranean must be the constant thought of Italy, the objective of her Ministers, the fundamental aim of the Cabinet of Florence."<sup>1</sup> Words pleasant to Italian ears, though obviously intended to embroil Franco-Italian relations.

<sup>1</sup> "Politica Segreta Italiana" (1863-70), Turin, 1881. Published by Diamilla Mulla, Mazzini's secretary.

When Italy attained to nationhood almost her first solicitude was to turn her attention to the North African littoral. The severe check to Italian ambitions administered by France in occupying Tunis, made Italian statesmen all the more determined to gain the control of Tripoli. In 1890 Crispi resolutely set about to secure Italian sovereignty of the Barbary Coast, and by making friends with Hassuna Pasha Karamanli, the direct descendant of the old Tripolitan "Bashaws," took the first decisive step in behalf of Italy. In a communication dated July 25, 1890, Crispi addressed an informal Note to Lord Salisbury with a view to receiving British sanction to his programme. But Lord Salisbury, while acknowledging that in the event of any change of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean it was indispensable for Italy to occupy Tripoli, stated that the time for such a step had not yet arrived, and he bade Italy wait, adding:

"The Italian Government will have Tripolitana, but the huntsman to bring down the stag must wait until it comes within the range of his gun, so that even wounded, it will not escape."<sup>1</sup>

This programme was not followed up by Crispi's successors in office, and the disaster at Adua so dampened the colonial ardour of the Italians that during the years which followed no effort was made openly to press Italy's claim to Tripolitana. However, towards the end of this same year (1896) the Marchese Visconti Venosta, who had taken over the direction of the Foreign Office, entered into an agreement with France regarding the revision of the treaties respect-

<sup>1</sup> Crispi: "Politica Estera," Treves, Milan, 1912, p. 369.

ing Tunis, and he pointed out clearly that Italy expected compensations for this step in Tripolitana. Italy, in recognising French sovereignty over Tunis, had opened the road for her own occupation of Tripoli. Tunis was now admittedly for all time the *terra perduta* for the Italians, while Tripoli had become the *terra promessa*.

In March, 1899, France and Great Britain without informing Italy, signed a treaty defining the spheres of their respective influence in Central Africa, which directly concerned the Tripolitan hinterland. The Italians were thoroughly alarmed. They feared a repetition of the Tunisian fiasco. The Government was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of its policy. The Ministry fell, and the Marchese Visconti Venosta, once again called upon to direct the destinies of the Foreign Office, was able to arrange a *détente* with France, which later led to definite agreements regarding the recognition of the priority of Italian interests in Tripoli. Thus in 1902 M. Delcassé, at the time French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was able to declare:

“In exchange for assurance given by France, not to interfere in Tripolitana, Italy has promised to do nothing which could obstruct French policy in Morocco.”

From this time onward Tripoli and Morocco were linked together in the minds of the Italians, so that it was inevitable that when the Moroccan question should come up for settlement, Italy would press for a solution of the Tripolitan affair.

Italian negotiations with Great Britain regarding

Tripoli are less clear. Questioned concerning the attitude of England, M. Prinetti, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in May, 1902, replying in the Chamber to the query: "Whether we (Italy) could hope to obtain from England, regarding Tripoli's eastern boundary-line, a declaration identical with that received from France," stated "Yes, certainly, these same assurances have been given."<sup>1</sup>

From 1902 onward, Italy showed that she meant to be faithful to her agreement with France respecting Morocco, and in pursuance of this policy, at the Algeiras Conference (1906), the Italian delegate voted with France against his ally, Germany, proving conclusively that Italy would not permit the Triple Alliance to stand in the path of her vital interests in the Mediterranean.

The Italian Government repeatedly made it evident that they had no desire to force matters. But when the French column marched on Fez, and Germany despatched the *Panther* to Agadir (July 1, 1911), the Italians were spurred to action. For not only did the liquidation of Moroccan affairs point logically to a solution of the pending Tripolitan question, but in responsible quarters in Italy it was widely believed that if Italy did not occupy Tripoli, Germany would do so. In recent years Germany had shown a singular interest in Tripolitana. A German Consulate was newly established at Tripoli, and a German line of steamers now made the city a regular port of call; German capital was being invested in local enterprises, and towards the end of the spring of 1911, the Italians learned that a German group was on the

<sup>1</sup> "L'Italie et la Tripolitaine," *Le Correspondant*, October 10, 1911.

eve of securing considerable concessions from the Ottoman Government, which would have given the German interests essential commercial advantages in Tripoli which had hitherto been refused to Italians. The Italian Cabinet understood only too well the methods of German *Interessenpolitik*, which created political capital out of commercial enterprise. Italians throughout the peninsula believed that the hour had come for Italy to pursue a vigorous policy in North Africa. The modification of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean, by French occupation of Morocco, stipulated by Lord Salisbury twenty years before, as a *sine qua non*, had at last occurred. The assent of the Powers had been secured. Italy, therefore, felt justified in seizing the occasion to vindicate her claims to Tripolitana and Cyrenaica.

Italian grievances against Turkish rule in Tripolitana were numerous. Italians were, so it was alleged, hostilely treated by Turkish officials. The new Young Turk *régime* had made matters worse rather than better. Insults to the Italian flag; the forcible abduction and conversion to Islamism of a young Italian working girl; obstacles to commercial development; obstruction and bad faith were charged.<sup>1</sup>

On July 29, 1911, the Italian Government instructed its representatives abroad that, unless there was an improvement in their relations with Turkey regarding Tripoli, Italy would take action. Negotiations dragged on. Italy, it cannot be denied, desired no other solution than one which would give her complete control of Tripolitana. The Porte made

<sup>1</sup> See semiofficial statement of Italian case, also Turkish reply. *Times*, September 30, 1911.

belated concessions when it was realised that Italy was in earnest. Wide commercial privileges were suggested. Italy refused these offers. On September 22, an anti-Italian demonstration took place in Constantinople. The next day Italian reservists of the class of 1888 were called to the colours. Then the news reached Rome that a Turkish vessel, laden with arms and munitions, was due to arrive at Tripoli. On September 25, the Italian *Chargé d'Affaires* at Constantinople presented an emphatic Note to the Porte, warning Turkey that its attitude was unfriendly, and that the shipment of arms and supplies to Tripoli at such a time could only be interpreted as a hostile act. Three days later, on September 28, the Italians delivered an ultimatum wherein, after setting forth Italy's grievances, it was stated:

"The Italian Government, therefore, finding itself forced to safeguard its dignity and its interests, has decided to proceed to the military occupation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. This solution is the only one which Italy can accept, and the Italian Government relies upon the Imperial Government giving such orders as may prevent any opposition on the part of the Ottoman representatives, in order that all necessary measures may be effected without difficulty."

The Turkish reply to the ultimatum, though conciliatory in tone, was not held to be adequate. The Italian Government, therefore, announced that:

"As the Ottoman Government has not accepted the demand contained in the Italian ultimatum, Italy and Turkey are from this date, September 29, 2.30 p. m., in a state of war."

The announcement took Europe by surprise. In England the Turks were held to be the victims of Italian greed. "Only once in the memory of living man has any war to such an extent as the present one taken the world by surprise. On September 25, for the first time, we heard that Italy had any serious grievance against Turkey."<sup>1</sup> All shades of English opinion were at the outset unfriendly to Italy, who was looked upon as a wanton aggressor. Yet for the past ten years the Tripolitan question had been continuously discussed in Italy, and for the past nine years Italy's rights in Tripolitana had been agreed to by the Powers, more especially by France and Great Britain.

Up to the last moment it was believed at Rome that the Porte would accede to Italian demands, and that the Tripolitan expedition would be in the nature of a *promenade militaire*. On September 28 an Italian squadron proceeded to North African waters. The blockade of the coast of Cyrenaica and Tripolitana was announced, and Italy notified Turkey that unless within three days Tripoli surrendered, the city would be bombarded. On the morning of October 1 the cable binding Tripoli with the outside world was cut, and the next day the Italian fleet cleared for action. Even then it was not believed that the Turks would resist. But word was passed that a show of resistance was to be made. Large numbers of the native civilian population fled, and on October 3, at 3.30 P. M., the first Italian shell struck the old Spanish fort which defends the seaside of Tripoli.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "The Turco-Italian War and Its Problems," by Sir Thomas Barclay, Constable, London, 1912, p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed account of the Italian campaign, see "Italy in North Africa," by W. K. McClure, Constable, London, 1913.

Two hours later all resistance had been silenced. No troops, however, had arrived from Italy to occupy the town. A sudden change in Italian plans had diverted the first transports from heading for Tripoli to Tobruk, the spot which it was feared Germany had intention of seizing. Time had to be gained until troops could arrive. On October 4 another bombardment of the forts took place, and on the next day the Turkish troops having evacuated the city, the Arabs began to pillage the town. It was imperative that the Italians should land to maintain order. Therefore, a detachment of 1,600 sailors was landed, and the Italian flag hoisted over the city. On October 7 Rear-Admiral Borea Ricci took over the governorship of Tripoli. A large number of sheiks and Arab notables swore allegiance to the Italian Government; most conspicuous among them was Hassuna Pasha, whose friendship Crispi had gained twenty years before.

Without incident the expeditionary force landed, and by October 20, after brief skirmishes, the chief towns of Tripolitana and Cyrenaica: Tripoli, Derna, Homs, and Tobruk were safely in Italian possession. At Benghazi alone did the Italians encounter serious obstacles, but the capital of Cyrenaica also fell into Italian hands after a two days' assault. Elsewhere Turkish resistance had been feeble, and in Tripoli order was so speedily established that the campaign seemed over before it had properly begun. The natives seemed to accept Italian rule with equanimity.

Three days later, on October 23, came a rude awakening at Tripoli. The Turco-Arab forces had withdrawn to the south and west of the city; their numbers were not definitely known, but they were

believed to be well over 12,000. At 8 A.M. they began an attack on the Italian intrenched positions to the eastward of the El Hanni plateau. It was soon rumoured that the Italian left had been crushed, and that the Turks were about to enter the town. Panic seized hold of the inhabitants. Suddenly the cry arose: "Death to the Christians." Italian soldiers were attacked with knives and sticks; some shots were fired, and in a moment what seemed to be a serious uprising burst forth. Orders were given to clear the streets, and natives found with weapons in hand were in some cases shot down. Whenever possible the Italian soldiery refrained from extreme measures. The rumour of the Turkish advance proved unfounded, and order was soon restored. On the next day it was deemed advisable to clear out whatever rebels remained. The work was trying. It required a house-to-house search. Sharp encounters took place between the Italian troops and the Arabs who had hidden in the oasis. "But by the evening of October 27 the task was practically completed. Several thousand Arabs had been brought into Tripoli, and of these some 2,500 were deported to Tremiti and Ustica."<sup>1</sup> The Italians had lost heavily; 13 officers and 361 men killed, and 16 officers and 142 men wounded.

In quelling this native rising harsh measures were inevitable, but Europe soon rang with the tales of Italian atrocities, of wilful murder of helpless men and women, which would seem altogether unfounded. The opinion of Field-Marshal Lord Roberts on the events in Tripoli as stated in the *Times* of November

<sup>1</sup> McClure: "Italy in North Africa," p. 67.

29, 1911, is a valuable commentary in extenuation of the Italian action:

"It is totally unfair, as we are a friendly nation, to criticise any military measures which the Italian Commander-in-Chief may have found it necessary to put in force, without having access to the information upon which he acted. As far as can be learnt from the more trustworthy reports that have reached this country, the Italians were suddenly faced with a rising of Arabs in the direct rear of their line of resistance. Such a desperate state of affairs would, in any case, warrant desperate measures to re-establish the equilibrium of battle. Time also was pressing, as the main attack by the Turks and Arabs was imminent. That the means employed to re-establish what I have called the equilibrium of battle was severe, is doubtless true, but in war it is usually the severest measures that are, in the long run, the most humane. No soldier will put any credence in the reports that women and children were deliberately killed by the Italians, but, doubtless, in the act of clearing hostile villages behind the Italian lines many innocent people suffered with the guilty. Such things are, unfortunately, inevitable in war.

"In no army in the world could the orders which General Caneva found it imperative to issue for the clearance of the Tripoli oasis have been carried out without instances of regrettable severity. The very urgency of the operation alone would necessitate this severity. Only those who have the experience of war in all its phases have the right to judge of the expediency of reprisals, and then only when they have access to the information which was at the time in the possession of the directing staff."

It cannot be denied that, after the rising of October 23, the Italians were looked upon with mistrust and

suspicion by the native population, and their position became more difficult.

On November 5 Tripolitana and Cyrenaica were, by a royal decree, annexed to Italy under the generic name of Libya. The work of conquest had not, however, been completed. The Italians held only the main towns along the coast and the territory immediately surrounding these. Fighting continued in a desultory fashion throughout the ensuing months, with long periods of inactivity. In Cyrenaica more particularly, Turkish resistance was tenacious. Enver Bey, who at the time of the outbreak of the war was Turkish Military Attaché at Berlin, left his post, proceeded to the scene of action, and organised the war-like Arabs into an efficient force which seriously menaced the Italians during the early months of 1912. Desperate fighting took place in the neighbourhood of Benghazi, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides.

It would seem reasonable to lend credence to the report that Turkish resistance to Italy was encouraged and supported by Germany. Von der Goltz Pasha, the chief of the German military mission at Constantinople, urged in so far as lay in his power—and this was very great—the continuation of the struggle, while the arrival of Enver Bey on the scene, coming directly from Berlin, would in the light of his pronounced pro-German sympathies conclusively prove that Germany had a direct interest in making the Tripolitan campaign as burdensome as possible to the Italians. There seems little doubt that the Berlin Government had expected to receive Tobruk for its own uses as a naval base in the Mediterranean, in

return for its acquiescence in the Italian occupation of Libya. This explains the undue haste of the Italians in occupying this base to the detriment of the broader needs of the campaign. Further than this it is not unreasonable to assume that the Central Empires, no longer able to count on Italian support in the event of a European war, wished to make the campaign of North Africa so arduous as not merely materially to weaken the resources of the Kingdom, but actually to deter the Italians from further military enterprise for some time to come.

The war against Turkey was also carried on in other spheres. At the very outset of hostilities on September 29 and 30, an Italian squadron under the command of the Duke of the Abruzzi attacked and sank two Turkish torpedo-boats off Prevesa in the Adriatic. But Italy was prevented from carrying the war into European Turkey by the vigorous protests of Austria. In November, 1911, Count Aehrenthal, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that "Italian action on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey or the Ægean Islands could not be permitted, as contrary to Article VII<sup>1</sup> of the treaty of alliance." This protest, which Italy could not fail to heed in view of the fact that Ger-

<sup>1</sup> This clause, as published in the "Austro-Hungarian Red Book" in May, 1915, reads:

"Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the Powers signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they will give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo*

many let it be known that she fully supported the Austrian thesis, restricted for the time being the scene of operations.

Throughout the early months of the campaign Austria had shown herself singularly hostile to Italy. An Italophobe party, which found strong supporters in exalted circles in Vienna, led by the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hötzen-dorf, asserted in no veiled language that the moment had come to attack Italy, who was daily growing stronger, and at the first opportunity would fall upon the Dual Monarchy. The Austrian Press welcomed the news of Italian difficulties, and gave wide publicity to exaggerated reports emanating from Turkish quarters. Count Aehrenthal, unwilling to precipitate a conflict with Italy at this time, when the Balkan problem had not been settled and a possible pathway to Salonika still lay open, was able to bring about the temporary retirement of General Conrad, but not before extensive military preparations had been effected by Austria along her Italian boundary, which caused deep annoyance to the Italians.

The German Press was even more bitter. The Italian expedition was treated as an "act of piracy," and German statesmen were especially resentful that

in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the Ægean Seas becomes impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the *status quo* for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing *status quo*, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties."

Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance should have dared to endanger the position of predominance which Germany had acquired in the Ottoman Empire.

Of all the European nations France had received with the most fair-minded equanimity the news of the Italian advance into Libya. During the early days of the campaign, notwithstanding the efforts of the politico-financial Press to discredit the Italian enterprise, the majority of the French people looked upon the Tripolitan venture as a sequel to their own Moroccan campaign. No untoward incident had marred the friendly relations of the two countries, when, on January 16, 1912, the Italian cruiser *Agordat* stopped the French mail packet *Carthage*, bound for Tunis, and took it into Cagliari, the Sardinian port, on the pretext that it was carrying aeroplanes destined for the enemy. This action on the part of the Italian authorities aroused the anger of the French, who demanded the immediate release of the detained vessel, and public opinion was united in its support of the most energetic measures that the Government might deem necessary to take. Two days later, when the anti-Italian agitation was at its height, news reached Paris that another French steamer, the *Manouba*, also bound for Tunis, had been taken, in a similar manner, into custody by the Italians on the ground that 29 Turkish passengers, who were travelling as doctors and nurses of the Turkish Red Crescent, were in reality Turkish army officials. The French believed this second incident to be a direct affront to their national dignity. The Government peremptorily demanded the immediate release of the steamers. On January 20 the *Carthage* and *Manouba* were al-

lowed to proceed. The next day the French Government required the release of the 29 Turkish officials. M. Poincaré, then Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the Chamber, in answer to a number of violent questions regarding the incident, used what may be termed extremely firm, if not unfriendly, language towards Italy. A week later the affair was liquidated. Italy was compelled to hand over the Turkish passengers of the *Manouba* to the French authorities, while it was agreed by both parties to refer the whole matter to The Hague Tribunal.<sup>1</sup> This regrettable incident once again, at a critical moment, disturbed Franco-Italian relations when they seemed on the eve of becoming friendly. In Italy the conviction was wide-spread that the Italians had been browbeaten by the French, while in France, what seemed to the French the high-handed policy of Italy in the Mediterranean was keenly resented.

The war in Libya dragged on. The Italians were making very slow headway. The cost of the campaign now amounting to nearly 1,500,000 lire (£60,000) per day was growing burdensome. In Cyrenaica the enemy was still able to put up a strong resistance. Nowhere had the Italians penetrated far into the interior. Though peace rumours had been at various times circulated, it was evident that the Porte did not feel itself beaten, and was unwilling to consider

<sup>1</sup> In May, 1913, The Hague Tribunal rendered its decision. It sustained the Italian contention that neither incident could be interpreted as an act of intentional hostility towards France. No damages were awarded for alleged affront to the French flag. In the case of the *Carthage*, £6,400 were awarded, while for the detention of the *Manouba*, only £200 were assessed. This verdict virtually proclaims that Italian action was justified.

the question of surrendering the last Turkish possessions in North Africa. Early in January the Italians gained a victory at sea, when near Kunfida, off the Arabian coast, an Italian cruiser, assisted by two torpedo-boats, sank seven Turkish torpedo-boats and captured an armed yacht. But the Ottoman Government seemed in nowise impressed by reverses, secure in the protection of the Powers and the ban placed on carrying the war into any other than the African zone.

On February 27 the Italians, wearied of the indecisive nature of the contest, braved the anger of the European Powers, and sank two Turkish ships in the harbour of Beyrout. Italy by this act had once again opened up the Near Eastern Question. Russia, France, and Great Britain expressed grave concern. None were eager to precipitate a crisis in the Near East. Within ten days, Russia, acting in behalf of the Powers, made confidential inquiries at Rome regarding the terms of peace which Italy would be ready to accept. On March 15, the Italian Government formulated its proposals, which included the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Libya. The Porte refused these terms, and the negotiations fell through.

Italy had now carried the war into the eastern Mediterranean, and she was soon to prove that she meant to push operations vigorously in this quarter. After due preparations, a month later, on April 18, an imposing Italian squadron appeared off the entrance of the Dardanelles. The land batteries of the forts of Kum Kaleh and Sedil-Bahr opened fire. The Italian guns soon reduced them to silence. The Ottoman Government became, for the first time, thoroughly

alarmed. The closing of the Dardanelles was immediately ordered, and the chancelleries of Europe were busied with negotiations regarding this event, while Austria threateningly announced that it declined to admit the right of Italy to make an attack on Turkey in Europe, and that further action in this quarter would result in serious consequences. A month later the Dardanelles were reopened for traffic.

But the bold course pursued by the Italians was to have a profound repercussion throughout Europe and the Near East. Italy in the face of the protests of Europe had dared to hunt the Turk in his lair. The Near Eastern Question, which for the past thirty years had never been faced since the Congress of Berlin had patched up a makeshift peace in the Balkans, was once again the problem of the hour.

The Italian fleet now cruised unmolested about the Ægean, cutting cables, and shelling various points both on the mainland and the Turkish Islands. Realising that the umbrage of the Powers was not very terrible, the Italians made ready to gain a foothold in the Ægean which could not fail to prove useful in the future. On May 4, an Italian expeditionary force landed at the Island of Rhodes, and, overcoming the tenacious resistance of the Turkish garrison, entered the city of Rhodes, while the Turks retreated to Psithos, in the interior of the island. Simultaneously other islands of the Sporades, known as the Dodecanese group, were occupied by the Italian forces. On May 17 the Turkish troops at Psithos were surrounded, and after a stiff encounter were forced to surrender. By the end of May, Italian rule was firmly established in the Ægean Islands, though

the occupation was reported to be merely temporary.

In the meantime a period of renewed activity had been inaugurated in Tripolitana. The Italian forces pushed westward and encountered a stubborn resistance at Zanzur. The Turks had dug themselves in and strongly fortified their positions about the oasis. Here one of the bloodiest battles of the campaign was fought, and though the Italians gained a notable success, it was not until three months later, on September 20, that the oasis was occupied. Notwithstanding the torrid summer heat, the Italians pushed their operations in all directions. The Arabs, now well organised, put up a plucky fight, but were slowly succumbing to the methodical Italian advance. The war in many sectors had settled down to static, trench-warfare, with frequent sallies by the Italians and furious counter-attacks by the Turco-Arab troops.

The Porte at last realised that nothing was to be gained by prolonging the conflict. Furthermore, news was reaching Constantinople of efforts which were being made to form a league of the Balkan States, directed against Turkey. The thunder of the Italian guns in the Ægean had drifted across the Balkans and aroused the longing of the Serbs, the Greeks, and the Bulgars to emancipate their kinsmen still under Turkish rule.

On July 12 secret peace negotiations were initiated at Ouchy, near Lausanne, Switzerland, between Prince Said Halim, the Turkish representative, and a commission of three Italian delegates, MM. Bertolini, Fusinato, and Volpi. It was evident at once that there seemed little chance of securing a satisfactory settle-

ment. The Italian Government realised that the only way by which it could hope to attain its demands was to push military activities ahead with all possible energy.

A week after *pourparlers* had been begun, five Italian torpedo-boats slipped up the Dardanelles on a raiding expedition which, though a daring enterprise, achieved no tangible advantage. Fighting continued actively in Tripolitana, while the peace negotiations, which had been interrupted, were resumed at Caux between the Italian delegates and two new Turkish envoys, Naby Bey and Fahreddin Bey. The Italian Government now made permanent arrangements for the governance of Libya. General Caneva, who had been in sole command since the outbreak of the war, after receiving high honours was relieved, and as the principal as well as minor points along the coast were now safely in Italian hands, Libya was divided into two distinct provinces of Cyrenaica and Tripolitana, each having its own governor and separate administration.

Through August and September the peace negotiations were tortuously pursued. The patience of the Italian delegates, their firm resolve to obtain their own terms, contrasted with the indirect "bluff" of the Turkish envoys, who made desperate attempts to secure a more favourable peace.

On October 1, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece mobilised their forces. Reshid Pasha thereupon arrived in Switzerland from Constantinople with full powers. Eight days later Montenegro declared war on Turkey, and the other States of the Balkan League joined in the war. The position of the Ottoman Empire was critical, assailed by the strong league of Balkan States,

with the Italian war unfinished. The Porte nevertheless procrastinated. On October 12 the Italian Government forwarded what amounted to an ultimatum to Turkey, demanding that its terms of peace be accepted within five days, and at the same time the Italian fleet was ordered into the Ægean. Thus under pressure, Turkey, on October 16, signed the preliminaries of peace. Two days later the Italian and Turkish plenipotentiaries affixed their signatures to the final draft of the Treaty of Lausanne.

By the terms of the treaty Italy acquired the sovereignty over Tripolitana and Cyrenaica. The Italians engaged to evacuate the Dodecanese as soon as the Turkish officials, both civil and military, had left Libya. In view of the fact that the Turkish Government had reason to fear that Greece would seize the islands if Italy evacuated them, no steps were taken to carry out this provision, and Italy still holds the islands. Wide religious freedom was granted by special decree to the populations of Libya, and the complete freedom of worship assured; the name of the Sultan was still to be pronounced in public prayers, and the Sultan was to appoint his representative in Libya, who was to look after Mohammedan interests.

Thus the war, which had lasted for nearly thirteen months, came to an end. Russia, who throughout the campaign had shown herself friendly to Italian interests, immediately recognised Italian sovereignty over the conquered provinces, followed by the other Powers, except France, who delayed her recognition for several days; a fact which was widely commented upon at the time. The Turk had been driven out of Africa, and the act of the Italians was a signal for the

Balkan peoples to unite and drive him "bag and baggage out of Europe."

Italy had entered the war believing that it would be more of a military promenade than a serious campaign. As time passed, and the war became more costly; as the number of casualties increased, and the expenses of the expedition mounted to unprecedented figures, many Italians expressed concern lest the people become discontented; lest scenes such as were witnessed during the Abyssinian war be repeated. But the Italian people had progressed greatly since those days. The war in Africa was to show that Italians of all parts of the peninsula had attained to a sense of national consciousness. The Italian army had undertaken a difficult campaign abroad on a large scale, and had acquitted itself with great credit. The slowness in the operations and a certain timidity of command were due mainly to political reasons. The Government of Giolitti, which had entered upon the war only after much pressure had been brought to bear, constantly dreaded a serious reverse, which might end in an episode such as accompanied the fall of Crispi. Yet when peace with Turkey was finally concluded, Giolitti, speaking in the Chamber on December 3, 1912, could exclaim with truth:

"The peace which we have concluded, leaves Italy stronger and more respected; it gives her a great colony in the Mediterranean opposite her own territory; it gives her a mission to perform (and it is not a small matter for a great people to have a mission to perform); it gives her, furthermore, as a great Power, full liberty of action. With this full liberty of action in times of difficulty we can provide ef-

ficaciously for the defense of our interests, and we can at the same time enforce our authority to protect the legitimate interests of other people."

The Libyan war up to this time had cost Italy 458,000,000 lire (£18,320,000.)<sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding the fact that the campaign was difficult and casualties relatively very heavy, the Italian people sustained the ordeal with splendid spirit. Nearly 200,000 men had taken part in the fighting, and the patriotism of the Italian people had brilliantly asserted the growth of solidarity and unity throughout the length and breadth of the Kingdom.

The African campaign had, however, again alienated the friendship of the Powers. The inimical attitude of France after the *Carthage* incident, the sulky mood of the French people regarding the *fait accompli* when Italian sovereignty over Libya was finally acknowledged, and the harsh British criticism of Italian methods and motives, made a strong impression in Italy. For the Italians had counted on the support and sympathy of France and Great Britain, with whose approval the Tripolitan campaign had been undertaken. The active opposition of Austria and Germany had not surprised the people of Italy, and made them desirous of freeing themselves from the shackles of the Triple Alliance. But Italian leaders believed that the Triple Alliance still served the best interests of peace. Germany was quick to gauge the significance of the dissatisfaction, rife in Italy, with France and Great Britain. To bind Italy more firmly

<sup>1</sup> The estimate of the actual total cost of the campaign made in February, 1914, was £46,000,000.

to the Central Empires it was expedient to proclaim unequivocally the strength of the Triple Alliance. Thus on December 7, 1912, eighteen months before the date of expiration, the Triple Alliance was once again renewed.

Italy now entered upon a period of what appeared to be the closest intimacy with Austria-Hungary. Not for many years had there been such a seemingly amicable understanding. Italy supported the Austrian contention regarding the inviolability of Albania. The Italian Government agreed to co-operate with the Dual Monarchy to compel Montenegro to evacuate Scutari; an Austro-Italian Note was handed to Greece, demanding its withdrawal from southern Albania. Yet everywhere Italy was actively safeguarding her interests, compelling the Vienna Government to consider Italian aims.

During the spring of 1913 severe fighting continued to take place in Libya, where the Italians encountered a determined opposition on the part of the Arabs. In Cyrenaica the problem of pacification was extremely difficult, owing to the unruly nature of the population. Fresh troops were despatched to Africa, and engagements took place intermittently throughout the summer with bands of raiding Arabs.

On July 2 the King and Queen of Italy, on their way to pay a visit to the Swedish Court, were entertained with much cordiality by William II and the Empress at Kiel. Though no official communication was made, it was known that at this meeting Italian interests in Asia Minor were considered. The Italian Press now for the first time discussed Italy's "Asiatic policy," and three months later it was announced

that a group of Italian financiers had been granted a concession to build a railway in southwest Asia Minor, from Adalia on the Mediterranean northwest of Cyprus, to a junction point on the Bagdad Railway.

Meanwhile, the Italians had established themselves firmly in the Dodecanese. At Rhodes municipal improvements had been taken rigorously in hand; city lighting and road building had been speedily pushed forward; a good postal-service was established, and plans were made to open Italian schools, in spite of the fact that France, inspired in part by phil-Hellenic motives, expressed grave concern regarding the continuance of the Italian occupation of the islands. Thereupon Sir Edward Grey, on behalf of the Entente Powers, addressed a formal Note to Italy, demanding the evacuation of the islands in accordance with her promise. The Triple Alliance replied to this Note, on behalf of Italy, though no definite assurances were given regarding evacuation.

Thus Italy, who two years before had been satisfied to play a negative rôle in world politics, suddenly found herself in a position of dominant influence. She had possessed herself of Libya in the face of the opposition of nearly all the Powers; she had matched her strength against Austria; assured the integrity of Montenegro and the neutrality of the Otranto Channel; she had furthered the establishment of an independent Albanian kingdom, and thus blocked the designs of Serbia to an outlet to the Adriatic, and prevented the expansion of Greece.

But if on the surface Italy seemed in agreement with her Austrian ally, many incidents showed how precarious were the foundations of their friendly

understanding. The Libyan war had aroused afresh the irredentist aspirations of the Italians, while Austria deliberately chose to continue her anti-Italian policy in the Adriatic. In August, 1913, at the time when General Caneva, the conqueror of Libya, was paying an official visit to Vienna, orders were issued dismissing all the Italian employees of the municipality of Trieste. This intentional affront to Italy could not fail to excite popular indignation throughout the peninsula. The relations between the two countries were further strained when, during this same month, the Vienna Government broached to Italy the project of attacking Serbia, in order to break the rising power of the Serbs (a plan which the Dual Monarchy was to put into execution twelve months later), and requested Italian acquiescence to this plan. Rome categorically refused to consider such a project, and warned Count Berchtold that such a policy of aggression could not be undertaken with the consent of Italy. General Conrad von Hötzendorf had been reappointed to the position of Chief of the Austrian General Staff, and there were many indications that the Dual Monarchy proposed at the opportune time to carry out its Balkan policy, relying only on the support of Germany.

Giolitti, who had been in office during these eventful years, took unto himself the full credit of the victorious Tripolitan war and the successful peace. He had renewed the Triple Alliance, and affirmed the important position of Italy in European affairs. In October, 1913, the universal suffrage law which he had decreed was put to test. The number of voters had been raised from three million to eight million, yet

so well did the dictator control the situation, that the elections resulted in an overwhelming majority for himself. Nevertheless, five months later, in March, 1914, Giolitti retired from office. There was no apparent reason for his retirement except that, as was his custom, he withdrew for the time being from public affairs in order that his successor should grapple with the difficulties arising out of his own administration, or rather maladministration, which could no longer be staved off. Thus after a dictatorship lasting eleven years and four months Giolitti, still the most powerful personage in Italian public affairs, retired to private life to watch and wait for an opportune moment to return to power.

During the decade of his "regency," he had corrupted the political life of Italy; he had demoralised Parliament by his methods of party-erosion so that no vigorous opposition remained. He had blotted out party lines so that though there were groups, there were no real parties. He had been a Liberal and then turned Conservative, and even semi-Clerical. He had adopted the programmes and policy which seemed most likely to succeed, and taken unto himself the credit thereof. He left office with the finances of the country compromised, its foreign policy obscure, and the subversive forces of the State strengthened. Notwithstanding the demoralised state of Italian political life, the resilient strength of the Italian people was soon to reassert itself. Giolitti's hold on the country was wide-spread but had nowhere taken deep root. It had undermined, but not sapped, the vitality of the country. So that when, during the great upheaval that was to come in May, 1915, Giolitti en-

deavoured to oppose the will of the nation, he was swept aside by the mighty current of popular opinion, by the sacred desire of the Italian people to fulfil their manifest destiny.

## CHAPTER VII

### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

SOCIAL AND VITAL STATISTICS. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL  
EXPANSION. COLONIAL DOMINIONS

THE fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom was celebrated in 1911 throughout Italy, with appropriate ceremonies. In Rome the vast monument to King Victor Emmanuel II was unveiled. Covering the greater part of the slope of the Capitoline Hill, facing the Corso, glitteringly new, of white marble with the equestrian statue of the King in gilt bronze, it symbolised characteristically Italian aspirations for expansion and world power, and represented the achievement of United Italy under the leadership of the House of Savoy. No other monument in Italy since the days of the Rome of the Cæsars had been undertaken on such a grandiose scale. Aside from any discussion of its artistic merit, it proclaimed significantly the Italian craving for "bigness," and was a forceful assertion of the unity of the nation. In Turin, the home of the Piedmontese Kings, an international industrial exhibition was held, which showed to the world for the first time the giant strides of Italian economic development. The statistics, carefully compiled at this time, afford a glimpse of the position of present-day Italy in the affairs of the world, and bring home the salient features of Italian growth and expansion.

The area of the Kingdom of Italy, including Sicily and Sardinia, is 110,623 square miles. According to the census, taken in the Jubilee year (June 10, 1911), the population amounted to 34,686,683 inhabitants, as compared with only 28,801,154 in 1871, which is an increase of nearly 23 per 100. When it is taken into consideration that during this period over five and a half million Italians have emigrated, and still retained their Italian nationality, the figures here given are representative of a vast growth in population well over 50.1 per 100, which Russia (103.4 per 100) and Germany (58.1 per 100) alone of European nations have outdistanced during the same period. Compared with the growth of the other great Latin State of Europe, France, whose increase of population during this half century has only been 9.7 per 100, it would seem probable that within a very brief space of time the population of Italy will be greater than that of France, which in 1911 had 39,601,500 inhabitants,<sup>1</sup> and is now reported as stationary or even declining.

In examining the records of Italian vital statistics, marked improvement is everywhere met with. Italy to-day occupies third place among European nations in point of natural increase of her population, as against fifth in 1871. Though her birth-rate has declined in common with that of the rest of Europe, (32.4 per 1,000 inhabitants), only Russia and Hungary can show a better record.

For many years Italy had almost the highest death-

<sup>1</sup> The Italian population in Europe, not incorporated in the Kingdom of Italy, is estimated at 2,495,549, occupying a territory of approximately 23,288 square miles, distributed as follows: Monaco, 19,121; Switzerland, 171,166; Malta, 228,442; France (Nice and Corsica), 536,820; Austria, 1,540,000.

rate in Europe. To-day, by great amelioration in the sanitary condition of the population, not merely in the cities, but more especially in the rural districts, the ratio of mortality has been materially reduced. The manner in which malaria, which as recently as 1900 still averaged as high as 31 per 100 of the population in the contaminated districts of the Maremma, was reduced to only 2 per 100 in 1908, and pellagra, which in 1881 totalled 104,000 cases, and notwithstanding the insidious character of the disease was reduced by over two-thirds, are fair examples of the advance made in stamping out preventable disease in Italy. However, the death-rate in Italy is still higher than in the other chief European States, varying between 19.6 to 21.9 per 1,000, as compared with Great Britain (14.8), France (17.98). The excess of births over deaths in 1911 in Italy amounted to 350,734 or 10.1 per 1,000.

The principal cause of this relatively small increase in population, notwithstanding the fecundity of the race, is emigration. Bad crops, low wages, bad housing conditions in the south of Italy, the desire to improve their economic status, and the example of so many successful emigrants who have returned home prosperous after a few years abroad are the chief causes of emigration. For a long period these able-bodied young Italians, who had gone forth into the world to earn a livelihood, owing to the short-sighted policy of the Government, which endeavoured to obstruct emigration, found themselves abandoned to their own resources. This is no longer the case. The Italian Government now realises that this great stream of emigrants is not merely a means

of propagating Italian influence in the less populous districts of the New World, more particularly in South America, but that it is the source of an ever-increasing income, which has begun to flow into Italian coffers from abroad. Moreover, many of those who have emigrated in poverty, return to Italy to enjoy the fruits of their hard-won fortunes, bringing with them modern ideas and influences, which has done much to rouse the peasantry of the South from its apathy. From 135,832 emigrants who left Italy in 1881, when the tide of emigration set in, the figures have risen until they reached the astonishing total of 872,598 in 1913. Of these 313,032 emigrated to European or Mediterranean countries, while 407,475 set out for the United States and Canada, and 145,702 for the Argentine Republic and the other South American States. The number of Italian emigrants who returned to Italy during this year, numbered 188,978. According to the official publication, *Anuario Statistico Italiano* (1913), the number of Italians resident abroad numbered 5,557,746. In recent years, these Italian emigrants, living abroad, have remitted annually important sums of money to their relatives and families who have remained in Italy. According to computation made of the postal money-orders received in Italy from emigrants abroad, these amounted to nearly £5,000,000 in 1913 from this one source, and showed an increase of £1,360,000 since 1906.

Sixty per cent of the population of Italy are engaged in agriculture. Though the trend towards industrial pursuits is increasing, agriculture in its varied forms still remains the foundation of the nation's

wealth. The total value of the whole agricultural produce in 1910 was estimated at £28,000,000. Great efforts are being made to increase the productivity of the soil by the use of carefully selected fertilisers. The vineyards are now the subject of scientific attention, and greater care is being paid to the quality of the wines. Mechanical implements are being introduced, and in certain regions in the northern districts, more particularly in Emilia, where co-operative methods are much in vogue, the initiative and improvements introduced in dairy-farming and in the making of cheese, butter, etc., have been widely copied abroad. These co-operative societies, which have sprung up everywhere in the north of Italy, are spreading rapidly and have proved themselves eminently successful, contributing much to the prosperity of Italy.<sup>1</sup> Rural credit banks to help the farmers with loans, agrarian unions, and Government travelling teachers of agriculture, who visit every district to instruct the farmers in the most approved and modern methods of carrying on their particular type of farming, have multiplied.

The case of the South is different, the conditions there are still far from satisfactory. The appalling poverty of the people—a man's wages are often not more than 6d. a day—is here the chief incentive to emigration, as a way out of an unbearable situation. Vast estates, absent landlordism, and all the evils of a defective agrarian system, have for so long been the rule, that the progress that is being made has as yet borne but little fruit.

<sup>1</sup> In 1910 there were 5,064 co-operative societies, and the returns from 4,222 showed 817,529 members.

Though Italy is not a country of mineral wealth, the output of her mines in 1910 was valued at £3,210,000. Owing to the fall in the price of sulphur, the output of the Sicilian sulphur mines, which two decades ago was of great importance, has materially decreased, whereas the tonnage of iron has increased greatly, amounting to 551,000 in 1910. Copper, zinc, and lead were also mined in small quantities. The value of the products of the rock quarries, travertine, marble, etc., has increased to approximately £2,000,000. Italy produces only about one-twelfth (562,000 tons in 1910) the amount of coal which is annually consumed there, and though this has in a measure retarded her industrial development, it has encouraged her engineers to seek methods of emancipating Italy from the need of coal. It has been conservatively estimated that the streams and rivers of Italy could furnish her with over 5,000,000 horse-power. According to recent reports (1914), 968,100 electrical horse-power were in operation. Italy thus leads all Europe, and is second only to the United States in this field. The first electrified railway to be successfully operated in Europe was inaugurated in 1890 on the line between Florence and Fiesole, and the work of electrification has been steadily extended. A direct electric line from Rome to Naples, a distance of 120 miles, is nearing completion, and it is hoped that eventually the entire railway system of the peninsula will be operated exclusively by electricity.

Notwithstanding the high price of coal in Italy, industrial progress has been steady. According to the census taken in 1911, 2,305,720 persons were engaged in industrial labour, of whom one-fourth were in Lombardy.

Whereas very little pig-iron was produced in Italy as recently as 1900, and the production was only seriously undertaken within the present decade, the output, 353,000 tons (1910), was nearly threefold as great as when the census was taken four years before; while in the same four-year period the output of wrought-iron increased from 237,000 to 311,000, and steel from 333,000 to 670,000 tons. During this period the value of the products of chemical industries increased from £4,093,000 to £6,001,000. The textile industries also developed most rapidly. The production of raw silk has more than tripled since 1875, while the value of silk and woven silk products exported in 1911 is estimated at close to £18,000,000, so that Milan now rivals Lyons as the centre of the silk trade of the world. Cotton-mills have sprung up everywhere in northern Italy, and Italian cotton fabrics were already competing in foreign markets, the exports to Turkey alone amounting to over 10,000 tons, while the value of cotton exports totalled (1911) £7,320,000. The beet-sugar industry shows an equal expansion. In 1899 only 5,972 tons were produced, while the figures for the production eleven years later are 173,184 tons, besides 62,700 tons of syrups and molasses. Italy supplies nearly one-third of the total world consumption of olive-oil, her exports (1911) in this article amounting to £1,800,000. The Italian automobile industry has won for itself a position of creditable pre-eminence, and the export of Italian automobiles, though numerically small, were valued at £1,100,000.

Italy was a late comer in world markets, yet the figures of her commercial development are amazing. In 1910 imports into Italy, excluding precious metals,

amounted to £129,839,039, and her exports during this year were valued at £83,199,095. "It was calculated that between 1898 and 1910, Italian imports had risen 143 per cent, and her exports 124 per cent—increases which surpass those of all other countries except the exportation figures of the United States."<sup>1</sup> Italy's chief imports are cereals, raw cotton, coal, chemical products, machinery, and wood. Her chief exports are silk, cotton and silk goods, fruits, wine, and agricultural produce. Exclusive of coal, which came chiefly from Great Britain, and raw cotton from the United States, Germany, as was to be expected from her position of control over Italian markets, furnished Italy with nearly one-fourth of her total imports; while Germany was Italy's best customer, Italian exports to Germany being nearly £4,000,000 greater than to the next best customer, the United States, with Great Britain third on the list, in 1911.<sup>2</sup>

As in other fields, the increase in Italian maritime trade has been important. The number of ships which entered and cleared Italian ports in 1910 was 312,689, with a tonnage of 102,390,908 as compared with only 32,070,704 tons in 1881, while the Italian mercantile marine numbered 680 steamships, with a tonnage of about 630,000, and 4,723 sailing ships of approximately 440,000 tons.

Naples is now the first port of Italy, and has shown the extraordinary increase of nearly 50 per cent in tonnage in the four-year period 1906–10. The harbour facilities have been greatly extended, and

<sup>1</sup> The "Britannica Year Book," 1913, p. 1045.

<sup>2</sup> For the year 1914, that is, before Italian participation in the European War, the imports from Great Britain to Italy exceeded those of any other country.

large sums have been voted for harbour improvements. Genoa, long the most important port in Italy, has now taken second place. The congestion of traffic at Genoa and the difficulty of increasing dockage facilities have hampered its growth. Venice is Italy's third mercantile port, though Palermo is competing strongly and has already won third place in passenger traffic.

The total mileage of railways in 1907 amounted to 10,368, and there have been few new lines opened, though a certain amount of doubling of existing lines has taken place. Italian railways have passed through many vicissitudes. At the outset, built and operated by the State, they were, in 1885 turned over to private corporations, and then repurchased by the State in 1905. The value of Italian railways in 1911 was estimated at £295,500,000 and the profits at £6,000,000. There has been much improvement in administration in recent years, and great efforts are being made to bring the passenger traffic up to the level of that of the chief European States. Steam and electric tramways have a mileage of 3,018, while motor-omnibus service is steadily being extended through rural districts not tapped by the railways, and over 2,000 miles of highroad were thus under operation. The motor lines receive subvention from the Government.

The number of post-offices in Italy in 1910 was 10,238, while the number of letters handled increased by 600,000,000 between 1906 and 1912. There were 8,147 telegraph offices in 1912, as compared with only 1,930 eight years before. The figures for 1912 include 22 wireless stations. The development of the tele-

phone system has been even more rapid. In 1904 there were only 92 urban and 66 interurban systems, while by 1910 there were 219 urban and 426 interurban systems, and the expansion continues steadily.

The great economic development during the past two decades has brought Italy up from the rank of a "poor" country, to which she was long confined, to that of a nation of ever-increasing wealth and well-being. The North of Italy is one of the most prosperous regions of Europe, and if the total of Italian wealth is still much below that of the other Great Powers its increase has been considerable. According to estimates of an Italian economist, the private wealth of the nation is estimated at over eighty milliard lire,<sup>1</sup> nearly three and a fifth thousand millions sterling or about £90 per capita. This amount is an estimated increase of a thousand million sterling in a decade. These figures are of necessity only approximate, and a more accurate insight into the increasing wealth of Italy is gained by looking into the condition of the savings-banks. In 1901 the total deposits in the savings-banks, credit banks, and other similar institutions, averaged about £3-4-0 per head. At the end of 1910 these deposits had increased to £6-3-0 or nearly 50 per cent, in the nine-year period, and the total amounts thus deposited were £214,500,000. To this figure must be added £74,000,000 in the postal savings-bank, and £98,000,000 in savings in ordinary banks.

During the early years of Italy's existence as a united Kingdom, her financial position was precarious.

<sup>1</sup> Prinivalli: "L'Italia nella sua Vita Economica," Treves, Milan, 1915, p. 66.

The new State had inherited a long list of debts from the various units incorporated in the Kingdom. The war of 1866 had added to the already overburdened Italian finances. This year ended with a deficit of £28,840,000. Only the most stringent economy and drastic forms of taxation could save the young State from bankruptcy. A grist tax (*macinato*) was introduced, which, though highly unpopular as it increased the price of bread appreciably, netted the relatively large sum of £3,200,000 a year; while economies introduced in all State and Government departments and the expropriation of Church property saved the situation. Yet the period of financial difficulties was not at an end, and though the deficits were reduced from year to year, the size of the budget increased rapidly. It was not until after the incorporation of Rome in the Kingdom, and the unsettled state of the country came to an end, that Italian finances began to be on a more stable footing. The year 1875 showed the first surplus, and for the ensuing decade the financial situation of the country was on a solvent basis. The economies were by degrees abandoned; the country now entered upon a period of premature expansion. The grist tax was abolished, extravagant expenditures on railways, unsound banking, and later, burdensome colonial enterprises again brought on a period of financial difficulties, and the long years of increasing deficits from 1884 to 1898 were finally terminated by careful economies and reforms which once again rescued Italy from financial chaos. During the ensuing fourteen years, owing in part to the great economic development of the country, Italian finances showed a yearly surplus, not-

withstanding the fact that expenditures increased over thirty millions sterling. The Italian *Rente*, which stood at 78 in 1893 soon passed par, while a conversion of the Debt, carried out in 1906, brought about an economy of a million and a half sterling a year. Though at the time it seemed as though the Tripolitan war had not affected Italy's financial position, yet a period of appreciable deficits was again inaugurated during the past three fiscal years. During the year 1913-14 the receipts of the exchequer amounted to £100,950,000, and the expenditure was £107,506,400, showing a deficit of £6,556,400.

Revenues are derived chiefly from imposts on lands, buildings, and personal estates; monopolies on salt, tobacco, and the lottery, and taxation on imports. Italy has not only a high protective tariff, but also taxes necessities, not produced in the country, such as wheat, sugar, coffee, etc. The expenses of collection are heavy, the burden of taxation is very unevenly distributed, and weighs onerously on the poor. The service of the National Debt still represents a great proportion of expenditure, amounting to about twenty and a quarter millions sterling yearly. In 1913 the figures of the debt on the Grand Livre amounted to £551,920,000, of which only approximately 12 per cent is owned abroad. The gold held by the Bank of Italy (June, 1912) was £40,976,000.

Crime in Italy is decreasing. Brigandage, in its more picturesque forms, which was once indigenous in Calabria, has been wiped out, and the "Camorra" has been shorn of much of its vigour as a result of the Viterbo trial of 1912. Vendettas still survive in the southern provinces, and though homicides are pro-

portionately more frequent in Italy than in any other European country, their number is rapidly diminishing, having decreased by nearly 50 per cent since 1880.

Hand in hand with this decrease in criminality, there has been a slow though steady increase in educational facilities. The Italian Kingdom's inheritance of illiteracy was appalling. The percentage of illiterates in 1871 was 73 per cent, the second highest in Europe. In 1910 it was still 50 per cent for the total and 30 per cent for the male population. In the North of Italy education is widely diffused, and the schools are efficient; in the South they are still defective, yet much progress has been made in elementary schools, both in numbers and attendance. The total number of schoolrooms has risen in a decade from 61,777 to 68,031 (1911), while attendance has increased during this period nearly 400,000 to 3,150,249 or 9.3 per 100 of the population. Schools for adult illiterates, established in 1906, had an attendance of 128,000, of whom four-fifths were men. Though increasingly large credits have been voted for educational purposes, there is still much room for improvement, especially in the South of Italy where school buildings are inadequate, the teachers poorly paid, and evasions from school attendance common. Though the Ginnasi and Licei, or classical secondary schools, show a distinct decrease both in number and attendance, the technical schools and institutes have gained appreciably, both of these latter gaining nearly 50 per cent in numbers of scholars in the eight-year period 1902-10. The 500 technical schools had in this latter year 83,621, and the technical institutes 20,305, scholars in attendance. This trend towards technical train-

ing cannot fail to have a very beneficial effect in Italy, where in the past the liberal professions were far too overcrowded. The rapid economic development of Italy is now attracting more and more the type of men into business who hitherto wasted their time in some Government sinecure after completing a course of study at a university. So that it is not surprising to find that the number of students in attendance at the universities (28,000) has been practically stationary during the past decade.

Italy, in order to protect herself from foreign aggression, from the earliest days of her existence felt the necessity of having a strong army. After her entrance into the Triple Alliance she further increased her effectives, and voted large credits for military purposes, which caused serious financial embarrassment. Though the army budget was subsequently reduced, the Italian General Staff has always been directed by intelligent and efficient officers, whose spirit of initiative has kept the Italian forces in the vanguard of development in all branches of military science. Italy was the country first to train troops for mountain warfare, and her corps of *Alpini* were imitated by both France and Austria; as were her *Bersaglieri*, the first *chasseurs à pied* or light infantry in Europe. Aviation was actively encouraged as an essential branch of the service from the very earliest days of its practical usefulness, and dirigibles were first used in modern warfare by the Italians during the Tripolitan campaign. Italy was one of the first countries to adopt an "invisible" field uniform. Though hampered by lack of funds, her armies have been kept up to a high standard of efficiency

and discipline. Service in the Italian army is compulsory, beginning with the age of 20; the men remaining 19 years with the colours. Active service, formerly 3 years in the infantry and 5 years in the cavalry, was reduced to 2 years, while those paying £48 and passing an examination were required to serve only one year. The peace footing of the Italian army was 14,000 officers and 255,000 men, while the nominal war footing was 1,215,000. The actual war footing, however, was 41,692 officers and 3,433,150 men in 1913.

Concerned with her position as a naval Power, and owing to the great length of her coast-line, Italy, when she entered upon the period of colonial expansion, made a great effort to bring her navy up to a high standard. She embarked upon a daring programme of naval construction, and set the example of building monster ships, armed with monster guns, the precursors of the modern Dreadnoughts. As the result of great enterprise and efforts, by 1893 Italy had reached the position of third naval Power in the world, ranking immediately after Great Britain and France. But, owing to financial difficulties, her ambitious policy of naval expansion had to be abandoned, so that one by one the United States, Germany, and Japan passed her, and the Italian navy now ranks sixth. During the past decade Italian expenditures for naval purposes have again risen. The total naval effectives in 1913, on a peace footing, included 2,016 officers and 32,984 men, with 329 vessels of all types. Her programme of naval construction for that year provided for seven new "Super-Dreadnoughts," a number exceeded only by Great Britain and France.

The total area of Italy's colonial domain is approximately 1,250,000 square miles, with a population of 1,580,000 inhabitants. The area of Libya is roughly 1,000,000 square miles, and has a population estimated at 900,000. The Italian occupation of Libya has entailed considerable expenditure amounting to well over £50,000,000, though the rapid increase in trade between Italy and her new colony has, in a measure, compensated therefor. The number of steamships arriving in Italian ports from Libya has risen from 9, with a tonnage of 9,637 in the year 1908, to 705 with a tonnage of 1,408,000 in 1912; while during the same period the number of ships clearing from Italy for Libyan ports rose from 42, with a tonnage of 55,342 to 990 with a tonnage of 1,863,825. The value of the annual exports from Libya to Italy has increased ninefold during this same four-year period from £27,053 to £236,098; imports from Italy to Libya having risen from £120,822 to £4,031,542. Communications between Libya and Italy have been greatly improved, so that Tripoli may now be reached in forty-eight hours from Rome.

Eritrea, with an area of about 85,000 square miles, had a population of 278,893 at the last census, of whom 3,949 are Europeans. The military force is chiefly native, commanded by Italian officers. The expenditures for the year 1911 amounted to £559,000, of which Italy contributed one-half. During the four-year period, 1908-12, imports have doubled, totalling nearly £1,000,000, while exports from Eritrea proper have increased threefold to £374,872. Though the development of Eritrea has hitherto been slow, Italy has high hopes for the future of the colony. A care-

ful investigation has shown that as soon as adequate transportation facilities are provided, Eritrea will be able to produce enough cotton to make Italy independent of American cotton. The work of railway construction is being rapidly carried on. The lines in existence now extend to 111.5 miles, and £200,000 was allotted in 1911 for extensions.

Italian Somaliland is an extensive tract of land hitherto little exploited. The annual expenditures amount to about £200,000. The colony exports ivory, coffee, cotton, and gums, and imports cotton goods, chiefly from Italy, the total trade of the colony amounting to £430,506.

Italy further occupied in the Ægean, Rhodes and other smaller islands. The expenses of occupation at the end of 1913 amounted to £850,000.

In looking over this very brief survey of the economic and social development of Italy, one cannot fail to be impressed by the great progress which the country had made during the half century since unity had been achieved. A new force was arising, which, with the passing years, was more and more to assert its power in the world. The Italian people were not blind to the fact that there remained much to be done to establish on a solid foundation this vast economic edifice, which had sprung up so rapidly. To check the wastage of emigration, to educate her peoples of the South up to the standards of the Western world, still awaited to be carried out. But of greater immediate importance was the necessity of freeing the economic life of Italy from foreign control, of emancipating the country from German domination. These were the two great tasks to which Italy was next to

turn her energies. Confident in her strength, relying on the united effort of her peoples, who under the ægis of the House of Savoy were rapidly losing their regionalist traditions, so that "Italy" was no longer merely a word, but meant to each and every Italian "*la patria*," such was the Italy which could calmly elect to follow the course best suited to her vital interests, when the hour came. In this hour the true strength of the nation was to be revealed.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL

ROME THE CAPITAL OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY. THE LAW OF  
GUARANTEES. THE ROMAN QUESTION

AMONG the various problems which have confronted the new Kingdom of Italy, none has been more difficult and vexatious than that of its relations with the Papacy. Though an Italian Pontiff, elected by a majority of Italian cardinals, sits on the throne of St. Peter, no Pope has hitherto become openly reconciled to the loss of his temporal power, and the King of Italy is still considered by the Vatican and its entourage as the unlawful usurper of the rights and privileges, as well as the estates, of the Holy See.

It was on September 19, 1870, that the Italian troops under the command of General Raffaele Cadorna stood before the walls of Rome. King Victor Emmanuel had, in a letter couched in terms of filial affection, prayed the Pope, Pius IX, to renounce his temporal prerogatives, and thus permit the peaceable accomplishment of Italian unity, which with the incorporation of Rome in the Kingdom would be complete. The Pope refused to comply with this request, stating that he would resist by force of arms all attempts to deprive him of his dominions. On September 20 the Italian forces, after a bombardment of the city lasting five hours, entered Rome through a breach in the walls near the Porta Pia. Seeing that further resis-

tance was useless, the Pope ordered his troops to retire, and as a protest to the world against the violation of his sovereignty, Pius IX shut himself up in the Vatican, never to leave it, a self-interned prisoner.

This was not the first time in recent years that the Popes lost their temporal power. As a result of the Napoleonic invasion of Italy a republic was proclaimed in Rome in 1798 which lasted but a brief period. In May, 1809, the Papal States were, by a decree issued by Napoleon from Vienna, annexed to the French Empire, and not until his downfall, five years later, did the Pope again enter into possession of his domain. The Papal authority was for a third time overthrown in 1849. In February, Mazzini, the hero of Italy's early struggles for unity and independence, hastened to Rome; Pope Pius IX was driven from the city; a republican form of government was set up under the leadership of Mazzini. The Romans believed that they could rally around them all Italy, but the attempts failed. Tuscany refused the invitation to join the Romans, and the disastrous effort to throw off the yoke of the Austrians in the North dampened the ardour of the Italians. The Pope from his exile at Gaeta sought foreign aid to bring about his re-establishment. France, though at this time a republic under the presidency of Louis Napoleon, the future Emperor, under the pretext of protecting the new Roman republic, fitted out a small expedition and despatched the force under General Oudinot to Rome. The Republicans, led by Garibaldi, suspecting the good faith of the French, gave battle and obliged them to retreat. The French, further reinforced, now openly announced their object of reinstating the Papal au-

thority. On June 3, they began the siege of Rome. For a month Garibaldi's legions held out against the French besiegers. Finally on July 2, it was deemed impossible to hold the city any longer. Garibaldi, with the remnant of his forces withdrew, and Rome once again was compelled to accept the rule of the Popes.

But the temper of the Roman people during this last uprising showed clearly that they would not rest content until they had overthrown for all time the rule of the Papacy. Rome was now permanently garrisoned by French troops. This force of some 15,000 men was not withdrawn until 1866. As soon as the French left the city, Garibaldi again planned an expedition to conquer the capital. Italian unity had now progressed towards its triumphant achievement. Under the House of Savoy all Italy had been united into one great State. Rome alone remained outside the union. The Italian Government, out of fear of France, had by a convention, signed September 15, 1864, agreed not to undertake an expedition against Rome, or to make any attempt to incorporate the city in the new Kingdom. Knowing that Garibaldi was contemplating such an expedition, the Italian authorities removed him to Caprera, a small island close to the coast of Sardinia, under an armed guard. Garibaldi, however, eluding his guardians, made his way safely back to Tuscany, and gathering together his legionaries, marched against Rome. In a first encounter the Papal troops were defeated at Monte Rotondo on October 29, 1867. In the meantime Napoleon III had despatched a fresh army to the assistance of the Pope. On November 3, at Mentana the Garibaldians

met the French and were badly beaten. Garibaldi returned to his exile at Caprera, and the French again garrisoned Rome.

The fifth and final attempt to deliver Rome from Papal rule was at last successful. The French troops were withdrawn from Rome at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. At the downfall of the French Empire, on September 4, 1870, the Italian Government, released from the engagement entered into with Napoleon not to occupy Rome, set about the undertaking which they so speedily brought to a successful issue.

On October 2, the inhabitants of Rome and the Papal States, by a plebiscite solemnly voted their adherence to the Kingdom of Italy. Rome was thereupon proclaimed the capital of the country. King Victor Emmanuel II and the Government removed from Florence to Rome. The King took up his residence in the Quirinal, the former summer palace of the Popes. Thus the temporal power of the Papacy, which with brief interregnums had lasted for eleven centuries, came to an end.

Pius IX continued, however, not to recognise the new authorities, or to treat with them in any manner. The Italian Government, wishing to regulate by statute its relations with the Papacy, had, in May, 1871, passed the so-called "Law of Guarantees," whereby the Pope is conceded nominal privileges and prerogatives as a sovereign, his person is inviolable, his residence at the Vatican, as well as at the Lateran and the Villa Castel Gandolfo, enjoy extraterritorial rights. The Pope is to have his own armed guards, receive Envoys and Ministers from foreign

sovereigns unmolested by the Italian authorities. Furthermore, besides other provisions which provide for every probable eventuality, the Italian Government pledged itself to pay an annual indemnity of 3,225,000 lire (£129,000) towards the maintenance of the Holy See; a sum which was equal to the normal Papal budget.

The perplexities of the Italian authorities were not, however, smoothed over by the passage of the Law of Guarantees. Pius IX throughout his pontificate obstinately continued to ignore its terms. He refused to accept the proffered indemnity, and repeated his protests to the world against the usurpation of his temporal authority.

Though there was a small and cultured element among the Roman churchmen, who were convinced that the Church could develop its prestige and extend its spiritual sway throughout the world more widely if the Pope no longer had to concern himself with temporal problems of civil administration, the majority of the Curia, as well as pious Catholics throughout Italy, felt that the Pope must inevitably be impeded in the exercise of his Papal functions by the presence of another authority in Rome.

The entry of the Italians into Rome, instead of solving the Roman Question, had thus on the contrary virulently revived it. Foreign nations which had hitherto shown undivided sympathy for the cause of Italian unity, England, Prussia, and Belgium—in the first the Irish Catholics, in the latter the Clericals—joined in protesting, both in and out of Parliament, against the Italian occupation of the Eternal City. Cavour's programme of a "free Church within a free

State," was the plan which the Italian Government set about loyally to execute. The separation of the Church and State, it was believed, might be carried out without prejudice to either. And though Pius IX, who had been despoiled of his temporal sovereignty, could not be expected to accept the new status, it was confidently hoped that his successor would in time inaugurate a more conciliatory policy. As long as Pius IX lived the Italian Governments maintained an attitude of patient toleration. The anathemas and invectives hurled against them were borne in a spirit of contrition. They were waiting for better days.

In 1878 the Pope died. The Conclave assembled to elect his successor. Unmolested, and in complete security and privacy, the College of Cardinals met for the first time under the new *régime*. In the most imposing, as well as well-ordered Conclave held in many centuries, after an unusually brief meeting of only thirty-six hours, Cardinal Pecci was elected Pope, and assumed the title of Leo XIII. The new Pontiff in no-wise resembled his predecessor. A man of broad views, and in many respects fully alive to the needs and conditions of our times, an acute observer and skilful politician, he nevertheless, in the very first act of his reign dealt a cruel blow to the hopes of the Quirinal. It was confidently expected that Leo XIII would consent to be crowned publicly in St. Peter's. Instead, his coronation took place in strict privacy in the Sistine Chapel and the new Pope at once let it be known that he saw fit to consider himself the prisoner of the Italian Government, and locked himself up in the Vatican.

Moderate in his acts as in his language, conciliatory in his attitude towards the peculiar needs of his Catholic subjects within the boundaries of their respective States, amenable to new ideas, Leo XIII was anxious and willing to compromise on almost every question except that of Rome. Undaunted, the partisans of a reconciliation between the Vatican and the Quirinal endeavoured to accommodate the relations between them. In the Italian Chamber the matter was favourably discussed, and proved the eagerness of the Italians to put an end to an equivocal situation. Leo XIII speedily quashed these negotiations when he sharply asserted his inalienable right to the temporal sovereignty of Rome. He maintained that Rome was not large enough to hold both a King and a Pope. Unable to persuade the Italian Government to leave the city and establish the capital in Florence or Naples, the Pope outwardly made preparations to leave Rome. He caused an inventory to be made of the treasures of the Vatican, which he proposed to convey abroad. The Italian Government became alarmed, for though the presence of a recalcitrant Pontiff in their midst was a source of much embarrassment, nevertheless, the removal of the Papacy would be a serious blow to the prestige of the young Kingdom.

Leo XIII, in order to strengthen his position in his conflict with the Italian Government, came to an understanding with Bismarck. A reconciliation between the Pope and the instigator of Catholic persecution in Germany was effected. The *Kulturkampf* came to an end, and we see Leo XIII using his influence with the German Catholics to persuade them

to accept Bismarck's dictates, while the Iron Chancellor offered the Pope a dignified asylum in Germany, should he wish to remove the Papacy from Rome, although this project was never carried out. The chief aim of Leo XIII had been to increase his moral influence abroad, as well as to raise the status of ascendancy of the Pope in political matters. A skilled diplomatist, and a genial Pontiff, he readily created for the Papacy a high place in international affairs. He was selected by various foreign States to act as arbitrator in their territorial quarrels, and his verdicts are luminous examples of astute and sound judgment, tempered by moderation and justice.

Yet Leo XIII never ceased to look upon the Italian Government with a hostile eye. He was able to cause innumerable embarrassments to the Quirinal, and during the early years of the new Kingdom the dominant figure of Leo XIII in the affairs of Rome prevented the Italians from developing their national strength and consciousness as rapidly as would have been otherwise possible. The Papacy, throughout his long reign, continued to ignore the Italian Government, and refused to treat with the Quirinal or to permit any loyal Catholics to take part in the public life of Italy. Wherever possible the Roman Curia placed obstacles in the path of the Italian authorities. The Pope forbade Catholic sovereigns to pay visits of State to the Italian capital, and the pride of the Italians was humbled by the strict observance of this command by the rulers of all Catholic States. Leo XIII, while receiving Ministers and Embassies from other States, refused to negotiate even distantly with the Italian authorities, and in matters both great and

small, the influence of the Papacy tenaciously opposed the increasing strength of the new Italy. So that within the Kingdom there remained this politically hostile power which militated against the best interests of the country, and continued to be a source of disintegration rather than of unity.

As the years passed, and the Papacy tacitly tolerated the *status quo*, a new programme to regulate the position of the Vatican was brought forward, which though not enunciated clearly until the succeeding pontificate, further complicated the situation. When the Pope realised that no moral suasion would induce the King of Italy to leave Rome, and that no foreign State would undertake an armed expedition to re-establish the temporal authority of the Papacy, it became the ambition of many churchmen to place the Vatican under international protection—in other words, to internationalise the Roman Question—and secure the enforcement of the Law of Guarantees or other similar statutes, by international sanction, thus placing the Pope beyond the jurisdiction of the Italian authorities. This plan, in view of the fact that Catholics, nominally subjects of the Pope, are to be found in all countries of the world, seemed peculiarly well adapted to secure greater liberties for the Papacy, as well as increased prestige. However, from the outset this proposal was vigorously opposed by the Italian Government. They maintained that the Roman Question was cosmopolitan and not international. It was cosmopolitan because the Catholic Church, as its name implies, embraces the whole world; it was not international because no one group of nations has the right to guarantee by treaty the maintenance

of the Papacy. Italy's Law of Guarantees regarding the Holy See is a unilateral contract, arising out of the fact that the residence of the head of the Catholic Church is situated within the boundaries of Italy, and that some arrangement had to be made to define the relations of the Papacy towards the civil authorities. Italy thus endeavoured to combat any tendency, which might arise abroad, to regard favourably the plan of internationalisation, and to affirm positively her right to be the sole arbiter of the Roman Question which she considered a purely domestic problem.

Upon the death of Leo XIII in July, 1903, the Conclave again met at Rome, to consider the election of his successor. Leo XIII, throughout his pontificate, had been ably assisted by Cardinal Rampolla del Tindaro, his Secretary of State, a man who by his training, natural gifts, and his tolerant views, seemed well-fitted to bear the Papal burden. The candidature of Cardinal Rampolla had received the support of the French Government, and the Italian authorities would have welcomed his election, but the Emperor of Austria, at the suggestion of Germany, on this occasion made use of his ancient prerogative of veto, and prevented the elevation to the Papacy of a man who, it was believed, would have considered the relations of the Vatican and the Quirinal in a new light. Cardinal Sarto, Archbishop of Venice, was the compromise candidate upon whom the election fell. Of humble parentage, he had risen from the position of village priest, through all the grades of the ecclesiastical career, to the throne of St. Peter. A man of great humility and religious zeal, whose piety and devotion

were known throughout Italy, yet unversed in the legal aspects of the position of the Vatican and the intricacies of the Roman Question, he took little interest in the political rôle of the pontificate. Pius X, a "religious Pope," more engrossed with the affairs of heaven than those of this earth, engaged in suppressing "Modernism," concerned with matters of ritual and dogma, neglected the more immediate problem of the relation of the Papacy to Italy. Though he departed from the policy of Leo XIII of playing an active political rôle, this did not imply that he held a more tolerant view of the matter of temporal jurisdiction. He followed and thus stamped as a traditional custom the idea of considering the Pope the "Prisoner of St. Peter's," and rejected the Law of Guarantees.

In his first encyclical of October 4, 1903, Pius X seemed to indicate that the Roman Question was closed. A number of Italians already proclaimed that the day of reconciliation of the Kingdom and the Papacy had at last arrived. Pius X withdrew the *non expedit* and freely granted permission to all loyal Catholics to take an active part in the political life of Italy, which the intransigent policy of his predecessors had prohibited; he assumed a more conciliatory attitude regarding the giving of religious instruction in the schools; sanctioned the singing of the Italian national anthem by the Catholic societies, and admitted the Italian flag within the precincts of the Vatican. But it was soon evident that these concessions were of no real significance when compared with the broader issue of the sovereignty of Rome. Pius X was to seize the first opportunity to voice

his protest against the usurpation of the Kings of Italy.

In the autumn of 1904, President Loubet of France paid an official visit to the King of Italy at Rome. The Pope immediately issued a circular note to the Powers, protesting against the visit of the chief of a great Catholic State to "him who, against all right, holds my temporal sovereignty, and impedes its liberty and independence." The result of this protest was the severing of diplomatic relations between France and the Vatican.

Pius X had ascended the Papal throne accompanied by the best wishes of the Italian people. The simplicity of his court contrasted vividly with the pomp and ceremony of the reign of Leo XIII. His humble birth, his affectionate regard for his sisters, who still remained simple peasant women, as well as the peaceful atmosphere of goodness, which impressed all those who came in contact with the Pope, created a legend which enveloped the Pontiff in a halo of sanctity. Never before had a Pope received Venetian peasants in the sumptuous private apartments of the Vatican; received them not as a sovereign but as a friend. Christian and Jew were alike admitted into his presence, and every one who so desired had access to the Holy Father, who was intent upon re-establishing the rule of Christ in its literal form of "peace on earth, good-will to men." So that the repressive acts which took place under Pius X were ascribed chiefly to the Papal entourage.

During the later years of the pontificate of Pius X, the Papacy revived virulently its anti-Italian policy. The celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the

founding of the Kingdom of Italy, in 1911, was seized upon by the Pope to proclaim that all good Catholics must consider these, "days of deep mourning." Henceforth Pius X took every opportunity to bring before the world the thorny subject of the temporal powers of the Papacy. At the same time the question of internationalising the Law of Guarantees was brought to the fore, and became the object of careful consideration and study by Vatican jurists.

The outbreak of the European War found Pius X still occupying the throne of St. Peter. The terrible conflict which had been enkindled throughout the Christian world was said to have been a source of deep anguish to the Holy Father. Borne down by age and infirmity, bewailing the fate of his fellow men, Pius X sank into his grave on August 21, 1914.

Ten days later fifty-seven Cardinals assembled in the Vatican to elect the two hundred and sixtieth Pope. Many of the prelates who had gathered here came from States now at war, and none could entirely divest themselves of their national allegiance, or put out of their thoughts the national passions and prejudices engendered by the conflict. The state of the Church might well give them cause for preoccupation. Under the late Pontiff the prestige of the Papacy had been slowly declining. The gravity of the moment demanded that the reins of the Catholic Church be placed in able hands if the Papacy was again to play an important part in worldly affairs. It, therefore, was evident that a "political" Pope must be intrusted with the keys of St. Peter's.

The *papabili*, as the candidates for Papal honours are designated, were not numerous. No strong

personality dominated the Conclave. During the first and second of September, when the ballots were counted, none of the candidates received two-thirds of the total votes necessary for election. It was noticed, however, that the Cardinal Della Chiesa, Archbishop of Bologna, who had come into the Conclave a relatively unsupported candidate, not even ranked among the more important *papabili* was slowly gaining the suffrages of his colleagues. During the ballot taking of September 3, no agreement could be reached. Finally to break the deadlock, when it became evident that neither of the leading candidates, Cardinals Maffi and Serafini, could secure the necessary majority, on the first ballot of September 4, Cardinal Della Chiesa received 39 votes, the number strictly necessary for his election.

During the Conclave the Pope-elect had followed the proceedings with a cool and dispassionate eye. He seemed to take little interest in what was going on; upon hearing the announcement of his election, the new Pontiff seemed unmoved. In answer to the question of what name he would assume, the Pope replied in a calm voice, "Benedict XV." In taking the name of Benedict, the new Pope wished to show that he intended to break away from the tradition of both Leo XIII and Pius X.

According to custom, three sets of white Papal robes of different sizes are prepared in advance, as the Pope on his election is immediately clad in his new vestments, and receives the homage of the assembled Cardinals. Benedict XV now entered the Sistine Chapel arrayed in the Papal robes of the smallest size, yet even these were too large, and they shrouded his

shrunken form in deep folds. His face, thin and drawn, wearing heavy lensed, gold-rimmed spectacles, peered out from over his white-caped gown, inquisitive, yet confident and self-possessed. The Pope received the obeisances of the Princes of the Church with great dignity. His countenance bore no trace of emotion. Those who saw him declare that it seemed as though the new Pope had been accustomed to his rôle all his life.

On placing the triple tiara on the head of Cardinal Della Chiesa, the Conclave had fulfilled its mission and elected a "political" Pope. The reign of Pius X already seemed covered with the dust of ages. A new era was to open in the history of Rome. Never before had a Pope been called upon to face a more grave and serious crisis, both within and without the Church. Benedict XV, undaunted by the difficulties which loomed before him, entered resolutely upon his new duties, and the evening of the day of his election to the throne of St. Peter, found the Pope busy, personally dictating telegrams, announcing his accession, to foreign sovereigns.

Benedict XV is the son of the Marchese Della Chiesa, of an ancient Genoese patrician family. Born at Genoa on November 21, 1854, he was ordained a priest in 1879, and then pursued his studies in canon law, more especially in ecclesiastical diplomacy at Rome. When Cardinal Rampolla, at the time a monsignor, was sent as Papal Nuncio to Spain in 1883, he took with him as his secretary, Della Chiesa. The young priest, who soon revealed great diplomatic aptitude, became the confidential adviser of his chief, and when later Cardinal Rampolla assumed the office of Secretary of State at the Vatican, Monsignor Della

Chiesa became his principal secretary, and was the active collaborator of Rampolla and Leo XIII during the busy days of the Leonine pontificate. When at the death of Leo XIII, Cardinal Rampolla retired from participation in Papal affairs, Della Chiesa did not follow his example. He remained at his post at the Vatican, ready to serve his new master, Cardinal Merry del Val, who became Secretary of State. But an astute and skilled diplomatist such as Monsignor Della Chiesa, could not long tolerate the careless trend which Papal policy now followed, nor did he ingratiate himself with his new chief. It was, therefore, not long before he was relieved of his functions, and in 1907 he was sent into relative exile to Bologna, as Archbishop. Raised to the cardinalate, he continued to interest himself in the broader issues of Papal affairs, and refused to be drawn into the local dissensions of his diocese.

Thus Benedict XV came to the pontifical magistracy endowed by long years of patient training, as well as by his natural gifts, with those qualifications of statecraft most useful to a "political" Pope. The Roman Curia could well believe that it had chosen wisely in selecting this skilled manipulator of diplomatic niceties, who was so familiar with both ecclesiastical and lay problems of international import; Benedict XV could be counted on to direct, guide, and govern in a manner worthy of the best worldly traditions of the Vatican. Firm, subtle, adaptable, he had devoted his life to the cause of affirming the temporal power of the Vatican, and had had a large share in its triumphs under Leo XIII. The new Pope could not fail to grasp the significance which his accession

to the pontificate would have to the world. Never in recent years had the civilised nations of the earth looked to Rome in such a mood of humility. In a world where the moral code was being daily violated, where treachery and treason and a ruthless disregard for the rights of mankind had become the rule, where the most elemental laws of justice and humanity were wholly disregarded, the figure of the Pope rose out of the flames of battle, the calm and just arbiter, whose word would at this juncture carry the full weight of divine inspiration.

Belligerents and neutrals alike waited for the pronouncement of the new Pontiff. By a frank, outspoken statement of policy, by a condemnation and censure of the violation of the accepted code of war and of international law, by a high-minded and affirmatively authoritative exposition of broad, Christian principles, which even belligerents would be bound to respect, it was confidently expected that the Papacy would lend its great moral support in maintaining the structural fabric of society.

But the Pope had too long been accustomed to the arts of diplomacy to be able to view with a broader and more statesmanlike grasp the value of such an undertaking. In his first encyclical, Benedict XV proved that he was more concerned with what he believed to be the immediate needs of the Catholic Church than with those of mankind. The Pope showed himself eager to take advantage of this seemingly favourable opportunity to rehearse the grudges and grievances of the Vatican. After fulminating against present-day society and discoursing on the tendencies towards "independence," deploring the

absence of all respect for authority, and dwelling on the "absurdity of socialism," the Pope discusses the dissensions within the Church, condemns Modernism, and, in the concluding and more important paragraphs, reaffirms "that for too long a time the Church has not enjoyed that liberty of which it has need," and joins in a prayer for the prompt re-establishment of peace among nations, "the desire for the cessation of that abnormal condition in which the head of the Church finds himself."

These are the chief contents of the first important statement of the new Pope to the world. To many influential Catholics this encyclical came as a distinct disappointment; to the world at large it appeared as a weak and insignificant document. The Italians were visibly annoyed that the Pope should see fit to make use of the occasion to bring to the notice of Europe the petty quarrel of the Vatican with the Italian Government. The Allies had expected at least a reference to the war, and a condemnation of its instigators. In France, the election of Benedict XV, the confidential adviser of Cardinal Rampolla, who had always been a warm friend of France, was hailed with much sympathy, and it was hoped that the new Pope would show some traces of the former's friendship for France. It was even confidently predicted that the estrangement between the Vatican and the French Republic would be brought to an end by Benedict XV. The revulsion of feeling was spontaneous and immediate when the attitude of the Pope regarding the war became known. For the Papacy proclaimed its strict neutrality, just as the States not engaged in the war had done. It was the aim of

the Vatican, leaving aside its moral and spiritual rôle, to conform itself to the habitual acts of non-belligerent, temporal States.

It soon appeared evident that the Vatican was by degrees falling under the influence of the Central Empires. The diplomatic representatives of Prussia, Bavaria, and Austria at the Vatican, owing in part to the fact that neither France nor Great Britain maintained a mission at the Papal Court, while the Russian Envoy was without influence, had by direct negotiations been able to persuade the Pope that the best interests of the Holy See were more closely linked with those of the Central Powers, than with those of the Allies. As Prussia was pictured as representing law and order, blind obedience, systematic control, and Austria is the greatest Catholic State, it is not difficult to understand that the Pope felt more sympathy with these than with republican France, heretical England, or schismatic Russia. Nor were the Austro-German envoys slow to make definite promises that the question of the re-establishment of the temporal power of the Papacy would receive careful consideration at the coming peace conference, and they are reported to have pledged the support of the Central Empires to the project of internationalising the Law of Guarantees, should the broader issue fail.

Busied with his diplomatic negotiations, careful not to displease Germany or Austria, the Pope refrained from expressing any opinion regarding the violation of Belgian neutrality, even when it was presented to his notice by Cardinal Mercier, Primate of Belgium. The reply of Benedict XV to the vibrant

appeal of the Belgian Cardinal is a vague expression of generalities, devoid of significance.

In order to present the cause of the Allies directly to the Vatican, Great Britain, in December, 1914, decided to send a duly accredited, diplomatic mission to the Papal Court. Though well received, the British Envoy was unable to wean the Papacy from its now decidedly pro-German tendencies. England had other causes for grave discontent with the Vatican. In Rome the Irish Catholics were in direct relations with the Germans, and it is rumoured that it was through their medium that the intercourse, which later resulted in the Easter Revolution of 1916 in Ireland, was actively carried on. It was noticeable and commented upon in the Eternal City, that the Irish Catholics continued their relationship with the German Envoy to the Vatican, even after the arrival of the British mission, which they feigned to ignore. Papal temporal prestige was greatly increased by the presence of a Minister Plenipotentiary from Great Britain, who after a period of four centuries again renewed diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the Court of St. James. Benedict XV was to be gratified with further solicitations for the opening up of diplomatic intercourse, first from the Ottoman Empire, then from the Netherlands.

While the Vatican, under the guidance of Benedict XV was increasing its temporal prestige, the Quirinal was leading United Italy through the tortuous negotiations with the Dual Monarchy, which were ultimately to end in Italian intervention in the European War.

As soon as the course which the Italian Government

was pursuing became more clearly defined, as soon as it became evident that Italy was preparing to range herself on the side of the Allied Powers, the Papacy began to exert all its influence to maintain Italian neutrality. For the Vatican feared that if Italy were to declare war on the Central Empires the position of the Austro-German representatives, accredited to the Papal Court, would become untenable, and they would be forced to leave Rome. In this question, as well as in all others which have arisen under the Benedictine pontificate, what was believed to be the best interests of the Vatican were alone considered. It so came about that the Vatican mobilised all its resources to prevent Italian participation in the war, and thus actively supported the efforts of the Austro-Germans. Spiritual and secular arguments were linked together, and presented to the numerous loyal Catholics of the Kingdom, bidding them to resist the current of intervention. The Vatican let it be understood that if Italy should engage in the war, the Papacy would consider seriously the question of emigrating to some neutral country, and negotiations were actually set in motion with a view to securing asylum for the Pope in Spain.

Thus the Quirinal found itself in open conflict with the Vatican, and though Italian participation in the war was brought about, there nevertheless remained a remnant of "Neutralists" who, encouraged as much by the Vatican as from independent sources, prevented Italy from putting forth a strong and united effort during the first year of the war.

The declaration of war against Austria, and the consequent departure of the diplomatic representatives

of the Central Empires, accredited to the Holy See, in May, 1915, gave the Vatican the opportunity again to voice through the Papal Press its protest against the intolerable position in which the Papacy found itself, in that it "would henceforth be able to communicate only with one group of belligerents, and thus would not be in a position to obtain all the information which is necessary for an exact understanding of the international situation." This assertion is not borne out by facts. In an official utterance the Italian authorities stated, "The Pope continues to exercise his apostolic office with all possible liberty. The Law of Guarantees remains in force in its entirety, and the Pontiff despatches today, as he did before the war, his communications in cipher, while his diplomatic couriers travel with sealed despatches, which are not subject to any censorship." The establishment of the Austrian and German Embassies to the Papacy, at Lugano in Switzerland, bears out the truth of this statement.

During the first year of the Italian participation in the war, the Vatican was able to exercise great influence on its conduct. The lack of cohesion of public opinion regarding the war, the efforts made to prevent Italy from putting forth her full strength, and above all the undisguised sympathy which numbers of Italians, belonging to "Black" circles at Rome, professed for the Central Empires, were a direct outcome of Vatican influences. However, the patriotism of the Italian Catholics finally triumphed, and in the "National Ministry," which was formed in June, 1916, we find the leader of the Catholic party as Minister of Finance. The attitude of neutrality of the

Italian-born Pontiff is deemed unpatriotic. Had the Pope confined his efforts to playing a purely spiritual part, had he remained aloof from the conflict, his policy might, if not understood, at least have been condoned. But the patent efforts of the Papacy to frustrate the plans of the Quirinal, to obstruct the fulfilment of the obvious destiny of national expansion of the Kingdom of Italy, has wounded the sensibilities of the majority of Italians, while even loyal Catholics cannot forgive the Pope the fact that in the face of the grave moral crisis, brought about by the outbreak of the war, the head of the Catholic Church, when summoned to speak, remained silent, purposely avoided to commit himself, and preferred the cautious, hollow phraseology of the diplomatist to that of a shepherd of the people.

In considering the relation of the Church and State in Italy, it must be borne in mind that, for more than a thousand years the fortunes of the Catholic Church have been intimately bound up with those of the Italian peninsula. For the past five centuries the direction of the Catholic Church has been in the hands of Italians. Roman Catholicism, the most complete theocracy that man has ever created, is the handiwork of Italians. The presence of the Papal Court at Rome has, during the past forty-five years, been the cause of much anxiety to the Italian Government. However, both parties seemed to have grown accustomed to the anomalies of their relationship. The efforts of Benedict XV to revive the Roman Question at such a critical period in the history of the Kingdom would seem to indicate that under the guidance of the "political" Pontiff elected at the last

Conclave, the Papacy in endeavouring to embarrass the Italian Government, by playing into the hands of her enemies, has sacrificed its moral and religious ascendancy for the attainment of chimerical, temporal gains. For it is not alone the Italians whom the Pope has alienated. At a time when a religious renaissance is unmistakably manifesting itself, there are many signs that would lead one to conclude that French and Belgian Catholics may wish to emancipate themselves from the control of the Vatican. While the Papacy has made indirect overtures, soliciting the renewal of diplomatic intercourse between France and the Vatican, which have been coldly received, the French clergy, whether cardinal or village priest, maintaining a lofty spirit of patriotism, are letting France know that "God is not neutral" whatever may be the attitude of "glacial serenity" of the Holy Father, as the neutrality of the Pope is stigmatised.

Notwithstanding the opposition which has arisen against the Vatican, the Italians do not forget that the Catholic Church is greater than its Popes: "a huge, slumbering giant whose head rests in the lap of Italy, and whose body spreads over the world." This great mass, long inert, may some day awaken. The World War, with its far-reaching results, may be the cause of such a resurrection.

The days have passed when the Quirinal trembled at a threat of the Vatican to reassert its temporal rights. As a result of a victorious war, with the economic and political strength of the Kingdom greatly increased, and with the stability of Italy as a World Power thereby assured, the temporal pretensions of the Papacy must inevitably vanish. Though the oft-

repeated menace of the Papacy to abandon Rome may again be made, and all Italians recognise that such a step would be a severe blow to Italian prestige, it is well-known that the Papacy cannot leave the Eternal City without losing the influence and moral ascendancy which *San Pietro presso Roma* alone can confer.

The delicate problem of internationalising the Law of Guarantees is of difficult solution. The great majority of the people of Italy are actively opposed to any such programme, and as long as the Papacy remains at Rome Italians would consider it an infringement of their sovereign rights for any foreign Powers to concern themselves with, what they hold to be, an internal problem. On the other hand, it is not improbable that, in view of the difficulties which the secular sovereign rights, conferred on the Pope by the Law of Guarantees, have created, the Italian Government may impose further restrictions on Papal sovereignty, and, by depriving the Papacy of all vestige and semblance of temporal power, settle for all time, by drastic measures, the vexed Roman Question.

## CHAPTER IX

### ITALY AND GERMANY

GERMAN PEACEFUL PENETRATION. INDUSTRIAL SERVITUDE.  
THE BREAKING FROM BONDAGE

WHEN Italy, only a decade after the achievement of national independence, badgered by Austria, disdained by Great Britain, and fearing an assault on the part of France which threatened her national existence, was isolated in Europe, she besought the friendship of Germany and sought to place herself under German protection. In order to secure this protection, Italy, at the behest of Berlin, even went to the length of becoming an ally of Austria, as Italian statesmen believed that by their alliance with Germany they were pursuing the only course open to them which would guarantee the integrity of the new Kingdom.

Though by courtesy admitted into the comity of the Great Powers, Italy was at the time in no position to assert her rights. In the twelve years which had elapsed since the House of Savoy had united the disjointed patchwork of Italian States, many of them the most backward and misgoverned in Europe, into a nation, much progress had been made in developing the national strength of the Italian people. Yet Italy remained the poorest and weakest of the Powers, seemingly unqualified, either practically or potentially, to aspire to great expansion.

With the help of France, Magenta and Solferino had won the first steps of Italian unity. Sadowa and Sedan had been German victories, which had made it possible to incorporate Venice and Rome in the Kingdom. Thus Italy had been created with the aid of both France and Germany, and now had to make a choice between the two. Owing to the antagonistic attitude of France at this time, it was not surprising that the Italians chose the alliance with Germany. During the first years of the Triple Alliance, Germany, as the result of her victorious wars, ruled as absolute master in Continental Europe. Italy had to content herself with playing a very secondary rôle. Yet these years were not without their benefit to her. Germany was the model and pattern. Quick to learn, eager to improve, the Italian people were laying the foundation of the future economic power of the State.

When, after 1890 and the subsequent Franco-Russian alliance, a semblance of the balance of power was re-established in Europe, Italy breathed more freely. Her importance as an ally increased, and she began to play a more independent and personal part in European affairs. The danger of a foreign invasion had passed. Italy was now entering upon a period of colonial expansion. She was, however, still not merely poor financially and industrially, but ignorant of the ways and means of increasing her worldly wealth. She understood little of the methods of industrial exploitation, so astonishingly perfected by the Germans. Germany was rapidly rising to the industrial leadership of the world and had become the master of modern efficiency in all forms of organ-

isation of industrial and commercial enterprise, which was the foundation of economic expansion. Italy had allied herself with Germany for the protection of her national boundaries; when this protection was no longer needed, when no enemies threatened her, and the political aspects of her treaty with Germany assured her few advantages, Italy deliberately turned to Germany and prayed to be instructed in the methods and secrets of this modern alchemy.

It was Crispi, in his sincere desire to foster the greatness and increase the wealth and power of Italy, who openly sought German economic aid. The opportunity was propitious for the German industrial invasion of Italy. France, after carrying on a prolonged commercial warfare against Italy, suddenly in a moment of childlike anger dumped all the Italian securities that she held on the market.<sup>1</sup> Italy was helpless and found herself in an embarrassed position. To assist Italian finances there was formed in the year 1895, by certain German financiers, chief among them Herr Schwabach, the head of the banking-house of Bleichröder of Berlin, an Italian bank, with its headquarters at Milan, known as the "Banca Commerciale."

Ever since the first visit of William II to Italy a few months after his accession to the throne in 1888, the possibility of the industrial exploitations of Italy had formed a cherished part of his programme of world expansion. The story of German peaceful penetration throughout the world is one of the most amazing chapters in contemporary history. While the Governments of other nations were content to permit their nationals to trade abroad, and open up markets for

<sup>1</sup>See p. 60.

their products, giving them no encouragement and little protection, Germany, from the earliest days of her existence as an Empire, realised that financial, industrial, and commercial enterprise are essential, determining factors in world politics. While other Governments still clung to the antiquated notion of a wide gulf between economics and politics, Germany closely co-ordinated and allied the two branches of this same science.

It was thus that Berlin became the headquarters of the Great General Staff of "Peaceful Penetration." Plans were here devised to achieve the economic servitude of the world. With methodical, plodding patience and scientific zeal, allied with a boldness of conception and brilliancy in execution worthy of the greatest military genius, the invaders prepared the outlines of the plans of their campaigns, devised the strategy, studied the tactics to be pursued. Just as at the War College across the Spree the weekly *Kriegsspiel* (war game) took place, which initiated the more brilliant younger officers in the plans for the military conquest of Europe, so within the silent, double-doored rooms of the Deutsche Bank, of the Dresdener Bank, of the A. E. G., and other great German concerns, the programmes for the industrial conquest of Europe and the world were matured. Italy, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Turkey, Bulgaria, Chile, Brazil, France, and even Great Britain were the subject of careful study.

The methods of procedure adopted to achieve the desired results were manifold. The Church, Parliaments, the Press were influenced, bribed, subsidised, and, if need be, coerced. The natural cupidity and

the ignorance of international politics of the average business man were preyed upon. The almost universal desire for material well-being, which was daily becoming more wide-spread among all classes, was exploited. To gain secret information regarding markets, trade spies, both German and native, were widely made use of. The well-trained German chemist or engineer was subventioned, and thus willing to work abroad for a trifling stipend, until he had learned the secrets of competitors' processes. By German methods of factory efficiency, superior organisation and preferential transportation rates accorded by the home railways, the German manufacturer was soon able to drive the native products out of the market with a cheaper German substitute. German capital was often judiciously invested with native capital abroad, and later, when prosperity had crowned the enterprise, withdrawn. Yet the management almost invariably remained in German hands, as the average stockholder was more interested in regular dividends than in questions of international influence. In each and every case the peculiarities and particular needs of a given situation were maturely investigated and studied, and then when the field had been prepared, the German was ready to reap the fruits of his labour. For it must be recalled that every German thus engaged felt himself an essential unit of the Empire, and the Government saw to it that this spirit was kept alive. Thus the mighty tide of German penetration spread irresistibly. As the years passed, on the maps and charts of Europe and the world, which hung in the halls of the great banks of Berlin, the black, white, and red flags of Germany, marking the deep inroads

of German trade abroad, spread their network ever more broadly and thickly. The grandiose plan of the Pan-Germans for world domination had found, in the material greed of the peoples of all nations, the pawns of their policy. The international character of world trade and commerce made it easy for the Germans to wear the cloak of a given nationality, which could be cast off at the opportune moment.

German peaceful penetration, advocated and encouraged by the Emperor himself, seconded by the united strength of the German Empire, having at its immediate disposal not merely the channels of diplomacy and the full support of the Government, but also the most powerful army in the world, ready to intimidate any presumptuous competitor, found opposed to it only the weak, individual initiative of a few groups, divided by internal dissensions. In many cases the Germans readily found influential personages abroad, who, in order to secure the co-operation of foreign capital, were willing to assist the invaders. In no country was this more true than in Italy.

Bound by the ties of their alliance with Germany, the Italians readily welcomed the Germans. Anxious to learn the methods and means of acquiring an increase in their material well-being, they guilelessly placed their resources at the disposal of their allies for exploitation along German lines. The country was new, the people, inspired by their successful struggle for national unity to attempt greater things, were ready to follow the German lead. A certain affinity of spirit, and the similarity of the recent historical development of the two nations, led the more

intellectual classes in Italy, who were coming more and more under Germanic influence, to look favourably on the increasing number of Germans, who now flocked to Italy to take up positions of trust, as directors, managers, and superintendents in the newly established factories which were everywhere springing up. The Germans brought with them to Italy a feeling of contempt for the Italian people, and, while exploiting the excellent and cheap labour which everywhere abounded, in the successful development of their enterprises, they remained faithful to their German allegiance. It cannot be gainsaid that, during the early years of German penetration in Italy, their presence was of immense material benefit to the country. Initiated into the secrets of German methods of industry, trade, and commerce, the country flourished.

It was not, however, until after the establishment of the Banca Commerciale, in 1895, that the German plan for the economic conquest of Italy was seriously undertaken. The moment was opportune. The bold colonial enterprise, which Italy had so enthusiastically begun, had collapsed; a period of strikes and internal dissensions was beginning. Public credit was at a low ebb; the confidence of the people in their financial institutions and government was shaken; the antagonism of France was more virulent than it had been for some years past. It was at this juncture that the Pan-Germans turned their attention to Italy. They now realised that Italy, notwithstanding recent failures, had the possibility of developing into a great industrial State. Though still largely given to agriculture, Italy, with her abundant supply of labour, the cheapest in Western Europe, and at the

same time the most frugal, hard-working, and adaptable, might, if not held in check, at no distant date rival Germany herself in the markets of the world. It thus came about that when Crispi called upon Germany for financial assistance, the Germans, officially encouraged by their Government, founded a bank in co-operation with Italian capital, at Milan, with a capital stock of only 5,000,000 lire (£200,000). Here, ready to hand, the Germans were soon to have the means of directing and dominating not merely the economic, but even the political life of Italy, in the interests of Germany. Such was the Banca Commerciale, which by degrees increased its capital until it reached the total of 150,000,000 lire (£6,000,000), and had an annual overturn of 800,000,000 lire (£32,000,000). Throughout the years of its growth this banking institution was ruled over by three Germans.<sup>1</sup> It is furthermore astonishing to note that, notwithstanding the fact that this bank, which soon became the leading financial institution in Italy and was in a position to control the economic life of the country, though it had long since passed from German ownership, so that at the outbreak of the European War only 3,000,000 lire (£120,000) of the capital stock remained in German hands, its policy was directed from Berlin and its power made use of in Pan-German interests.

It was not long after the establishment of this bank that it succeeded in gaining control of the chief industrial and commercial enterprises in Italy. The

<sup>1</sup> Cf. G. Preziosi: "La Germania alla Conquista dell'Italia," Firenze, 1916, p. 62. This volume sheds an interesting light on the question of German penetration in Italy.

number of the joint stock companies in Italy is stated to be 793, with a capital of 3,898,174,049 lire<sup>1</sup> (£155,926,961). By skilful manipulation, the Commerciale has been able to control this vast capital, and thus the economic life of Italy. The favourite device to secure voting control was to offer a small sum for the privilege of representing the stock of individual holders in the directors' meetings. The shares were deposited with the bank for the time being, and the bank was authorised to represent its owners. By this simple method, year in and year out, the bank was able at very trifling cost, to dominate secretly the economic life of the country. The enormous power which was at the disposal of this bank was made use of to favour by all possible means the sale of German products, with a twofold object of keeping out of Italian markets products coming from other countries and of preventing any serious expansion of Italian industries.<sup>2</sup> It thus came about that great credit facilities were offered through the bank, both to German firms and to the Italian customers of German firms. Furthermore, when an Italian firm was in the need of new machinery or other materials, should it dare seek to obtain them in the open market, a strong "recommendation" from the bank would almost invariably be received, urging it to choose a German product, purchased from a German firm or one bound up with German interests, otherwise it would find its credit cut off, and would soon be ruined. By means of a slowly and carefully woven web of interests, within comparatively few years, the Commerciale gained control of the chief industries of Italy;

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 77.

steel plants, machine-shops, ship-building yards, shipping companies, power plants, armament firms, all passed under German control and were exploited in German interests. The steel plants at Terni, the Vickers Arms factory at Spezia, the smelters at Savona and at Elba, the Italian Lloyd, the General Navigation Company, as well as many of the other more important industries of Italy, it is alleged came under German domination. Slowly the grip tightened until, towards the end of the first decade of the present century, Germany had succeeded in gaining a stranglehold at the throat of Italy.

The German invasion was so insidiously carried on that the majority of the Italians did not even realise its existence. Its growth was facilitated by the fact that the leading men of Italy, both in political and commercial spheres, had been brought up to admire Germany and all things German. The great and ever-increasing prosperity of the country was ascribed to German co-operation, and few were in a position to know the full extent of German penetration. Few knew that the greater part of the Italian merchant marine was in German hands. Though the Italian flag flew over the ships, the policy of the companies was controlled by the Banca Commerciale, and the bank saw to it that its numberless employees and agents pursued a policy which was distinctly Germanophil. And so it was with the steel and iron industries, which the bank dominated. More dangerous to the vital strength of Italy was the German control exercised over the electric-power plants. Recent development of electrical energy in Italy has been very marked. Those controlling its supply and

distribution have in their hands a source whence they can derive secret information concerning the most intimate particulars of any given district. The engineers and employees of electric light and power companies must, in the course of their business, be admitted everywhere. Arsenals and factories, private homes and ministries, staff colleges and fortresses, all are thrown open to the electrician. The ease with which intelligent espionage can thus be carried out, unobserved, can be readily understood. Yet, notwithstanding the peril of intrusting the control of this most vital interest to foreigners, in Italy in the province of Venetia, bordering along the Austrian frontier, 99 per cent of the electrical horse-power was in German hands.<sup>1</sup>

The hold exerted by Germany over the economic life of Italy soon led to active interference in the political life of the country. In carrying on its campaign of penetration, the Press was from the outset the most essential means used to influence public opinion. Thus certain important Italian daily newspapers were subventioned to act in the interests of the *Commerciale* and to proclaim the superiority of German methods and German goods.

“The method of the *Commerciale* is in the main always the same; each one of the corporations controlled by the bank is compelled to subscribe to a definite share of the capital stock of a given newspaper or periodical. The journals, moreover, are in receipt of subsidies of various kinds, generally in the

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 118. Out of a total of 74,800,000 lire (£2,992,000) invested in electrical enterprises in Venetia, 72,000,000 lire (£2,880,000) was in German hands.

form of advertising contracts and advertisements of the industries which are established in the region where they are published and circulated. . . . Certain industries have their own journals. It is beyond doubt that a goodly part of the daily and periodical Press, technical as well as political, whether of large or small circulation, without distinction as regards political affiliation, obeys the mandates of the *Commerciale*, which are those of German policy. It is thus that a great share of the Italian Press, by means of biased leaders, or news articles, by reports or accounts apparently dealing with technical matters, by telegrams, sensational despatches, parliamentary reports, and local comments, in brief by means of all those elements which constitute the spirit and policy of a newspaper, is enlisted in the service of this non-Italian Bank, to create public opinion, propagate its ideas, and mould the thoughts of the people." ("La Germania alla Conquista dell'Italia," p. 130.) Further than this, with multifarious ramifications stretching in every corner of the peninsula, the influence of the bank could make itself potently felt. It was no very difficult matter to materially assist the candidacy of a Deputy who was favourable to the German interests of the *Commerciale* in Italy.

Not content with taking an active part in internal politics, the bank now interfered in Italy's foreign relations. It would not seem doubtful that, acting on instructions received from Berlin, the bank exerted every influence to prevent the Italo-Turkish War, and when this was no longer possible, pressure was brought to bear to bring the campaign to a speedy conclusion, and save Turkish susceptibilities. Unable

to prevent the war, the German "interests" were, however, able to negotiate the terms of peace. Two of the three delegates who negotiated the Treaty of Lausanne were closely identified with the bank.

It has been suggested that the dictatorship of Giolitti was alone made possible by the fact that he was supported by this Pan-German institution. Whatever the truth of the matter may be, it would seem that during the latter years of his administration Giolitti entered into close relations with the bank. The concession of Adalia in Asia Minor, granted to Italy in 1913, was turned over to the *Commerciale*. The establishment of the Bank of Albania was, in so far as it concerned its Italian share, intrusted to this same institution. Several men, closely allied to the bank, were appointed Senators by Giolitti,<sup>1</sup> and other proofs have been brought forward to show that Giolitti and the *Banca Commerciale* held Italy in subjection bordering on political and economic slavery. Writing of the condition of Italy as the result of the manœuvres of this Pan-German institution, M. Preziosi declares:

"The great calamity of Italy is that this bank not only controls the navigation companies, the metallurgical and manufacturing industries, but likewise the greater part, if not all, the industrial enterprises which specialise in the manufacture of armaments. This explains not only the power of the bank, but also its policy. The *Commerciale*, controlling such an enormous and formidable mass of interests, exercises an almost overpowering influence on our political life and public opinion. Many of our so-called leading lawyers, numberless engineers, manufacturers, sena-

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

tors, deputies, statesmen, officers of the army and of the navy, members of the clergy, etc., obey its commands. The Banca Commerciale had its candidate for the premiership "in reserve," and there was a moment in which this candidacy nearly triumphed. The influence which the bank exercises is vast, and is increasing continuously. Newspapers great and small in the capitals and in the provinces, smaller banks, stock companies held in leash—these are means by which the Commerciale dominates and directs the life of Italy."<sup>1</sup>

It is one of the most curious phenomena of German penetration in Italy that it rallied to its support many sincere and ardent partisans among the upper and more intelligent classes of the country, unsolicited. The causes of this trend must be sought in the temper of our times. For the past sixty years, economic development has been the sole objective of Western civilisation. The unbridled exploitation which would turn man into an automaton, and make him an adjunct of a machine, has been the result of the frenzy for efficiency and organisation, inaugurated by Germany. The megalomania of Germany, the triumphant struggle for commercial and industrial expansion, for the conquest of world markets, the dreams of world dominion, the Pan-German programmes of world hegemony awakened in the minds of the Italians profound and unbounded admiration. Whether they saw mirrored in German aims and German ambitions their own longings is not easily determined; whether by an atavism which hearkened back through the ages to the times of Imperial Rome, they sought to conceive a future Im-

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

perial Italy, ruling again both shores of the Mediterranean, the sober fact remains that the bond which united Italy with Germany was the source of exultation and pride. It was not the men who concluded the Triple Alliance, but their successors twenty or even thirty years later, the Italians of to-day, who, before the European War broke out, were the most enthusiastic Germanophiles. During the present century Germany, in the eyes of the people of Italy, has stood forth as the embodiment of all the essential characteristics by which world power is achieved. Blinded by the glare of the shining armour of Germany, by the discipline of her regiments, the efficiency of her military organisation, by the amazing piles of statistical tables which computed by hundreds of thousands and millions the increase in her population, the expansion of her commerce, the production of her industries, the accumulation of her wealth, Italy stood bewildered at the thought that she would perhaps share this power, enjoy this wealth and prosperity. So that within recent years all Italy, save a few isolated groups, had become frankly Germanophil. Socialists, conservatives and nationalists, freethinkers and clericals, university professors, scientists and philosophers, artists and musicians, the nobility and the middle classes, all joined in a public profession of faith, in a hymn of praise to this new deity, "Germany." Hand in hand with this untrammelled "Germanism" there was a growing, contemptuous disregard for France, owing in part to the German trumpetings of French decadence, which resounded broadcast throughout Italy; while the conviction that Great Britain was being rapidly driven out of the world's markets, and

was no longer in a position to compete with Germany, was daily gaining headway.

It is interesting in looking for the immediate palpable causes of this astonishing "Germanophilism" to note the part played by the German Emperor, William II. We are still in too close propinquity to the conditions under discussion to gain a clear-cut perspective of events, but it would seem beyond question that the influence of William II was preponderant in bringing about this pro-German intoxication. Not a year passed without repeated visits of the Hohenzollern Emperor to Italy. Now it was Venice, then Brindisi, now Rome or Naples, or Palermo which caught a glimpse of the Imperial presence, in glittering state and glory. Not once or twice, but again and again William II came on one pretext or another. Now, he appeared in Rome, and presented to the Imperial City a statue of Goethe, which was unveiled with much ceremony in the gardens of the Villa Borghese. Then in the company of the King of Italy he visited the Abbey of Montecassino, a German monastery which was the centre of much valuable German propaganda; or again the Imperial yacht *Hohenzollern* cruised in Sicilian waters, or appeared suddenly amid the lagoons of Venice, and cast anchor close to St. Mark's. Whether these repeated visits to Italy were pure policy or predilection, is difficult to infer. In all probability it was a combination of both. Thus during recent years while insidiously the chains of Italian servitude were being forged, on the surface the cordiality, consideration, and friendship of the most powerful monarch in the world, won for Germany many staunch and faithful adherents throughout Italy. It

was not only the Emperor, but his most able and brilliant Chancellor, Prince Bülow, who sought to weave the Prussian spell over Italy. Retiring from the Chancellorship, he took up his residence in Rome, and soon succeeded in forming a pro-German coterie, which was made up of Italians more devoted to German than to Italian interests. And in the wake of the Emperor and the former Chancellor each year saw a more numerous tide of invasion of Germans of all classes. Italy has always been the land of promise for the peoples of the North. The Germans now came in droves as tourists. Many remained to take up their residence. They built hotels along the coast of Liguria; their villas dotted the hillsides of Rapallo and Capri, the Lido and Taormina. They opened small shops and large bazaars. German doctors established their sanatoria, and in their train came German patients, nurses, and chemists. In the region of the Lake of Garda, the Germans almost drove out the natives. In recent years German signs were everywhere to be seen along the lake side, and at the small stations around the lake the names of the towns were called out in the German language. German commercial travellers crossed Italy from one end of the country to the other, selling German wares. According to statistics gathered in 1914, there were 80,000 Germans permanently or semi-permanently resident in Italy, of whom 40,000 lived in Lombardy and Venetia. These same statistics showed only 3,000 British and 4,000 French residents. To hasten the Germanisation of Italy, which was already making such rapid strides, other mediums were now openly made use of. The Prussian Historical Institute, which

had been founded in 1888 for the purpose of permitting German scholars to pursue their studies in the Vatican Archives, the German Archæological Society (*Istituto Germanico in Campidoglio a Roma*), where the study of art, science, and the humanities had hitherto been pursued in cloistered seclusion, now became focal centres, directing and propagating Pan-German doctrines of Germanic world superiority and racial supremacy.

While the web of Pan-Germanism was thus being woven ever more intricately, and the upper classes in Italy had become thoroughly saturated with German ideas and ideals, the masses had remained relatively untouched by the alien taint. The prosperity which Italy was enjoying, the relatively high wages, and solid benefits which the people were receiving, were their sole immediate interest. But when, after the outbreak of the European War, the Italian people became convinced that Germany was responsible for the war, when the stories of the violation of Belgium came to be known, the century-old hatred for the Germans, which had slumbered in the hearts of the masses since the days of the Guelphs and the Ghibelines, burst forth.

Italy, during the early weeks of the European War passed through long days of careful searching of heart, and awoke to the full realisation of her plight. She was no longer the master in her own home. The Germans and the pro-Germans held the country bound and gagged. Though Germany was unable to force Italy into a war against her best interests—it has even been suggested that up to the last minute Berlin had assigned to Italy a rôle of most friendly and useful

“neutrality,” as best suited to Pan-German aims—she was able to confuse public opinion and scatter the seeds of distrust and perplexity throughout the peninsula. Among a small section of the upper classes the significance of the enormity of the situation dawned slowly. They soon became convinced that only a war could shake off the shackles of bondage, could arouse the national spirit of the people. But the masses were unanimously in favour of peace, and a majority of the upper classes were still openly pro-German in their sympathies. Italy had been friendly to Germany ever since the days of the founding of the Kingdom; the Italians had trusted the Germans blindly; many still trusted, and the remainder feared Germany. The Italians had learned thoroughly from their German masters the lessons of ruthless realism in politics. The most enthusiastic pro-Germans in Italy could not consistently oppose the putting into practice at this opportune moment of those principles and methods of world politics which Germany had taught so forcefully.

Though Italy was bound by ties of alliance with Austria, the alliance was regarded openly by the most fervid “Triplists” as merely as an opportunist arrangement. It had been imposed on Italy in the days of Italy’s weakness. The European War had suddenly placed Italy in a position of mastery towards Austria. The national aspirations of the Italian people had long been held in check, and these must now be realised. Applying the German lessons of *Realpolitik* to her own case, Italy must seize this opportunity to satisfy her vital interests. With the bulk of the Austrian forces engaged in a life-and-death struggle against

Russia, the moment had arrived for Italy to strike. Here was a stepping-stone to world power. And so the weapons which Germany had placed in Italian hands were to be turned against her. The economic development of the country, which had been of German origin and had been carried on in German interests, had rendered the Italians strong and confident; now the Pan-German doctrines of ruthless aggression which had been so assertively reiterated, were to be made use of to stab Germany to the heart. Such was the tragedy which was to be enacted.

But Germany still felt confident in her ability to hold Italy pinioned to the ground. Italy grew more restive as the months passed, and the speedy conclusion of a victorious war, so often proclaimed by Germany, was again and again postponed. The moral forces of the Italian people began to gather strength. Defections from the pro-German ranks, among the younger, more intelligent and aggressive Italians, grew daily more numerous.

The conduct of foreign affairs had been intrusted to Baron Sonnino, a man imbued with German doctrines and a chief protagonist of the Triple Alliance, who now saw clearly that the best interests of Italy demanded that the chains of this alliance be severed. William II thereupon sent his most skilled emissary, Prince Bülow, to Rome. On his arrival he conducted himself in the manner of a Proconsul in conquered territory. He mobilised the Pan-German organisation, so patiently perfected in times of peace. The mission of Prince Bülow was to impose upon Italy a policy of continued neutrality. The Banca Commerciale, the Vatican, and Giolitti became the chief

auxiliaries of his efforts. His obstruction was for a time successful. Italy, bewildered by the strength and resource of the Germans, hesitated to pursue an independent policy. German gold and German threats for a time held the country in leash. To appease the more aggressive elements, the German envoy offered Italy territorial compensations at the expense of Austria, and endeavoured to direct Italian attention towards Tunis, Corsica, and Malta. But the Italians were not to be deceived by these machinations. They had been thoroughly initiated into the secrets of German methods. They understood fully German deductive processes and the mechanism of Pan-Germanic procedure. They knew that the liberty and independence of Italy could only be regained by the defeat of Germany. They now understood clearly that it would be of no value to Italy to have her flag float over the Trentino and Trieste, if the German flag flew at Tangier, or the Austrian over Salonika.

Nevertheless, Italy proceeded with caution. The bitter lessons of "isolation" had taught her to weigh her policy step by step. A storm of moral conversion was sweeping over the land. Dull rumblings, like those of some great volcano ready to erupt, shook the peninsula. The Germans redoubled their zeal. The pressure of Prince Bülow's "diplomacy" increased in violence and brutality. Then when he perceived that his efforts were doomed to failure, the Germans made frantic efforts to retain for themselves at least a portion of their former dominance. In this they were in part successful. The rupture of diplomatic relations between Italy and Germany at the outbreak of the Austro-Italian War was preceded

by the negotiation of a treaty which was to safeguard German economic interests in Italy. In return for certain privileges granted to Italians who had long been resident in Germany, more especially by an arrangement by which Germany agreed to pay the pensions due to Italian workmen who were living or had lived in Germany, Italy consented not to sequester property belonging to Germans in the peninsula. By this agreement Germany had protected over £150,000,000 worth of property, owned by Germans in Italy, and in return was to continue the payments to Italians, amounting to about £200,000 annually.

This arrangement was at the time interpreted in the nature of a "reinsurance" treaty. Whether Italian politicians, uncertain of the temper of the Italian people, wished to safeguard themselves in so far as possible, or whether as seems more likely, the Italian Ambassador at Berlin who was known to be distinctly pro-German, was able to influence his Government to accede to the German proposal, the treaty was hailed by the Germans as a sign that their hold over Italy had not been broken. It would be useless to contend that in a few months the work of three decades can be wiped out. The roots of Pan-Germanism have struck deep in Italy. The process of uprooting must of necessity be slow if it is to be thorough. Thus Italy waged war on the ally of Germany for over a year, before the pressure of events from abroad forced her to declare war on Germany. But during that time the process of purification had continued. The majority of the pro-Germans have been weaned from their former allegiance, and the work of national redemption continues.

What the relations of Italy and Germany will be in the future can only be surmised. The Italians, whether they willed it or not, have accepted many German political precepts. The political and economic life of Italy during the past twenty years has not been conducive to bringing forth the type of statesman or financier who could lead the country boldly into the safe channels of national emancipation. Whatever the course of the relations between Italy and Germany may be in the future, the legend of German superiority and invincibility has been shattered. If cordial intercourse with Germany is resumed by Italy more rapidly than by the other Powers, it will be on the terms of perfect equality, in pursuance of a policy of self-interest. Italy would seem to have taken firmly into her own hands the conduct of her affairs. The German has been driven out of Italy; the vigilance of the Italian people can be relied upon to see to it that he will not be permitted to return.

## CHAPTER X

### THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC

RELATIONS WITH AUSTRIA. THE NEED OF HEGEMONY.  
ITALIANS AND SLAVS

ITALY, on entering the Triple Alliance, had arbitrarily sacrificed her interests in the Adriatic in order to safeguard what she believed to be her more vital interests in the Mediterranean. When, by her increased strength and subsequent agreements with Great Britain, these interests were protected, the Italians felt themselves at liberty to again turn their eyes eastward and take up the threads of their plans to secure the control of the Adriatic.

Among the varied imperialist ambitions which have been fanned to flame by the growth of nationalism during recent years, the one most likely to cause unending difficulties to those upon whom it will be incumbent to rearrange the map of Europe, will be the allotment of the lands bordering the Eastern Adriatic. Whereas in other fields the issues are relatively well defined, and since the outbreak of the European War the struggle may be qualified as German *vs.* French, German *vs.* British, German *vs.* Russian, none of the conflicts impinging but correlative; in the Adriatic a threefold struggle to the death is going on, which would appear likely to continue as a menace to the peace of Europe. Leaving out-

side of immediate consideration Germany's interest in the affairs of the Adriatic, which is chiefly an outgrowth of the Pan-Germanic movement, and as such essentially alien to the Adriatic, the grave danger lies in the fact that the conflict here is one of ethnic imperialism—Italian and Slav. The Adriatic has become the scene of a struggle where these opposing influences, both equally strong and equally determined to resist *à outrance* any intrusion of the other, stand face to face. The Italians are striving to regain their ancient prestige in the Adriatic, to redeem their *irredente* provinces, and once again extend the sway of Rome eastward. The Jugo-Slavs, after centuries of oppression in turn by the Turks and the Austrians, when finally they shall have thrown off the yoke of the latter, are eager to realise their national independence.

Looking at a map of the Adriatic, it would appear at first sight as though Italy and the Dual Monarchy held respectively an equal share of the littoral. But a brief study of the topographical configuration of these regions will at once reveal the inferiority of Italy's share. The Italian coast-line is, from one end of Italy to the other, a slow-sloping, sandy beach land, affording few harbours, none of which are of strategic value, whereas the opposite shore, held by Austria-Hungary, is a rocky coastland, dotted with over 600 islands, containing some of the finest natural harbours in the world, such as Cattaro and Sebenico, affording a preponderant strategic advantage to the country possessing them. With the Austrian navy able to protect itself behind these natural ramparts, leaving the Italian coast-line exposed and vulnerable,

it can readily be understood that Italy felt herself threatened as long as Austria should remain, or any other power succeeding to the Austrian heritage should be permitted to become established along the Adriatic. This geographical inferiority of Italy was further emphasised by the fact that by the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Austria was intrusted with the police duties of the Montenegrin waters, which indirectly gave her commercial fleet a great impetus, so that within recent years Austrian ships (17,230) in the Adriatic outnumbered the Italian ten to one, while their total tonnage (605,551) was nearly twenty times as great.

However, the Italians to-day hold the Adriatic to be an indivisible unit, whose domination must eventually again rest with Italy, if Italy is to survive as a great Power. According to a favourite Italian interpretation, and it cannot be denied that it is not altogether unjustified, geographically speaking, the natural boundary of Italy lies beyond the shore-line of the Eastern Adriatic. Since earliest historic times this region has, with brief interregnums, been indissolubly linked with the West by the ties of Rome. A study of the map, so they claim, will indicate that it is not the Adriatic but the Julian Alps, the Velebit Mountains, and the Dinaric Alps, towering along the coastal fringe of the Northern and Eastern Adriatic, which form the bulwark, which, according to the Italian thesis, is the natural boundary of Italy. Already as early as 177 B. C. the Romans realised the necessity of acquiring the control of the lands beyond the Adriatic in order to insure the safety of the Italian peninsula, when in that year they conquered the territory of the North-

eastern Adriatic, which is present-day Istria, and formed the province of Illyricum. Two centuries later under Augustus, Dalmatia was annexed to Illyria, and for centuries continued a flourishing Roman dominion whose former splendour is testified to by the Palace of Diocletian at Spalato, and ruins at Zara and elsewhere. The Gothic invasions followed, and during the era of darkness of the Middle Ages, the lands of the Eastern Adriatic sank to a level of quasi-barbarism under Slavic dominion, from the sixth to the eleventh century. Then once again these regions passed into the hands of the Italians under the protection of the Venetian Republic, to continue Italian with varying fortunes for eight centuries.

In the heyday of the power of Venice, the Adriatic was a *mare clausum*; both its shores from Bari to Venice in the west, and from Trieste to Ragusa and Corfu in the east, were lined with thriving, wealthy cities, where Italian culture, language, and customs held undisputed sway. A people of more ancient and unquestionably superior culture, the Italians who settled in the cities along the shores of the Eastern Adriatic concerned themselves little with the rural inhabitants, whether Croat, Slovene, Serb, or Albanian. Satisfied with a thin strip of coastland, they made no attempt to penetrate into the interior, nor to colonise in any real sense of the word, content with the trade and commerce of the littoral and the wealth gained thereby. As long as no competitor appeared in the field, the "Italianism" of the Eastern Adriatic retained its hold, long after the power of Venice had passed away and Austria had succeeded to the Venetian domain. When, in 1866, Venice was united with

the Kingdom of Italy, Austria still retained the ancient Venetian possessions of the Eastern Adriatic.

Then out of the East, as an indirect result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the ever-rising tide of Pan-Slavism rolled across the Balkans. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Hapsburg throne, seconded by his morganatic wife, the Countess Chotek, herself a Slav, who was devoted to the Slav cause in so far as it coincided with her personal ambitions, conceived a plan of uniting all the Jugo-Slav elements of southeastern Europe with the Czechs and Poles of the north, and making the Slavs the dominant factor in the Dual Monarchy. The increased strength of the Slavs thus channelled would, so the Archduke believed, rejuvenate the senile Hapsburg realm. Excluded by Prussia from participation in the affairs of Germany in 1866, and by Italy from those of the Italian peninsula in the same year, Austria turned her eyes on the Balkans and fixed upon Salonika as the goal of her ambitions in the south, while all the intervening territory of the Balkans to the shores of the Adriatic, acquired by "penetration" or conquest, was to round out this new preponderately Slav-Hapsburg Empire. This programme had two chief antagonists—the free Serbs and the Italians. The elimination of Serbia was required to reach Salonika, while that of the *irredente* Italians was necessary to secure the hegemony of the Adriatic. To this latter task the Austrians first turned their attention. By favouring the Slav elements of the populations of the Adriatic, by encouraging them to persecute the Italians of their districts, at the same time placing every sort of hardship and difficulty

in the path of these Italians, by arousing in the basest manner the race prejudice and hatred of the Jugoslavs against the Italians, the future ruler of the Dual Monarchy hoped to accomplish his designs. He was zealously assisted in the undertaking by the Slav clergy, which has always lent itself willingly to any political design of the Hapsburgs.

Up to the opening years of the present century Italy was too weak to give any material support to her nationals abroad, and Austria, under the tutelage of the Heir Apparent, with unabated fury strove to crush and extirpate the Italian population and influence along the Eastern Adriatic. When, by 1903, Italy had strengthened her position as a World Power, and was able to lend a hand to her compatriots across the Adriatic, she set to work with great skill and energy, not only to keep alive the Italianism of such localities as were of Italian character, but eager to gain a position of preponderant influence across the water and forestall the aims of Hapsburg expansion, she concerned herself with the affairs of Montenegro. This small Slav State, the outpost of Slav independence in the west, was bound to Italy by family ties, as Italy's Queen is the daughter of King Nicholas, at that time the ruling prince of Montenegro. The Italians had little difficulty in gaining a secure economic foothold here. Encouraged by this success, Italian agents became active in Albania. This country, then a semi-independent Turkish province, soon became a profitable field for the extension of Italian influence. As the Albanians lived in a state of semi-mediaeval feudalism—each man an arsenal, each village a fortress, without any real government—it was not difficult for

Italy to find frequent pretexts for interfering in Albanian affairs. The Italians established schools, newspapers, banks, etc., and carried on an extensive propaganda. It soon became evident that Italy would not tolerate that any other Power should become established in Albania at the dissolution of the Turkish Empire in Europe, which could not be long delayed. For, aside from the fact that Albania was a region which offered promising prospects of future development, the port of Avlona, situated opposite Brindisi across the narrow straits of Otranto, would, if held by a foreign Power, bottle Italy up in the Adriatic. As it had long been foreseen that Albania might become a *casus belli* between Austria and Italy, as early as 1897 a verbal agreement had been entered into between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, and the King of Italy, by which both parties agreed to refrain from acquiring any portion of Albania, though both agreed to favour the establishment of an autonomous Albania, in case Turkey should disappear from the Balkans. This agreement was in 1899 set down in writing and subsequently reaffirmed in 1905. However, Austria did not remain inactive in Albanian affairs. She feignedly espoused the cause of Albania independence, fostered the expansion of the Albanian language, combated Italian propaganda as well as Turkish suzerainty, and with the help of the Vatican, as the protector of the 220,000 Albanian Roman Catholics, succeeded in gaining a dominant position in the country.

In 1906 the Austrian Imperialists, who were in the confidence of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, became impatient. They were anxious to make a trial

of the new strength of the Hapsburg realm. The combined Grand Manœuvres of the Austro-Hungarian army and navy were in that year held in Dalmatia, which was intended as a threat towards Italy. This was followed by the appointment of General Conrad von Hötzendorf to the position of Chief of the Austrian General Staff. The appointment could not fail to arouse the apprehension of Italy, as General Conrad was known to have gained the confidence of Francis Ferdinand chiefly because of his violent hatred of Italy, and his reiterated memorials of the necessity of declaring war against Italy at the first opportunity. He even went so far as to outline in detail the plan of campaign.

In October of the same year Baron von Aehrenthal was appointed Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was known to be a man of action who would push forward the plans of Hapsburg aggrandisement with utmost vigour. The era of Austrian expansion was thus inaugurated. The ensuing two years were busily employed by the new Foreign Minister, on the one hand in putting to sleep Italian suspicions regarding Austrian expansion along the Adriatic, which had been aroused by the acts above mentioned, and at the same time in paving the way for the realisation of the Archduke's plans.

In how far Austria was directly responsible for the "Young Turk" revolution which broke out in July, 1908, lies beyond the scope of this work, but it was the spark which lighted the trail of powder which crossed the Balkans from one end to the other. Three months afterwards, on October 5, came Count Aehrenthal's *grand coup*; the proclamation of the definitive

annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Dual Monarchy. By this bold stroke 1,800,000 Slavs were added to the ranks of Hapsburg subjects. For a moment the peace of Europe hung in the balance. But the promise of German support to Austria immobilised whatever desire Russia may have had to protect the Jugo-Slavs.

Italy viewed with misgivings the reviving strength of the Dual Monarchy, and she felt her interests in the Adriatic now seriously endangered. Under the fostering hand of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand the Slavs of the Adriatic had prospered. They had already gained an overwhelming numerical superiority along the whole eastern littoral. In Dalmatia, out of a population of 645,000 inhabitants in 1910, 96 per cent were Slavs (Serbo-Croats) and only 3 per cent Italians. Along the Croatian littoral the population is wholly Slav, with the exception of the city of Fiume with a population of 49,822, of whom approximately one-half are Italians. In Istria of 403,566 inhabitants two-thirds are Slavs, the remainder are Italian. Trieste itself, the chief centre of the Italianism of the Eastern Adriatic, was slowly giving way under the repeated onslaughts of the Slavs, and though in the city itself they maintained a majority (118,959 Italians, 60,074 Slavs), yet the Slavic populations were daily encroaching on the surrounding territory so that within two miles of the city only Slav villages and towns are to be found. In the province of Gorizia the Slavs have already gained complete numerical control with 155,275 Slovenes as against 90,119 Italians.

While the Archduke was busily engaged with his

plans of eventually bringing all the Jugo-Slavs under Hapsburg hegemony, forces were at work which gave a new trend to events in the Eastern Adriatic. This is the Pan-Serb movement which, with independent Serbia as its kernel, supported and protected by Russia and having enlisted the open sympathy of leading publicists and statesmen in France and Great Britain, was to rally the entire Jugo-Slav world to its standard. By arousing the latent nationalism among the Southern Slavs, Serbia hoped to unite these diverse elements of kindred race under her national leadership, as Prussia and Piedmont within their respective lands had done a half century before. The most active supporters of this movement were the Slavs of the Adriatic, chiefly Dalmatians who had tasted the first-fruits of liberty under the protecting hand of the Austrian Heir Apparent, and now wished to turn to their own advantage their acquired strength; while Russia saw in this new State the possibility of dominating the Balkans, and France and England a tangible safeguard against the Austro-German *Drang nach Osten*.

After the Pan-Serb Congress held in 1909 at Laibach, the capital of Carniola, the political ambitions of the Jugo-Slavs became a living factor in the affairs of the Adriatic. The creation of a great Slav State, under the hegemony of Serbia, stretching from the confines of Bulgaria to the eastern boundary of Venetia, including Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slavonia, Istria, Dalmatia, and Carniola and possibly Albania, with a population of over 12,000,000 people, kindred in race, language, and tradition; this is the programme which the Jugo-Slavs set for themselves. Of these,

8,100,000 were under Hapsburg rule. This new State, if it should become a *fait accompli*, controlling, as planned, the great ports of Trieste, Cattaro, Avlona, and Salonika, was held by the Italians to be a grave menace to their vital interests and its establishment must at all cost be combated.

Though fact and fiction regarding the aims and plans of the Dual Monarchy are so closely intermingled, and the events of so recent origin as to preclude a thorough and dispassionate examination of the conflicting factors, it nevertheless is evident that as soon as the Pan-Serb programme above mentioned was clearly formulated, as soon as the Austrians realised the potential strength of this new Slav movement, which they believed could count almost unreservedly on the full support of the Russian Empire, they threw themselves into the arms of their German allies, and the reins of independent leadership in foreign affairs virtually passed from Vienna to the Berlin Government.

The position of Italy, bound by the Triple Alliance, was perplexing. Though the leading Italian statesmen were all loyal supporters of the Triple Alliance, they began to realise that Italy would, sooner or later, be confronted by a coalition of Austro-German interests in the Adriatic, bent on destroying Italian prestige and influence along its eastern littoral, while on the other hand, the peril of a Slav empire, confronting them across the narrow waters, was an altogether unpleasant alternative.

Inspired by confidence in Austria's new, closely knit relations with Germany which materially weakened the Russian menace, the Archduke continued

with redoubled zeal his policy of favouring the Slavs and persecuting the Italians. The most influential Viennese personages made no secret of the fact that they believed that in the Adriatic, Austria, as inheritor of the domains of Venice, alone had the right to dominate this body of water, and that at the first favourable opportunity Austria would assert her inalienable rights. To be in a position to do so she increased the size and efficiency of her navy. Two of the most faithful servants of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand were despatched to the Adriatic littoral to stamp out the last embers of Italian national spirit which still lingered there—the Prince Hohenlohe as Governor of Trieste and the Count Wickenburg to Fiume. They rivalled one another in their zeal in crushing the Italian elements of their respective districts, and made no attempt to disguise their efforts, while they fostered the loyalty of the Slavs for the Hapsburgs, which was still strong, by ever more blatant cajolery and favoritism.

The problem of the Adriatic now entered upon a new phase. Under the stress of the anger aroused in Italy by these events, the irredentist movement there, which had long been dormant, or at least had taken on the form of a literary, rather than a political, movement, again burst forth. Early in 1909 Gábríel d'Annunzio, entering for the first time the arena of national political discussion in which he was to play so decisive a part later on, published his poem "La Nave," and referred therein to the "most bitter waters of the Adriatic," hinting clearly that the time had come for Italy to assert herself in the Adriatic if the eastern shorelands were not to be irretrievably lost. Though

in popular opinion the sufferings of the unredeemed Italians aroused the ire of the people of Italy, and revived acutely the vexed *irredente* question, yet many of the more intelligent Italians foresaw that the orientation of events portended a clash of forces in the Adriatic and the Near East, which would involve all the nations of Europe and that Italy, owing to her peculiar position, must be strong enough to defend her vital interests.

The Slav ambitions in the Adriatic must henceforth be considered independently from the Austrian, while the Pan-German aims now demand brief attention.

If one should attempt to trace back to its source the interference of Prussia in the affairs of the Adriatic, no more significant document could be produced than the copy of a letter from the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs which Count Brassier de St. Simon, the Prussian Minister at Turin, left with Count Cavour in December, 1860. It throws an illuminating light on Prussian sentiment at this early date. Though conditions have altered materially, and Trieste is no longer within the boundaries of the "Germanic Confederation," Prussian and Pan-German sentiments have in nowise changed.

*"To Count Brassier de Saint-Simon, Turin.*

*"Berlin, 24/12, 1860.*

*"MY DEAR COUNT:*

*"It is only a few days since we have knowledge of a decree, dated November 8, and published in the official gazette, *Il Corriere delle Marche*, according to which the Commissioner Extraordinary of H. M. the King of Sardinia in the Marches, M. Lorenzo*

Valerio, confirms in the name of his Sovereign all the privileges which the Papal Government has granted to the Austrian Lloyd. If we had not been unaware of the existence of this document up to the present time we would not have failed to call the attention of Count Cavour sooner to two passages which it contains, and which were for us the cause of acute and painful surprise. M. Lorenzo Valerio in the preamble of his above mentioned decree asserts among other things that the company known under the name of Austrian Lloyd, does not belong to the Power whose name it bears. I must confess that it has been impossible for me to follow the arguments on the strength of which M. Lorenzo Valerio arrived at the conclusion of his strange assertion, though I do not hesitate to declare that in our eyes the Austrian Lloyd, a company whose head offices are located in the *German city of Trieste (la ville allemande de Trieste)*, is in truth an Austrian company. M. Valerio furthermore expresses the opinion that Trieste is not a German city, and that it is only by duress that the treaties have incorporated it in Germany. He also affirms that the city of Trieste has given unequivocal proofs that she considers herself as belonging to Italy and not to Germany. I do not know on what facts M. Valerio relies for accusing the city of Trieste of manifestations which, from our point of view, would have to be qualified as treason against our common country. However, we must vigorously protest against the conclusion which M. Valerio has evidently drawn based on facts to which he refers without knowing them. Prussia has refrained from interfering up to the present in all the disturbances which have arisen in the Peninsula recently. But she has always reserved for herself the right to object in case the Italian movement developed so as to no longer respect the *German frontiers*, as delineated by treaties, which frontiers by virtue of these same treaties Prussia is obliged to defend. But it is evident that

the decree of M. Lorenzo Valerio raises pretensions altogether incompatible with the rights of the Germanic Confederation. I do not doubt that Count Cavour disapproves wholly of the language of M. Valerio. But inasmuch as this official has spoken in the name of His Majesty King Victor Emmanuel, we would fail to fulfil our duty if we passed over in silence an incident which must necessarily worry Germany regarding the ultimate aim of the Italian movement. By order of His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent, I request you to ask the President of the Council: (1) Whether the Commissioner Extraordinary in the Marches really spoke in the name of his Sovereign as the text of the decree announces, and if he expressed the opinion of his Government regarding the Austrian Lloyd and the city of Trieste. (2) Whether if this is not the case, M. Valerio has been admonished. Requesting you to advise me as soon as possible of the answer of Count Cavour, I authorise you to leave with him, if he so desires, a copy of the present despatch.<sup>1</sup>

“Kindly accept, etc., etc.

“SCHLEINITZ.”

After the creation of the German Empire, Bismarck never failed to impress upon Italy that Germany would not tolerate that Trieste should fall into the hands of the Italians. Repeated efforts were made to encourage and increase German prestige in Trieste and other cities of the northern Adriatic. For two decades every effort was made by the German elements of Vienna, at the instigation of the Germans of Germany, to establish a flourishing German colony in these regions. But the attempts were only partially successful. Many of the descendants of these

<sup>1</sup> Chiala: “Lettere edite e inedite di Camillo Cavour,” Vol. IV.

German "colonists" became assimilated with the Italian elements of the community, and soon joined the ranks of the most ardent irredentists. Those few who remained steadfast to their German allegiance formed the nucleus of a group of wealthy industrial and commercial firms whose affiliations with Germany rendered them influential, though numerically insignificant.<sup>1</sup>

When, early in the present century, Germany had created for herself a dominant position in Asia Minor, and, by the so-called "trust of thrones" had woven a web of Germanophil sovereigns over all the Balkan States, with the exception of Serbia, and was thus artfully paving the way for the realisation of Hohenzollern hegemony from Berlin to Bagdad, it became evident that Trieste had been selected as the south-western outlet of the great Central European State which the Pan-German Imperialists had set about to create. The Adriatic was the shortest water route from the German *hinterland* to the Mediterranean, while the domination of the shores of the Eastern Adriatic, as well as the road to Salonika, by the docile Hapsburgs, seemed from the German point of view the best solution of the difficult problem of ruling the Jugo-Slavs. These plans were being matured with all the patience and skill with which the Germans enter upon any enterprise, and, with the puissant resources that they were able to command, would, if realised, not only destroy the prosperity of the in-

<sup>1</sup> Wickham Steed, in his brilliant study of the "Hapsburg Monarchy" (p. 275), remarks that the German, "*Drang nach Triest* has always been and remains a much more positive and practical factor of European politics than the Austro-Hungarian *Drang nach Osten*, or the dream of a 'March to Salonika.'

dustrial and economic life which the Italians were laboriously building up, as well as their markets in the Mediterranean, but would thwart for all time Italian ambitions across the Adriatic.

In order to protect herself against this imminent Austro-German peril, Italy now chose to pursue a policy of *rapprochement* with Russia, and indirectly with the Jugo-Slavs. The visit of the Tsar to the King of Italy at Racconigi in October, 1909, had inaugurated an era of friendliness between Rome and Petrograd which it was easy to cultivate. Though this policy must be judged as purely opportunist, yet it served its purpose in that it acted as a timely warning to Austria of the possibility of a joint action on the part of the Serbs and their Russian protectors, together with the Italians. This eventuality alone, it is believed, prevented the Austrians from attacking Italy when the latter was engaged in her Tripolitan campaign against Turkey (1911). Though the Archduke Francis Ferdinand paraded his bellicose intentions by a showy inspection of the Austrian fortifications in the Trentino, he became convinced that the settling of accounts with Serbia was a more urgent problem, which must be carried through before attacking Italy. For the programme of a "Greater Serbia" was now assuming in Austrian eyes alarming proportions. Russian interest in Balkan affairs had become insistently active. A recrudescence of nationalist enthusiasm incited by Russia began to assert itself. The Balkan peoples, in their eagerness to oust the Turk from the peninsula, forgot, for the time being, their differences and united in a common action. Then came the first Balkan War in the autumn

of 1912. Through the machinations of Vienna, the Serbs, who had borne the brunt of the conflict, were deprived of the fruits of their victorious campaign. Their moral prestige, however, had grown in stature, so as to become a real rather than a fancied menace to Hapsburg interests within the boundaries of the monarchy. The second Balkan War (1913), when Bulgaria fell upon her former allies, unleashed in all probability as the result of intrigues to which the entourage of the Austrian Heir Apparent was not alien, was to crush the growing power of the Serbs. Serbia, however, was again victorious, though she achieved no tangible benefits, and still found herself without an outlet to the sea.

The repercussion of these events along the Eastern Adriatic was violent. The epic campaigns of the Serbs had fired the imagination of the Pan-Serbs, who believed that their deliverance was at hand. Albania, freed from the Turkish yoke, was erected into an independent kingdom by the London Conference in December, 1912. Italy sanctioned the candidature of Prince William of Wied as the ruler of the new kingdom, believing it to be to her best interests to create an independent Albania, even though weakly governed, and thus remove this vital segment of the Adriatic coastland from the field of expansion of either Hapsburg or Serb.

Events now matured rapidly. The Jugo-Slav populations of the Dual Monarchy had become increasingly restive, and the Pan-Serb propaganda was daily gaining in strength. In order to forestall a Jugo-Slav revolution, which many Austrians feared would break out within the boundaries of the Mon-

archy, the Vienna Government, at the instigation of the Archduke, determined to strike a blow at the root of the Serb agitation, and by subjugating Serbia put an end to the dreams of the Pan-Serbs. The stage-setting for this *coup de main* was similar to that in the episode of the annexation of Bosnia. The meeting of the German Emperor and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Konopischt,<sup>1</sup> in early June, 1914, seems to indicate that the Austrian Heir Apparent there laid his plans before his powerful ally. These consisted, after a suitable pretext had been found, of an Austrian punitive expedition against Serbia, the overthrow of the Karageorgevich dynasty, and the substitution of a servile sovereign who would work in the best interests of the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, as did the rulers of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, at that time. The question of more drastic measures was left open.

Judging from the confused state of public opinion and from the internal dissensions rife in France and Great Britain in the early summer of 1914, it seemed more than likely that this plan could be carried out without European interference. Though Italy, as an ally of Austria and Germany, had every right to be informed of these plans, the more so as Article VII of the treaty of the alliance definitely stipulated that "the Austro-Hungarian Government is obliged in exchange for the occupation of territory, even tem-

<sup>1</sup> Konopischt is an old château which belonged to the Archduke, situated in central Bohemia about thirty miles south of Prague. Here William H., accompanied by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, arrived on June 11. The object of the Imperial visit was solemnly stated to be that "the Emperor desired to see the gardens of his friend, the Archduke, in full bloom."

porarily, to make a preventive agreement, and offer compensations," Rome was kept completely in the dark regarding Austro-German intentions, as it was evident that Italy could not be made a party to a bargain which was to increase the power and possibly the dominions of the Dual Monarchy without any regard for Italian interests in the Adriatic, where the Archduke was more unwilling than ever to make any concessions.

Francis Ferdinand then visited Bosnia for the purpose of military inspection. The expedition against Serbia, if it should take place, was to be launched along this lateral frontier. To disarm suspicion he was accompanied by his wife, now raised to the rank of a Highness and known as the Duchess of Hohenberg, who looked forward confidently to the realisation of her long-cherished desire of placing her son Maximilian, who was debarred by hismorganatic birth from occupying the throne of the Hapsburgs, on another throne. The Sarajevo tragedy followed. The assassination of the Archduke and the Duchess cannot from the most reliable evidence as yet available be linked with a prearranged political plot. It seems not unreasonable to suppose that this deed, like so many of the tragedies which have dogged the steps of the Hapsburgs in recent years, had no immediate relation whatever with impending events, and as such was merely fortuitous. Its causes must be sought outside the realm of politics, in all probability in court intrigues and designs of personal ambition. The murder of the Duchess of Hohenberg would appear to confirm this opinion.

The removal of the Archduke from the scene came

too late to change the course of events. Half measures would no longer suffice. The survival of the Hapsburg Empire demanded that the Serbian undertaking be pushed to its logical conclusion. The ultimatum and declaration of war against Serbia found Russia, France, and Great Britain ready to act in concert against the Austro-German combination. Italy alone remained outside the conflict. No treaty obligations bound her to assist her allies in a war of aggression.

After the first days of upheaval Italy began to realise the inherent strength of her position as a neutral. Those in authority in Vienna were now aware of the mistake which the late Archduke had made in encouraging the Jugo-Slavs of the Adriatic to the detriment of the Italian populations and endeavoured to remedy matters by a policy of favoritism towards the Italians. The Prince Hohenlohe was removed from the governorship of Trieste and other conciliatory measures were hastily introduced. But the Italians were in nowise deceived by these belated concessions. The opportunity was at last at hand for Italy to carry out her plans for the undisputed domination of the Adriatic. No longer content to lay claim only to the *irredente* coast towns, Italy foresaw the possibility of realising her ambition to become sole arbiter of all the lands bordering the Adriatic. By November, 1914, Italian pretensions as voiced in a section of the Italian Press were formulated: the whole Eastern Adriatic from Trieste to Avlona, with the exception of a small strip of territory which would give Serbia an outlet to the sea, must become Italian. Eager to be avenged for the humiliations imposed on their

Italian brethren by Austria in recent years, and for the torture which Venetia and Lombardy had suffered at the hands of Austria before Italian unity was achieved, it was the ambition of Italy to exclude Austria from any participation in the affairs of the Adriatic.

Feeling secure in her armed neutrality, Italy took the first step to carry out her designs. On Christmas Day, 1914, the Italian Admiral Patris landed a body of marines at Avlona, where the preceding day a disturbance had occurred which caused the Italian Consul to demand protection. Avlona, it will be recalled, commands the entrance to the Adriatic. A magnificent natural harbour protected by steep cliffs, rising mountain high with only one narrow navigable channel of access, easily fortified, it could speedily be transformed into one of the strongest naval centres in the world. To place it outside the realm of Austro-Italian ambitions, Avlona had by the London Conference been incorporated in the Kingdom of Albania. Albania, owing to the weakness of its ruler, had not long survived its birth, and the "King" having fled, the kingdom was held to be a defunct State. With Avlona in her possession, Italy now held securely the keys to the Adriatic. Even Russia, the protagonist of Jugo-Slav interests, appeared to approve of Italian occupation of Avlona. M. Sazonoff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on congratulating Italy on her bold step, declared:

"Albania no longer exists as an independent state; but Russia wishes that other peoples, the Serbs and Montenegrins, should be permitted to live, and their imprescriptible rights respected," wishing to affirm

thereby the right of the future Serbia to the northern portion of the late Albanian State.

Italy immediately set about to establish herself firmly at Avlona. She extended the limits of the territory acquired until the city was safe from attack by land and sea. In the meantime Italy, while continuing her attitude of friendly neutrality towards her ally Germany, did not lend a deaf ear to the proposals of the Allies to take up arms against Austria. As long as the Russian armies were victorious, Italy found the Allies unwilling to negotiate regarding such concessions in the Adriatic as the Italians believed essential to their vital interests. On the other hand, Germany was eager to secure the guarantee of Italy's permanent neutrality and urged the Italian Government to initiate negotiations with Vienna to this end. After various preliminary discussions, on April 8, 1915, Italy formally presented her claims to Austria-Hungary regarding the territorial concessions she required in return for continued neutrality. The clauses which more particularly concern the Eastern Adriatic littoral are:

"I. The cession of the Trentino, according to the frontiers of 1911.

"II. A rectification of Italy's eastern frontier in her (Italy's) favour, comprising in the ceded territory the cities of Gradisca and Gorizia. The line to run from Trogkofel eastward to Osternig; then via Saifnitz between the valley of the Seisera and the Schlitz to the Wischberg; from here along the existing frontier to the Nevea Saddle, and thence to the Isonzo east of Plezzo; continuing along the Isonzo to Tolmino, whence it runs via Chiaporano and Comen to the sea, which it reaches at a point east of Nabresina, between Monfalcone and Trieste.

"III. The city of Trieste and its neighbourhood, including Nabresina up to the new Italian frontier, and extending to the south to include the judicial districts of Capo d'Istria and Pirano, to be constituted into an autonomous State, independent in all respects regarding international relations, military, legislative, financial and administrative affairs; Austria-Hungary renouncing all rights of sovereignty over the new State. Trieste to remain a free port. No troops, either Austro-Hungarian or Italian shall be permitted to enter. The new State to assume its share of the Austrian public debt, in proportion to its population.

"IV. Austria-Hungary shall cede to Italy the Curzolari Islands of the Dalmatian coast, including Lissa, Lesina, Curzola, Sagosta, etc.

"V. Italy shall occupy immediately the ceded territory, and Trieste and its territory shall be immediately evacuated by Austro-Hungarian troops and civil authorities.

"VI. The recognition of Italian sovereignty over Avlona, its bay including Sasseno, and *hinterland* necessary to their defense.

"VII. Austria-Hungary renounces all claims to Albania."<sup>1</sup>

In return Italy pledged herself to remain neutral throughout the duration of the war and, furthermore, to pay an indemnification to Austria for Government property, debts, etc., amounting to £8,000,000. This programme, though moderate, nevertheless included the annexation of certain territory exclusively Slav.

Towards the middle of April, 1915, or about a week after the above proposals were made by Italy, the Russian offensive had spent itself. The Germano-Austro-Hungarian forces were already initiating the movement that was to clear Galicia and break the

<sup>1</sup> The "Italian Official Green Book, May, 1915," Document No. 64.

Russian advance. The necessity of Italian intervention on the side of the Allies became urgent. Russia, after conceding to Italy the principle that no "Greater Serbia," as outlined by the Jugo-Slav programme, would be permitted to be created—but instead two Jugo-Slav States—made the following offer to Italy in return for her co-operation in the war on the side of the Allies. In the event of the success of the Allied arms, which with Italian assistance seemed assured, Italy was to receive:

"I. Aside from the Trentino, all of Friuli, Trieste, and the western shores of Istria, including Pirano, Capo d'Istria, and the great naval base, Pola.

"II. The eastern shore of Istria and all territory as far south as the river Narenta was to belong to the new independent Croatian state, which was to be made up of Croatia, Slavonia, Carniola, and the greater part of Dalmatia; a State of some 4,000,000 inhabitants, almost exclusively Slav, with Fiume, Zara, and Sebenico as its ports.

"III. The remainder of the Dalmatian coast to be ceded to Serbia and Montenegro; Serbia was to receive also all of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

It will be seen that this Russian proposal, while abandoning some of the chief Jugo-Slav pretensions, ceded to Italy nearly all the territory which, before the war, had been claimed by Italian irredentists, and is far more comprehensive in scope than the demands made by Italy to Austria only a few days previous. Italy, however, rejected the Russian offer. The cause thereof may be sought in the fact that rumours had reached Rome, that in Russia there was a shortage of arms and munitions,

that the Allies were in a more difficult position than they had been in since the beginning of the war, and that Italian co-operation was more valuable than could be estimated in mere terms of territorial concessions.

Italy here had the opportunity she had long been waiting for, to secure the acquiescence of Great Britain, France, and Russia to the absolute Italian domination in the Adriatic. Austria-Hungary, feeling more secure as the result of the recent successes of her arms under German leadership, rejected the Italian proposals, and Germany was content to threaten Italy with the well-known German "frightfulness," should she dare to take up arms against her former ally. Whatever Russian or other opposition there may have been to abandoning the pretensions of the Jugo-Slavs to the right of united independence, in accordance with the principle of nationality, were silenced by the military necessity of the moment and the urgent need of securing active Italian co-operation. Italy thereupon presented her counter-proposals to the Allies, which were reported to be as follows:

"I. The Trentino up to the Brenner, to be Italian.

"II. All of Friuli and Istria, including Gorizia and Gradisca and the ports of Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, to be ceded unconditionally to Italy.

"III. To the new Croat state, the sea-coast beginning just east of Fiume, and extending as far south as the river Zermagna was to be given. However, all the islands commanding the coast were to be handed over to Italy.

"IV. From the Zermagna River, as far south as the Narenta the Dalmatian coast, as well as the Dalmatian Islands, to be ceded to Italy.

"V. The remaining coast land, as far as Durazzo, was to belong to Serbia and Montenegro, while the Italian possession of Avlona and surrounding territory had already been agreed upon."

These are, in outline, the territorial demands which Italy made to the Allies. The territory includes a population of over 1,500,000 Slavs, and gives Italy dominant control of the Adriatic, both strategically and commercially. These demands were in principle accepted by the Allies,<sup>1</sup> and definite financial assistance guaranteed to Italy on April 24, 1915, with a proviso that, within one month from date, Italy should declare war on Austria. Italy's declaration of war against Austria on May 24, automatically ratified the agreement entered into with France, Great Britain, and Russia, guaranteeing Italian hegemony of the Adriatic. The difficult problem of the Adriatic is thus tending towards a solution.

According to those in sympathy with the broader Jugo-Slav nationalism, Slav aspirations in the Eastern Adriatic have been trampled under foot. They already point to a Slav "irredentist" movement, directed

<sup>1</sup> Though the exact terms of the compact entered into have been kept secret, according to an authoritative statement the following outlines the agreement reached between Italy and the Allies regarding the distribution of the lands of the Eastern Adriatic, and the *irredente* territory guaranteed to Italy:

1. The Trentino up to the Brenner to be Italian.
2. Friuli and Istria to be handed over to Italy. The eastern boundary to run through Adelsberg to a point a little west of Fiume.
3. Fiume and the coast, as far as the Zermagna River to be given to Croatia.
4. From the Zermagna to a point three miles northwest of Spalato to be Italian, as well as certain of the Dalmatian Islands, including Lissa.
5. Remaining coastlands as far as Durazzo (?) to be Serb.
6. Italy to be confirmed in possession of Avlona.

against Italy, if Italian pretensions as stipulated are realised in full, more threatening and dangerous to the peace of Europe in the future than any other factor in the international situation. A representative Jugo-Slav committee in London issued a manifesto in May, 1915, from which the following significant passages are quoted:

"The Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes pray for the victory of the Triple Entente and confidently await from it the salvation of the Jugo-Slav nation. The conviction that the Triple Entente is fighting for the triumph of the principle of Nationality, inspired the moral energy and superhuman efforts of Serbia and Montenegro and prevented their kinsmen across the frontier from utterly losing heart.

"For Serbia and Montenegro this war is one of self-defense and liberation, not of conquest; they are fighting to emancipate our people from a foreign yoke and to unite them as a single free nation. The military and political overthrow of Austria-Hungary will forever put an end to that system of *Divide et Impera* by which our people has for centuries been governed. The Jugo-Slavs form a single nation, alike by identity of language, by the unanswerable laws of geography, and by national consciousness. Only if united will they possess the resources necessary for an independent existence.

"The Jugo-Slavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) inhabit the following countries: the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro; the Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia (with Fiume and district); the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Carniola; considerable portions of the provinces of Istria, Trieste, Gorizia-Gradisca, Carinthia, and Styria; and finally the Jugo-Slav zone of Hungary proper.

"To perpetuate the disunion of these territories by leaving so many under Austro-Hungarian rule, *or to*

*transfer even portions of them to another alien rule,* would be a flagrant violation of our ethnographical, geographical, and economic unity, and to this our people would unquestionably oppose an energetic and justifiable resistance.

"The Southern Slav people aspires to unite its territories in a single independent state. The internal arrangements of the new state will be determined by the nation itself, in accordance with its own wishes and needs."

This proclamation, issued in the name of 12,000,000 Jugo-Slavs, voices their determined opposition to Italian plans of aggrandisement.

Though a small minority of Italian Nationalists may wish to push to extreme limits Italian expansion along the Eastern Adriatic, the more reasonable and influential sections of public opinion in Italy are in favour of a more moderate programme, which will give the Jugo-Slavs full liberty for their economic, social, and national development. It is evident that Italy sought to secure wide territorial guarantees in the Eastern Adriatic in order to be able to use these as pawns in the general exchange of territory which will inevitably follow upon the remaking of the map of the world. Recent developments would tend to indicate clearly that Italy expects, in the event of the partition of Asia Minor, to receive a large share of the rich territory in southern and western Anatolia. The vilayets of Smyrna and Konia have been suggested as possible future spheres of Italian development, while a victorious campaign in Europe will no doubt assure Italy a large share of the Ethiopian Empire of Abyssinia, which now stands on the threshold of disruption. It is not unlikely, therefore, that Italy will be

willing to forego certain territories in the Eastern Adriatic guaranteed to her by France, Great Britain, and Russia for adequate compensation elsewhere. Nevertheless, it cannot be contested that Italy would seem destined to become the chief Power in the Adriatic. Through long centuries Italians have dominated its waters, and under their domination busy, populous cities sprang up, where the arts, industry, and commerce flourished. The memory of the glories of Venice, the Queen of the Adriatic, still lives in the hearts of all Italians. It would seem unreasonable to wish to exclude the new and greater Italy from the right of inheriting this Venetian hegemony. The Adriatic through two thousand years of its known history has always after brief periods of estrangements returned under Italian protection. It is not to be believed that for many decades to come the Jugo-Slavic peoples, even if their territorial aspirations were realised, could contest Italian supremacy. Many years must elapse before the educational, social, and economic standard of the Jugo-Slavs could reach a stage of development to be able to cope, even feebly, with the ancient and vigorous Italian culture.

As long as Italy was linked with Austria and Germany by the bonds of the Triple Alliance, France and Great Britain, looked askance at Italian aspirations in the Adriatic, which they believed to be a part of a broader Central European scheme. Italian participation in the European War on the side of the Allies conclusively proves that these fears were unfounded. When Napoleon, after his triumphant campaign in Italy, had wrested the lands of the Eastern Adriatic from Venice, the Italian envoy, Count Rocco

Sanfermo, endeavoured to persuade the French Directory of the advisability of ceding Istria and Dalmatia to Italy, "so that it could defend its coast and protect its commerce, as Italy united in a single body, governed according to the principles of liberty, would become an efficacious factor for stability and, joined with France, offer a strong defense against Austria." Since that time the history of the Italian people has been one long struggle to attain their *confini naturali*, their natural boundaries, to redeem the *irredente* provinces, to incorporate in one compact and great State all Italians. Italy is to-day by the force of her arms asserting what she believes to be her inalienable right to the domination of the Adriatic.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY

THE TREND OF POLICY. NEUTRALISTS AND INTERVENTIONISTS.  
THE MAY REVOLUTION

IN March, 1914, Giolitti relinquished office, and the Government was intrusted to M. Salandra. As the weeks passed the *malaise* of Europe became more pronounced. In Italy the restlessness of the people showed itself in mild revolutionary outbreaks in Romagna; though soon suppressed, they indicated a pervading discontent, which was current throughout Europe.

On June 28, came the report of the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Italy received the news with undisguised relief. It seemed to portend an era of more amicable relations with Austria. These hopes were soon shattered by the announcement of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, followed by the declaration of war. These events came as a complete surprise to Italy. How carefully the plan of aggression against Serbia at this time had been concealed by the Berlin and Vienna Cabinets from their Italian ally is difficult to ascertain. Italian official documents proclaim that Italy was in nowise apprised of the course of action which the Vienna Government proposed to pursue. It would seem reasonable, in the light of events, to place fullest confidence in this official version.

Berlin and Vienna both believed that, owing to the disturbed state of Italy, the depletion of her military resources of which they had very definite information, and the financial weakness of the country resulting from the vast expenditures of the Tripolitan campaign, Austria would be unmolested by Italy in her proposed punitive expedition against Serbia. When the conflict between Vienna and Belgrade, contrary to the expectations at least of Vienna if not of Berlin, no longer localised, became a world conflagration which soon was to involve all Europe, when Russia, and then France, espoused the cause of Serbia, Austria endeavoured at the last moment to summon Italy to her side. The famous despatch *casus fœderis* was hurriedly sent to Rome. General Cadorna, the Chief of the Italian General Staff, was convoked to confer with General Conrad respecting the measures to be taken jointly to defend the Dual Monarchy against the threatened Russian invasion. Italy's reply was the prompt declaration of her neutrality on August 3.

This declaration must be regarded as one of the most important factors of the first phase of the European War. It is incontestable that Italy's straightforward declaration of neutrality radically changed the course of world history. By merely mobilising her armies along the French frontier, from the Mediterranean to the Rhone, Italy would have kept 400,000 French troops in this area, and would thus have prevented France from throwing her whole strength into the balance against the German invaders from the north. The battle of the Marne instead of a brilliant French victory would, in all probability, have had another issue, and the triumphant German advance would

have swept across France instead of being stemmed in Picardy, Champagne, and the Argonne. Furthermore, the mobilisation of the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean could not fail to have dislocated French plans for the transport of troops from northern Africa, which rendered such great assistance from the very first days of the war; while it is not generally appreciated that during those first weeks, which found England wholly unprepared, British lines of communication with India would have been at the mercy of the Italian torpedo flotilla, whose conveniently situated base in Eritrea along the western shores of the Red Sea would have made it no very difficult task to cut British communications with the East, leaving Egypt open to invasion.

Italy, however, spontaneously and clearly showed what her intentions were by withdrawing her garrisons some distance from the French frontier and by concentrating her fleet at the entrance of the Adriatic.

The Italians now began to feel the strength of their new position. Italy's declaration of neutrality was in reality to prove a declaration of independence. During the half century which had elapsed since Italian unity had been achieved, Italy had felt herself obliged by the weakness of her international position to play a part of minor importance in world politics, incompatible with her population, resources, and national dignity, while the best interests of the Kingdom had often been sacrificed. Italy had never been free from foreign influences: first, that of Napoleon III and the French, during the formative days of the new Italy; later that of Bismarck and Germany. Repeatedly, during the long years of Italy's servitude, she had

sacrificed her legitimate ambitions for the sake of national security. Now, suddenly she found herself the mistress of her destiny. By her declaration of neutrality she had cut loose from the moorings to which, for more than thirty years, the ship of state had been anchored. Italy was thus confronted by a new set of problems, which for the first time in her history she was called upon to solve for herself; she was now free to consult only her own interests. From a position of minority and dependence in world affairs, the Italians had reached man's estate, and on the decisions which they were now called upon to make, the future of the country rested.

As the only great Power in Europe which had remained outside the war, Italy became at the same time the object of suspicion and solicitude on the part of both belligerents. On the one hand, Germany and the Dual Monarchy, while privately considering the conduct of Italy as traitorous in not coming to the assistance of her allies in a war of such magnitude no matter what its causes might have been, were nevertheless eager that Italy should continue in her attitude of friendly neutrality, as the Italians were at that time rendering great assistance by securing supplies from abroad. On the other hand, the Allied Powers though by habit of mind they classed Italy with their enemies, yet, eager to enlist whatever arms they might find in their cause, and appreciating the great strength Italian armies would add to their forces, soon began a campaign of propaganda in Italy to arouse the sympathy and active support of the Italian people.

The Italians themselves were divided in their con-

victions. The Triplist tradition had for a generation moulded the public opinion of the country. The leading statesmen, politicians, professors, and the more intelligent classes were confirmed believers in the advantages which Italy had derived from the Triple Alliance. The nation had been tutored in a faith in Germanic ideals of statecraft. German *Realpolitik* had in Italy many influential advocates, while the ascendancy of Germans in the affairs of the peninsula has never been doubted or denied by the Italians themselves.

Italy soon found herself divided into two distinct camps or parties—the Neutralists and the Interventionists. The first were in favour of continuing the policy of neutrality and of deriving whatever advantages possible from this attitude, both in increased wealth and in territorial concessions; the second, in favour of seizing the opportunity offered to vindicate Italy's national aspirations by the force of arms. But whatever policy was to be pursued, both parties were agreed that it was to be a purely Italian policy. Though the cause of the Allies aroused responsive sympathy throughout Italy, all Italians were convinced that in this crisis the best interests of Italy alone must be consulted. While the Neutralists appeared to be playing the part of defenders of the Central Powers, such groups as the Nationalists, that is, those who had hitherto urged violently the need of a war against Austria to regain the mastery of the Adriatic, were the first to declare: "Let us have no stupid Austrophobe policy." Italy, wide-awake to the opportunities of her position was to choose a course of action most suited to her national needs.

The problem resolved itself at once into whether Italy should remain neutral or take up arms on the side of the Allies. The few, who in the first days of the war may have been in favour of actively supporting the Central Empires, soon became silent or joined the ranks of the Neutralists. Italy was now in the throes of a moral and political conflict, the like of which has never hitherto been witnessed in a great State. On behalf of the Neutralists Giolitti, whose following was wide-spread and whose voice was listened to with attention, sounded the key-note of their convictions when he exclaimed:

“It would not seem improbable that, owing to the present condition of Europe, much can be obtained without going to war.”

The Neutralists further had enlisted the sympathy and support of such divergent elements as the Papacy and the Socialists. The Roman Catholics, who by tradition and principle were hostile to any policy which might increase the strength and popularity of the House of Savoy, opposed Italian participation in the war on the side of the Allies, on the grounds of a natural distrust of France, and jealousy and fear of any further expansion of Russia, the great Orthodox Catholic State. Moreover, the Roman Curia was bound by many ties of sympathy to Austria, now the “eldest and most faithful daughter of the Church.” The Papal entourage knew that in the event of a war with Austria, the diplomatic relations between the Pope and the representatives of the Central European Sovereigns would be broken off, and that the Papacy would be greatly hampered

in playing the part to which it aspired of moral arbitrator and pacificator in a world where all law and order had been violated. The elevation of Benedict XV to the Papacy showed that the Catholic Church had not altogether abandoned its aspirations to regain its temporal powers. Both Berlin and Vienna let it be known clearly that should Italy pursue a course of action prejudicial to their interests, the Pope could expect every assistance from them towards the realisation of these temporal desires; while the efforts of the Catholics to maintain Italian neutrality would not go without recompense.

The Socialist members of the Chamber of Deputies, though not unanimously (several groups soon joined the Interventionists), basing their arguments on the grounds of pacifism and international brotherhood, maintained that it was in the best interests of Italy that the country should continue its policy of strict and stringent neutrality.

But the most important and numerous group of Neutralists were not those directly affiliated with any political or religious party, but were what might be called "debtors of Germany." As has been pointed out in a previous chapter, German penetration had so thoroughly permeated Italian industrial and economic life that it was difficult to find even an unimportant branch of industry or commerce which was not dependent in a measure on German capital and support. The whole Italian economic structure had been built up on German foundations. To break with Germany meant, so they feared, the collapse and ruin of their hard-won prosperity. Further than this, during the thirty-three years of a close alliance with

Germany, a very considerable number of Italians had intermarried with Germans, and were now bound to Germany by these ties of marriage and blood relationship, while others, trained at the German technical schools and universities, had retained a very deep respect for their German masters. The great majority of the working and peasant classes were also opposed to war, chiefly on the ground that it would upset their economic well-being. At the other end of the social scale, many members of the higher aristocracy, enriched bourgeoisie, and university professors of the older and more rigid type who had absorbed the German point of view, rallied to the cause of the Neutralists.

The opinions of the Italians varied widely in the different parts of the country. In Venetia, the province closest to the frontier, though the district likely to suffer the most from the consequences of a war, the people were enthusiastically Interventionist, as they were also in Romagna. The Piedmontese, however, mindful of their historical affinity with Prussia, were actively opposed to the idea of a war against the Central Empires. In Lombardy, the industrial heart of Italy, opinions were divided, though the Neutralists were in a majority. In Liguria, Genoa was enjoying a period of unwonted prosperity on account of her traffic of imports, ultimately destined for Germany, and was thus not eager for any change in the *status quo*; while Rome and Naples and the remainder of Italy were undecided or indifferent regarding the war with Austria which the Interventionists now demanded.

With Germany few Italians found any cause for

quarrel, nor were there many who wished to seek far afield for such a pretext. With Austria the century-long feud subsisted, and the violence of the hatred of the Italians of Northern Italy was soon aflame. But Germany had espoused the cause of the Dual Monarchy so completely that it did not seem possible for Italy to declare war against Austria without German interference, and the legend of German invincibility was deeply rooted in Italy.

The Interventionists had a difficult task before them. At first composed only of an unimportant minority of young men, army officers, professional men, writers, journalists, and teachers, they believed that Italy could obtain her legitimate ends only by participation in the war on the side of the Allies. But for years past Italians had been temperamentally hostile to France. They could not forget the conduct of Napoleon III in regard to Nice, the Tunisian episode, and the many vexatious incidents which had clouded Franco-Italian relations within very recent years. Even more unpalatable to the Italians was the idea of fighting hand in hand with Russia, the protector of the Jugo-Slavs, and a possible antagonist in the Adriatic.

Those in favour of intervention were materially assisted in their propaganda, by the campaign of ruthless terrorism which the Germans had pursued in France and Belgium. The violation of Belgian neutrality had a less concrete influence than the destruction of the Cloth Hall at Ypres and the Cathedral at Rheims. The Italian people, whose æsthetic sense is more highly developed than that of any other modern European nation, could understand and gauge minutely

the sacrilege of the German invaders against the monuments and rich treasure stores of the past, and they were aroused to anger by the vandalism which was vividly pictured to them by distinguished Belgians who soon flocked to Italy.

However, the Italians were not to be persuaded by sentimental arguments. Though they deplored the loss of the historic monuments, they deemed that the war, if declared, must be an Italian war, definitely outlined as pursuant of a definite plan of action.

By degrees the Interventionists rallied to their support the leading journalists and publicists of Italy; in politics, Liberals, Radicals, and Conservatives soon ranged themselves on their side. In the universities many of the younger professors and the whole student body joined the party which now clamoured loudly for war—war against Austria. For throughout this campaign of persuasion there was little or no mention of war against Germany. Austria was the enemy and Austria alone was to be assaulted. In every city in Italy the propaganda for and against intervention was carried on. The man in the street was called upon to decide for himself in advance a problem which would eventually confront the Government. For all Italians felt that Italy could not long remain a neutral spectator. The future of the nation was at stake. Italy must sooner or later play an active part in the war which was to settle the destiny of Europe.

While in the public forum of the newspaper, street, and theatre the question of participation or non-participation in the war was being hotly debated, and the various opinions argued in pamphlet, leaflet,

and *viva voce*, the Government found itself assailed by the two belligerent groups.

On the death of the Marchese di San Guiliano, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in October, 1914, this office was assumed by Baron Sonnino; a clear-headed, silent man, who, though in the past a confirmed supporter of the Triple Alliance, was nevertheless admirably fitted by his realist training and temperament to guide Italy through the intricate negotiations which were to follow.

Early in December, Italy took the first official action when Austrian forces crossed the Danube and began the invasion of Serbia. The Italian Government at once made inquiries in Vienna regarding Austrian plans in the Balkans, and what compensation the Vienna Government was ready to make to Italy in accordance with the terms of their treaty of alliance, which demanded reciprocal compensation in the event of either party acquiring further territory in the Balkans. At the same time Baron Sonnino communicated with Berlin, and added these significant words: "The current which manifests itself in a section of public opinion in favour of neutrality, does not mean that it abandons Italian interests in the Balkans and the Adriatic, nor the national aspirations, but rather it is persuaded of the possibility of protecting these interests and realising these aspirations, at the same time remaining faithful to neutrality."<sup>1</sup>

While the Vienna Government endeavoured to turn a deaf ear to Italian demands and let matters drift, Germany soon discovered that the party in Italy

<sup>1</sup> Despatch to Italian Ambassador at Berlin, dated December 9, 1914. "Italian Official Green Book," Document No. 2.

favouring Italian intervention was daily gaining ground. William II, who took a very personal interest in Italian affairs, despatched the former Imperial Chancellor, Prince Bülow, to Rome as Ambassador Extraordinary to open negotiations with the Italian Government with a view to securing Italy's permanent neutrality for the duration of the war. If any man was fitted to succeed in this difficult task it was Prince Bülow. His residence at Rome, the Villa Malta, was still the centre of a wide and influential circle of important personages in Italian public life. Confident in his ability to accomplish his mission, Prince Bülow arrived in Rome. On December 19 he was received by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. During this interview, Baron Sonnino frankly told Prince Bülow that, though the majority of the population was still willing to support the Government's policy of neutrality, their support was based on the belief that the Government would secure adequate compensation—in other words, the realisation of Italy's national aspirations—and that he felt himself quite in accord with this point of view. For the next three months the Italian Government, chiefly through the medium of the German Envoy, was engaged in negotiations with the Vienna Government, respecting the territorial concessions to be made to Italy in return for her continued and friendly neutrality.

In the meantime the war had developed into a new phase. The German invasion in the West had been permanently checked, and the Russian armies were advancing victoriously through Galicia and stood on the heights of the Carpathians, ready to invade

the Hungarian plain. At the same time the Serbs had achieved an overwhelming victory over their enemies, and after a brief and brilliant campaign had driven the Austrians completely out of Serbia and captured many thousand prisoners and great booty.

The Italians looked with no little concern at this sudden triumph of the Slavs. They believed that their plans for the domination of the Adriatic were definitely imperilled. The news of further Russian successes continued to reach Rome. Negotiations with Vienna were dragging on slowly. The Austrians, after much bickering, had finally conceded the principle of territorial compensation. The Italian Government had been persuaded to forego some of its chief pretensions in order that a settlement might be reached. Italy, thereupon, on April 8, 1915, presented a definite proposal to Austria, regarding what she deemed the minimum compensations in the form of territorial concessions<sup>1</sup> by Austria, in the Trentino and the Adriatic; in the words of M. Sonnino, "indispensable for the purpose of creating between the two States a normal and stable status of reciprocal cordiality and possible co-operation in the future."

The representatives of the Allied Powers at Rome were watching closely the changing attitude of the Italian Government. For the Allies were, notwithstanding the Russian victories, fully aware of their intrinsic military inferiority *vis à vis* the Central Empires. When it seemed that Italy was about to conclude negotiations with Vienna, and Prince Bülow was already congratulating himself on the success of his efforts, the Allies decided to make a bold offer for

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chap. X, p. 229.

Italian assistance. Though for long months the campaign of preparing Italian public opinion for armed intervention had been going on, the Allied Governments had hitherto been unable to agree as to the terms to be offered to Italy. When it became known that the Russian advance had been checked, and that Russia had so taxed her resources as to be unable to cope effectively with the enemy, even on the defensive, the Allied Governments felt that the moment had arrived to secure Italy's active co-operation at all costs.

Then followed the series of Russian reverses. The Austrians again victorious, through the assistance of their German allies, were not anxious to accept Italy's proposals, while the Allies, who were passing through the most critical phase of the war, were willing to make almost any concessions demanded to secure Italian aid.

It is chiefly owing to the skill and tact of the French Ambassador at Rome, M. Barrère, that the negotiations which actually led to Italian intervention were brought to a successful issue in a very brief space of time. By April 24, 1915, the Italian Government had pledged itself under certain contingencies, and in return for guarantees given by the Allies,<sup>1</sup> to declare war on Austria. The Government in contracting this engagement had kept in close touch with the will and temper of the Italian people. During the months which had elapsed since the outbreak of the European War, the campaign of the Interventionists in Italy had progressed from day to day with increasing violence. The plight of the *irredente* provinces had again

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chap. X, pp. 232-233.

aroused the sympathy of all Italians. The day of their redemption was at hand. The opportunity must not be missed to complete the unification of Italy. The European War lost its significance and interest in comparison with the war which Italy was to declare on Austria. Italians concerned themselves little with the other struggle; their whole interest centred on Italian affairs. It is not unnatural that observers in France and Great Britain should have misinterpreted the Italian attitude, and the numerous delays which arose. "Italy will fly to the rescue of the victors," was a *bon mot* which plainly voiced their impatience and their mistrust of Italian policy.

But Italy had good reason for delay in declaring herself openly. Few foreigners could rightly appreciate how disorganised and unprepared for war the Italian armies were in the late summer of 1914. The Italian military authorities at once foresaw that sooner or later they would be called upon to take up a quarrel which was being fanned to flame by the national will of the Italian people. They must be ready to assume the responsibility when that moment should come. Under the leadership of that brilliant and methodical officer, General Count Cadorna, the Italian armies were being put into shape to be prepared for every eventuality. The task was arduous. The lessons of the first months of the war had to be learned; the methods of the new warfare assimilated. Slowly the armies were making ready. By the end of April, 1915, it was evident that the great gaps in the *cadres* had been filled; the empty caissons replenished; stores and munitions accumulated.

On May 3, Baron Sonnino transmitted to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna instructions to denounce the treaty of alliance with Austria. This document, so lucid and concise, sets forth in a succinct manner the justifications of the Italian Government in taking this step:

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
TO

THE ROYAL AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA

“(Telegram)

ROME, May 3, 1915.

“I pray your Excellency to communicate the following to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and leave with him a written copy:

“‘The alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary proclaimed itself since its beginning as an element and a guarantee of peace, and aimed first as its principal object at mutual defense. In the presence of subsequent events, and of the new situation which arose therefrom, the Governments of the two countries were obliged to propose another object no less essential, and in the course of the successive renewals of the treaty, endeavoured to safeguard the continuity of their alliance by stipulating the principle of preliminary agreements regarding the Balkans, with a view to conciliating the interests and the divergent tendencies of the two Powers.

“‘It is plainly evident that these stipulations, loyally fulfilled, would have sufficed to furnish a solid basis for common and fruitful action. On the contrary Austria-Hungary during the summer of 1914, without making any agreement with Italy, without even giving her the least notice, and paying no attention to the counsels of moderation which were addressed to her (Austria-Hungary) by the Royal Government, handed to Serbia the ultimatum of July 23, which was the cause and the beginning of the present European conflagration.

“Austria-Hungary in neglecting the obligations of the treaty, disturbed profoundly the *status quo* in the Balkans, and brought about a situation by which she alone would be called upon to profit to the great detriment of the interests of greatest importance, which her ally had so often affirmed and proclaimed.

“A violation so flagrant of the letter as well as the spirit of the treaty, not only justified the refusal of Italy to range herself on the side of her allies in a war brought about without her advice, but at the same time it took away from the alliance its essential factors as well as its *raison d'être*.

“Even the clause concerning benevolent neutrality provided for by the treaty, was compromised by this violation. Reason as well as opinion agree in precluding that benevolent neutrality can be maintained when one of the allies takes up arms to realise a programme diametrically opposed to the vital interests of the other ally, interests the safeguarding of which constituted the principal reason for the alliance itself.

“Notwithstanding this, Italy during several months, endeavoured to create a favourable situation for the re-establishment between the two States of those friendly relations which constitute the essential foundation of all co-operation in the realm of general politics.

“With this object in view, and with this hope, the Royal Government declared itself disposed to lend itself to an arrangement having for its object the satisfaction, in an equitable manner of the legitimate national aspirations of Italy, and which at the same time would have served to reduce the existing disparity between the two States in the Adriatic.

“These negotiations, however, arrived at no apparent result.

“All the efforts of the Royal Government met with resistance on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government, which after several months has only made

up its mind to admit the claim of the special interests of Italy at Avlona, and to promise an insufficient concession of territory in the Trentino; a concession which provides in no way for a normal adjustment of the situation, either from an ethnic, political, or military point of view.

“This concession furthermore was not to be carried out until some undetermined date; that is to say only at the end of the war.

“In this state of affairs, the Italian Government must renounce all hope of arriving at an arrangement, and sees itself obliged to withdraw all its proposals of agreement.

“It is likewise useless to give to the alliance an outward form, which would only be destined to dissimulate the reality of continual suspicion and daily differences.

“Therefore, Italy confident in her good right, affirms and proclaims that she resumes henceforth her full liberty of action and declares her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary annulled and without effect.’<sup>1</sup>

“SONNINO.”

Thus the Government had executed the mandate which it believed intrusted to it by the people of Italy. For in this Italian war it was the voice of the people that dominated. Italy alone of all the belligerent Powers was to enter into the conflict with her eyes wide open. The first decisive step had been taken. The treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary had been declared null and void, yet the Neutralists did not give up hope that war might be averted. They had worked with great skill and much tenacity to spread abroad their views. They had proclaimed their admiration

<sup>1</sup>“Italian Official Green Book,” Document No. 76.

for the genius of the German people, its strength and virility. The historical associations and similarity of the rise to nationhood of Italy and Germany had been evoked. The necessity of Italy's remaining faithful to her treaty obligations was emphasised; the threat of a Slav peril in the Adriatic was reiterated. But the most trenchant argument of the Neutralists was that of the added burden in the form of increased taxation and disturbed industrial conditions which would be brought upon Italy in the event of war, to say nothing of the thousands of useful lives that would be sacrificed on the field of battle; while by negotiations much might be obtained without going to war.

To these arguments the Interventionists had opposed others equally strong. First and foremost was the problem of the *irredente* provinces, which they were now prepared to solve. As a result of unforeseen circumstances, Austria found herself embarrassed and in a difficult position. Italy must not refrain from seizing this opportunity of rescuing the unredeemed Italians, whose survival under the pressure of the Germans of Tyrol and the Slavs of the Adriatic was daily more threatened. Secondly, military considerations demanded that Italy's northern frontier should be rearranged so as to secure Venetia from invasion, which, under existing conditions, could be launched without difficulty, and with every chance of success by the Austrians. The gates of Italy were in the hands of a potential enemy. The time had come for Italy to act as her own gatekeeper. A third, more cogent argument was that Italy could not afford to remain outside the conflict. Isolated in the midst of

the combatants, no matter which group of belligerents won, Italy would find herself unable to vindicate her position as a World Power, and would inevitably sink to the position of a State of the second rank. Italian aspirations in the Adriatic would be definitively thwarted. Should the Austro-German Powers be victorious, Italy would be forced to accept a subservient part in their scheme of a great Central European Empire, and would become another Bavaria. Should the Allies win without Italian co-operation, they would have no time nor desire to consider Italian needs or ambitions.

Notwithstanding the apparent gains of the Interventionist cause, the Neutralists were still confident in their strength. The ferment of the Italians had already reached such a height that any slight incident might at the last moment determine the course of action which the nation was to pursue.

On the very day, May 4, that the Italian Ambassador at Vienna delivered the Note denouncing the Austro-Italian alliance, there arrived in Italy, coming from France, a man whose voice was to carry the day; a man who seemed by temper and character, as well as by his past record, wholly unsuited for the part that was to be allotted to him in the great Italian drama. It was Gabriel d'Annunzio. Known abroad chiefly through his novels, wherein the vision of the poet is often obscured by a sordid, egotistical materialism, d'Annunzio in his own country was hailed as a poet whose knowledge and flexible use of the Italian language, as well as his unerring poetical instinct, rank him with the greatest in the Italian tongue. Many of his later poems breathe a lofty spirit of pa-

triotism and devotion to the cause of a Greater Italy. Of æsthetic temperament, he had hitherto kept himself aloof from crowds, and seemed wholly unfit to become the leader of the people and to force a Parliament and a Government to obey his mandate. It is more than probable that d'Annunzio had only a very vague notion of the part that he was to be called upon to play. His chief object in coming to Italy, after an absence of nearly five years, was to deliver an address at the unveiling of a monument at Quarto, near Genoa, where, on May 5, fifty-five years before, "the Thousand" under Garibaldi had set sail, to undertake the first step to bring about the unification of Southern Italy. Though d'Annunzio had never before played an important political rôle, he nevertheless appreciated the psychological possibilities of his position and the influence he could exert on his fellow countrymen in this crisis. From time to time during the past months, he had, since the war began, by his articles in the Press set forth his convictions as to the necessity of Italian intervention.

On his arrival at Bardonnechia, the first small station on Italian soil, d'Annunzio was greeted with enthusiasm by a group of officers and soldiers who had assembled on the railway quay. At every station where the train stopped he was the object of a boisterous ovation. At Turin, the chief centre of the Neutralists, a great crowd of students gathered to welcome the return to Italy of the poet. By the time he had reached Genoa all Italy was aflame with the news. The poet had become the *vates*, the seer of the new Italy. The Italians were ready to be led, eager to find a hero. D'Annunzio, by his stirring ad-

dresses to the people, by the appeal that he made to the grandeur and splendour of the past glory of Italy, aroused his listeners to an enthusiasm which bordered on frenzy.

At the fêtes at Quarto d'Annunzio was to be the principal speaker. The King of Italy had signified his intention of being present. At the last moment, however, the King, not wishing to show his sympathies for one party or the other, before the people had through the Government proclaimed their will, cancelled the engagement. D'Annunzio thus became the chief figure of the celebration. His oration, couched in high-flowing, allegorical language, did not arouse more acclaim than his mere presence. He became the object of an ovation the like of which has rarely been given to any civilian. His carriage was surrounded by excited admirers; he was showered with flowers, and with difficulty escaped from the hands of his well-wishers. Everywhere he was called upon again and again to harangue the assembled crowds. His words, inspired by an intense sincerity, carried with them a conviction and authority which increased hourly. D'Annunzio's reception at Genoa and Quarto was merely a precursor of other and greater triumphs. He became the embodiment of the idea which he preached. To an audience of university students who had presented him with a gold medallion of homage, d'Annunzio exclaimed:

"If it is true, as I swear it is, that the Italians have lighted again the flame on the altar of Italy, take torches lighted in its fires in your hands, and fan them to flame! Hold them in your clenched fists, brandish them aloft wherever you may go! Sow the warlike

fire, my young companions! Be ye the intrepid incendiaries of your great country. 'Begone! Obey! said the priest of Mars to the consecrated youth.' You are the seeds of a new world. Begone! Make ready! Obey! I can command you to do this because you have made me worthy to consecrate you since you are the sparks of the divine fire. Sow broadcast this fire! to-morrow let the souls of all be aflame! Let the voice of all arise in one single flaming clamour, 'Italy! Italy!'"

Thus d'Annunzio exhorted others to carry on the task which he had assumed for himself. His mission was to inflame the hearts of all Italians for war.

After a triumphant progress through various Italian cities, on the evening of May 12 d'Annunzio was to arrive at Rome. The city was in a turmoil. Giolitti, at the head of a group of influential Neutralists, who were apparently working in close co-operation with Prince Bülow, had arrived in Rome on May 9. Though no longer in office, Giolitti was omnipotent in Italian political circles. He still controlled a majority in the Chamber. It was said that he had come to the capital for the purpose of overthrowing the Government, and of forming a new Cabinet under his own leadership; he would then repudiate the Sonnino-Salandra agreement of April 24 with the Allies, reopen negotiations with Austria, and secure in return for Italy's neutrality wider and more extensive concessions from the Dual Monarchy, which the latter at this eleventh hour would be compelled to grant. The fact that Giolitti on his arrival had been received by the King as well as by M. Salandra, seemed to confirm these rumours, notwithstanding the fact that Giolitti emphatically denied the allegations, and stated that he

had come to Rome at the invitation of the King to confer on the situation in general. For a moment it seemed as though the Giolittian plot was about to succeed, and that Parliament, in face of a strong though disjointed and incoherent public opinion, would readily veto the arrangement entered into by the Salandra Cabinet in favour of intervention. It is at this juncture that d'Annunzio arrived at Rome.

In the square in front of the railway-station in the vast Piazza delle Terme, with the imposing background of the massive brick arches of the Baths of Diocletian rising against the deep blue of the evening sky, 150,000 Romans had assembled to welcome the arrival of the modern Tribune, for such d'Annunzio had now become in the eyes of the Italians. To the people of Rome d'Annunzio came in the guise of a deliverer. By some strange whim of fate, d'Annunzio the poet, the artist, the maker of elegant verses, had been clad by popular fancy with the virtues of a hero of ancient Rome. The Romans, ever ready to applaud, to be led, willing to be admonished, exhorted, inflamed to action, greeted their new idol with scenes of wild and exultant tumult. D'Annunzio was borne aloft on the shoulders of the people. Finally he was able to reach his automobile; the car was compelled to proceed at a snail's pace, halting at almost every yard, cutting as it advanced a lane through the dense throng which lined the streets from side to side. Escorted by torch-bearers, the car made a slow progress through the city. The multitudes formed in procession in the rear, and with banners and flags unfurled, among which those of Trent and Trieste were conspicuous, bearing thousands of torches and vari-

coloured lanterns, the procession wound its way through the streets of the capital, up the Pincian hill to the Hotel Regina, opposite the palace of the Queen-Mother. Queen Margherita, surrounded by her ladies-in-waiting, stood at the window of the palace, and added her applause to that of the multitude.

The next day Rome awoke to learn important tidings. The Salandra Cabinet, not feeling itself strong enough to confront Parliament at its opening on May 20, intended, so it was reported, in view of the uncompromising attitude assumed by the Neutralists, who controlled a majority in the Chamber, to tender its resignation to the King. The situation was critical. The honour of Italy was at stake. The Salandra Government had pledged itself to foreign Powers on behalf of intervention; the accession of Giolitti to office would mean that the Italian Government would repudiate these pledges. It appeared as though Giolitti and the Neutralists, working in concert with Prince Bülow, were about to frustrate the aims and manifest will of the Italian people.

It was then that d'Annunzio, in an improvised speech during a performance at the Costanzi Theatre, voiced a direct accusation against the "traitors," and bade the Romans fight against this enemy within their gates:

"Giolitti knew the terms of our treaty with Austria and Germany; knew that on May 4, we had denounced it—at least so far as Austria is concerned. He also knew the terms of our recent agreement with the Triple Entente, and the engagements entered into by us with France, England, and Russia. Nevertheless, he is making every effort to compel us to break

our given word. . . . He is betraying the King and the country. . . . He is guilty of treason. This is not merely a manner of speaking, a simple phrase. Giolitti is a traitor according to the usual interpretation of the word. . . . If the Italian Parliament re-opens on May 20, we must by every manner and means forbid the entrance of the lackeys of the Villa Malta and send them back one by one to their master. . . . At the Italian Parliament on May 20, the sacred Garibaldian anniversary, the liberation of the country and the realisation of its ambitions must alone be proclaimed."<sup>1</sup>

Rome, on learning the confirmation of the news of the resignation of the Salandra Government, was in an uproar. "War or revolution," was the ugly cry that now spread through the remotest corners of the Eternal City. Insurrection committees were formed, and a barricade was even erected in one of the streets. The outburst was not directed against the King, but against Giolitti and the Neutralists, against the "lackeys of the Villa Malta," as d'Annunzio had branded the pro-Germans. The violence of the mob grew. In the streets well-known Neutralists, who dared to venture abroad, were openly maltreated. The police authorities were forced in the interests of public safety to advise Giolitti to leave Rome.

In the meantime the King was called upon to find a solution of the crisis. Victor Emmanuel III, though a constitutional monarch in the most exact meaning of the word, could not fail to take into account the will of the majority of his people. One after another, the most important officials were called in consultation by the King. This constitutional formality

<sup>1</sup> *Corriere della Sera*, May 15, 1915.

having been gone through with, the King requested M. Salandra to reassume office as Premier and reconstitute his Ministry. Thus assured of the support of his sovereign, as well as of that of the people, Salandra on May 16 accepted the mandate of the King, and was ready to lay before Parliament at its opening the project of Italian intervention on the side of the Allies. King Victor Emmanuel had by his firm conduct in this crisis averted an armed outbreak which might have menaced the existence of the dynasty. Had the King chosen to dissolve Parliament, or taken any other course than the one followed, grave disorders would have undoubtedly arisen. The more active elements of the population had been aroused and incited to action by the impassioned speeches of d'Annunzio, and had been led to expect an affirmative outcome, a declaration of war.

On May 20, Parliament reassembled. The historic session opened. D'Annunzio's commands had been obeyed. Giolitti, fearing for his life, had fled to Piedmont. The Neutralist Deputies, hooted and threatened by the crowd, had been compelled to take refuge in a hotel adjoining the Chamber the day before the session. Here, protected by a strong guard, they remained in order to be able to attend the meetings unmolested.

The newly constituted Ministry under M. Salandra, having received a vote of confidence, was granted full powers. Even the Neutralists, cowed into submission, voted for war. D'Annunzio thereupon arrived at the Chamber. The Deputies rose to their feet, and with prolonged cheers acclaimed the poet: "Long live d'Annunzio! Long live Italy!" Three

days later Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary.

What course Italy would have followed had d'Annunzio not appeared on the scene is difficult to determine. Before his arrival the work of preparing public opinion had been zealously carried on by the Interventionists. D'Annunzio did not create the current of opinion which brought Italy into the war. He merely aroused popular imagination, and by the vivid imagery of his speeches, by the searching sincerity of his words, made the people visualise the passions, hopes, and desires which slumbered in their hearts. But it cannot be gainsaid that had not some such a dynamic force awakened the patriotism of the more alert elements of the population, the Giolittian Neutralists, who controlled a majority of the Chamber, would have been able to force the country to accept the rôle of neutrality and would have prevented Italian intervention. To d'Annunzio must be allotted a great share of the responsibility for Italy's declaration of war.

Thus the days of neutrality had come to an end. Italy during the ten months which had elapsed since the outbreak of the European War had undergone a radical national metamorphosis. She had abandoned her policy of alliance with the Central Empires; had emancipated herself from foreign control. She had weighed carefully the advantages and disadvantages which she might expect to reap from her continued neutrality, and then calmly faced the alternative of war. At the outbreak of the European War, the great majority of Italians had been strongly in favour of neutrality. Even after the campaign of the Inter-

ventionists had been carried on for many months, the great mass of the people still favoured non-intervention. The Neutralist arguments were subtle and feasible. The "much can be obtained without war," enunciated by Giolitti, and summed up by him in the Piedmontese term of *parecchio*, which was interpreted to mean "a good deal" when referring to territorial compensations offered by Austria in return for Italy's continued neutrality, had captivated the steadier elements of the population. It was then that the Salandra Government, making itself the interpreter of the more virile elements of the country, showed signs that it deemed war with the Dual Monarchy inevitable, if Italy were to realise her greater territorial ambitions, *i maggiori destini d'Italia*.

The nation was quick to respond to the cue given it. But there arose the figure of Giolitti, who for twelve years had cast his shadow over the public life of Italy. He held the reins of power firmly in his hands. He had behind him a docile parliamentary majority. The Salandra Government knew itself to be helpless.

Who bade d'Annunzio to return to Italy? Who intrusted him with the task he so successfully carried out? Was it the Nationalists, or a Francophil coterie at Rome? Or was it the private invitation of the Salandra Government? Future historians will tell us. An account of the struggle of those two mid-May weeks has been briefly related. It is the story of a nation coming into its own heritage, and forms one of the most brilliant pages in the history of the Italian people.

When the effervescent enthusiasm had died down,

and the Italians took up the business of waging war in earnest, M. Salandra, rising to address the vast crowds who had assembled on the Capitoline Hill (June 3, 1915), eloquently interpreted the feelings of the Italian people when he exclaimed:

“As destiny has allotted to our generation the terrible though sublime task of realising the ideal of a Greater Italy, which our heroes of the *Risorgimento* did not live to see, let us undertake this task with an invincible courage, ready to give ourselves wholly to our country, to give what we are and what we have.”

## CHAPTER XII

### ITALY AT WAR

PERIOD OF ALOOFNESS. MILITARY AND POLITICAL CRISES.  
UNITY

ITALY had entered into the war with her eyes wide open, in pursuance of a carefully matured programme of policy. She had ranged herself on the side of the Allies not only to safeguard her vital interests, but with the clear intention of increasing not merely her prestige and power, but her territory. The scenes of enthusiasm for the war against Austria, witnessed in Rome, Milan, and elsewhere, were effervescent outbursts of long pent-up feelings; they soon died down, and the people of Italy prepared themselves calmly to face the trials and hardships of war.

Italy had chosen her own time to open hostilities. Though the actual declaration of war was postponed for some days, owing to the Giolittian *coup d'état*, which gave the Austrians more time to bring up reinforcements and fortify their positions, yet they were unable to carry out their long and carefully prepared plan, drawn up personally by the Austrian Chief of the General Staff, General Conrad von Hötzendorf, of a smashing offensive into the Italian plain. Nevertheless, Austria's strategic superiority was not without its dangers to the Italians. Italy had to close securely her Trentino gates, and see to it that they remained tightly shut, for only then would she have

a free hand to conduct an offensive in the east. Both plans required superhuman efforts on the part of the Italian troops, owing to the geographical configuration of the boundary-line. In the north the high Alpine passes, leading straight down into the Italian plain, were in the hands of the Austrians. In the east the Isonzo River and the rock-ribbed Carso plateau presented formidable barriers to any advancing armies.

The Italian General Staff realised fully the difficulties of the task which was to be intrusted to them. The war which had been raging for nine months throughout Europe had taught them many valuable lessons. They had learned the advantages to be derived from a body-blow delivered at the very outset of the campaign. If this was an advantage in other zones of operations, it was an absolute necessity along the Italian battle-line, otherwise Italy would find herself in a difficult position; therefore, she prepared to wage an offensive campaign.

Throughout the winter and spring the Italian armies had been moulded into shape; the *cadres* brought up to full strength; the transport perfected; munition and supply depots arranged for. By the end of April everything was in readiness; the "armed neutrality" declared by Salandra, which the Vienna Government had long believed to be a "bluff," was to prove itself an important factor in the early days of the war. For when the declaration of war came, there was no stoppage of the ordinary life of the country; there was none of the chaos and confusion such as was witnessed in France when mobilisation was ordered there. In Italy on May 22 the general mobilisation orders were issued. Except for the delimita-

tion of the *Zona di Guerra* (war zone)—which included virtually only Venetia and a very small sector of Lombardy—a slight delay of some trains, and the movement of troop trains, there was little to indicate that Italy had entered into the conflict. On May 25, the King left Rome for General Headquarters, where he personally assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief of all the Italian armies, after appointing his uncle, the Duke of Genoa, "Lieutenant-General" of the Kingdom during his absence.


The actual control of the conduct of the war was intrusted to General Count Luigi Cadorna, the son of the General Cadorna who had played such an important part in the wars of liberation and had directed the operation which resulted in the taking of Rome. To the father had been intrusted the task of setting the seal of consummation on the plan of Italian unity; to the son was to be intrusted the task of bringing about the redemption of the Italians who lived beyond the boundaries and the creation of Greater Italy. No man knew better than General Cadorna the difficulties which would confront his troops. No man knew better than he did the regions of the Trentino and Trieste. Though he had never commanded an army in the field, his skill as a commander had been brilliantly displayed during several Grand Manœuvres. Furthermore, by his writings on military subjects he had won for himself a high reputation. His "Frontal Attack," first published in 1898, set forth lucidly the advantages to be gained by a well-executed offensive. The temper of the man is well given in his own words, when in the preface of his book he remarks: "It is impossible to achieve success in war,

if the stanch discipline of the men is not joined to a stern discipline of the leaders. The first makes the body of troops docile in the hands of their chiefs, the second makes these capable of guiding the operations with that unity of opinion and conception which is indispensable to victory." He himself superintended, even down to the most minute details, the reorganisation of the Italian armies during the days of neutrality. Though hampered by the lack of funds, he was able to bring his armies up to a high standard of efficiency. His organising faculties are remarkable, so that it became a byword throughout Italy, soon after the outbreak of the war, that "General Cadorna has organised his armies too well not to be able to *organise* victory." Possessing in a superior degree calmness in the face of danger, yet deprecating individual bravery as detrimental to the smooth working of the military machine; brilliant in his method, though consistently, almost ploddingly methodical, he was to lead Italy into war as coolly and calmly as though it were merely the usual Grand Manceuvres. The sobriety of his *communiqués* won the confidence not merely of his troops, but of the civilian population. Trusted implicitly by all Italy, from the King down to the humblest peasant, he was to be able to carry out his plans of campaign, even at the most crucial moments, undisturbed.


It is believed that General Cadorna had planned to begin his campaign on May 15, and, thus taking the enemy by surprise, to carry the warfare by swift, bold strokes deep into the enemy country. The machinations of Prince Bülow and Giolitti prevented this plan from being realised, and the enemy had ten

days at his disposal to reinforce his positions as soon as he saw that war was inevitable. Yet General Cadorna kept to the main outline of his plan. In one mighty bound, along Italy's four-hundred-mile Austrian frontier, from the Stelvio at nine thousand feet above sea-level, to the shores of the Adriatic, the Italian troops sprang forward. During the first days of the campaign the Italians secured the keys to the passes leading into Italy, while the Austrians retired all along the line to well-fortified positions. The war had been everywhere carried into enemy territory. The Austrians offered little resistance. It was obvious that General Cadorna planned to carry on his offensive in the east, at the same time exerting an ever-increasing pressure in the north.

The operations along the Isonzo were, however, hampered. Mistakes and delays occurred during those first days which, though perhaps inevitable, cost the Italian armies many valuable lives. The crossing of the Isonzo, which it was hoped to carry out in a few days, was delayed three weeks, and it was not until June 18, that a general forward movement was made. But the Austrian guns, posted on the Carso heights, still dominated the river, which is here nearly a mile wide. The Italians worked with dauntless courage to repair the broken bridges, to build new ones, to get across the river by boats. It was at Sagrado that the most determined attacks were made. By dint of persistent efforts and dogged courage, the Italians crossed the river, established themselves firmly at Sagrado, and pushed up the flank of the Carso to Castello Nuovo. By June 27, the Italians held the bridge-head, which now made it possible to carry on



THE ITALIAN WAR ZONE



a general attack on the Carso. Soon a general advance began, so that early in July the Italians had everywhere crossed the lower Isonzo and securely held its left bank. Only in one sector the two almost impregnable positions of the Monte Sabotino and the Podgora, defending the town of Gorizia, the former rising two thousand feet and the latter eight hundred above the plain and fortified with great skill by the Austrians, remained in Austrian hands on the right bank. Though the Italians made repeated assaults, one of which at least almost succeeded, the fire of the enemy batteries, posted on even higher peaks beyond the river, drove off the assailants, and the fighting soon settled down to trench-warfare. In the region of the upper Isonzo minor successes were gained by the Italians.

In the Alpine regions the *Alpini* battalions, the most daring mountain troops in the world, had achieved astonishing successes. They climbed over seemingly impassable rock ledges; they clambered up perpendicular cliffs and drove out the Austrians. As they advanced the resistance of the enemy stiffened. By the end of June the impetuous onslaught of the Italian mountain regiments had slackened. The *Alpini* dug themselves in, and here as elsewhere trench fighting began.

It was soon found that the enemy had been able to spare more troops from his Galician front than had been expected, and that he was equipped with a more numerous artillery than the Italians. Above all, his skilful and flexible use of his heavy guns had rendered the task of assault difficult. Though the Italians had settled down to trench-warfare, this did not mean

that they had abandoned their offensive tactics. Along the Isonzo they pushed their trenches forward and kept the enemy constantly engaged. Steadily the pressure along the whole Carso line continued. The Italians took many prisoners, and were daily consolidating their positions more strongly. Suddenly, during the last week in July, the Austrians began a furious offensive. The attack was well conducted, but the Italians by bringing up reserves soon counter-attacked with increased vigour. For nearly a fortnight the battle raged violently with varying fortunes. The crest of the Carso was won and again lost by the Italians, and when the fighting ceased at the beginning of the second week in August the Italians found themselves established in strong positions close to the top of the plateau.

Throughout the summer the fighting in the high Alps continued. It was more in the nature of skirmishes and brushes with the enemy, than well-defined warfare. The Austrians frequently held niches above ravines commanding an important line of communications, where a corporal's squad with a machine-gun or two and plenty of ammunition could do an immense amount of damage to transport columns and passing troops, until destroyed by a bold assault on the part of a few intrepid volunteers. The Italians were slowly gaining the summits. The fighting was now carried on from at seven to nine thousand feet above sea-level. The Austrians under the protection of their heavy-calibre guns, which jutted out from thick armoured, revolving turrets on the mountain tops, were able to maintain themselves in relative security. The task of destroying these gun emplacements was

stupendous. The Italian forces had to bring up their big guns. There were no roads. Roads were built. Then by hand, by harnessing a company, even a battalion to one gun, the guns were hauled slowly and laboriously to the mountain tops. Artillery duels followed, while the infantry remained inactive until the enemy guns were silenced and the infantry could then move forward.

Winter set in early, but the Alpini did not abandon their positions. By the end of September deep snow had made the high Alps almost impenetrable. Yet these mountain troops stuck to their posts. The silence of the Alpine valleys was suddenly and unexpectedly disturbed by the crash of exploding shells or a dull hiss as the hot metal buried itself deep in the new-banked snow. Thus the heights above the valley of Cortina d'Ampezzo were mastered. The Monte Baldo, and the mountains dominating the Val Sugana and the Val Lagarina and all the other valleys which converge on Trent, one by one fell into Italian hands. But the work was slow, and throughout the winter and early spring the positions maintained were relatively unchanged.

On the Isonzo the campaign was active, even if no great progress was recorded. During October and November the fighting continued. The Italians attacked furiously, hoping to gain the Monte Sabotino. They advanced their trench lines, and once, early in November, actually held the heights, but were obliged to evacuate the position. Nor was the enemy inactive. He fought doggedly and never gave ground until it had been dearly paid for. The *morale* of the Italian troops was excellent. Though their

offensive had not progressed as rapidly as they had desired, they were everywhere fighting on enemy territory. Two thousand square miles of the cherished *Italia irredente* had been redeemed, including 125 villages and townships, with a normal population of nearly 100,000 inhabitants.

WHILE General Cadorna was vigorously prosecuting his campaign, the attitude of Italy at large remained perplexing. The country had entered into the war in the face of a Parliament whose majority was distinctly Neutralist. After the "week of Passion," as d'Annunzio so strikingly characterised those eventful May days, which culminated in the historic session of May 20 and the declaration of war, the country regained its normal aspect with astonishing rapidity. Not two weeks elapsed before the Germans (for though Rome had broken off diplomatic relations with Berlin, numerous partisans remained to take up their cause) were again at work. Italy had declared war against Austria. There were few who were in favour of declaring war on Germany. The most active Interventionists had hoped that the declaration of war would come from Berlin. But when the weeks passed, and Germany maintained an attitude of stolid silence, it became evident that the Germans had other plans.

The position of M. Salandra was one beset with difficulties. He had skilfully guided Italy into the war, and was a sincere Interventionist, yet he realised that the Chamber was still controlled by Giolitti; that the majority was still secretly Neutralist while he himself commanded only a small following. Further-

more M. Salandra's part in Italian public affairs had been local in character. "A modest burgher of Apulia," as he was wont to characterise himself, he was not in the habit of thinking nationally; he displayed few of those qualities of statesmanship, the breadth of view or the bold initiative needed in such a crisis. He had led the country into war, and having thereby won the high esteem of the majority of the Italian people, it seemed as though he felt that his task had been accomplished. A warm friend and admirer of Baron Sonnino, whose faithful lieutenant he had been until he had rallied to the Giolittian majority in 1913, Salandra had called Baron Sonnino to the Foreign Office, and together they had laboured in the cause of war. However, neither possessed the gift of magnetic leadership necessary to inspire the country with buoyant confidence. As was to be expected, it was soon evident that the Government had lost touch with Parliament and the people.

Though Italy had entered the war on the side of the Allies, during the first months she seemed to wish to let it be known that she was fighting her own war independently; that Italy's war against Austria was only indirectly connected with the war being waged along the other fronts. Italy maintained an attitude of aloofness towards the Allied Powers. They, in turn, regarded Italy with some misgivings. The fact that Italy had not altogether broken off indirect commercial intercourse with Germany, and that goods from Italy were still reaching Germany, rankled in their minds. The belief that some secret arrangement between Rome and Berlin existed, readily gained wide credence in both France and England. Though there

was no truth in these rumours as circulated, the commercial agreement,<sup>1</sup> entered into by Italy before the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany, was distorted to fit the circumstances. The Salandra Government did not exert itself to dispel the false impression which had gained currency, so that it was not surprising that Italy was regarded with increasing suspicion abroad.

In Italy itself there was a party with German affiliations, who soon after the declaration of war began a campaign in favour of what came to be known as *la piccola guerra* or "small war," which meant that Italy should only put forth a half-hearted effort, instead of energetically prosecuting the war. It cannot be denied that during the early months many obstacles were placed in the way of mobilising Italian resources to the fullest for war purposes. The peculiar timidity of Governments, which manifested itself in all the Allied States, in London as well as in Paris and Petrograd, where the several Cabinets, fearing popular discontent, were afraid to ask their countries to bear burdens which were subsequently looked upon as trifling, was a contributing factor in preventing the Salandra Ministry from pursuing a vigorous policy, though the nation at large was ready and eager to bear manfully its share.

On August 21, Italy declared war on Turkey. This action was taken in view of Italy's increasing interests in Ægean affairs, more particularly in Asia Minor, rather than from any probability of direct conflict, though the Turks had stirred up some trouble in Libya. The declaration of war against Germany was,

<sup>1</sup> See page 205.

however, still deferred. The active Interventionists became restive. Parliament was not to reopen before December 1. It soon became known that the Italian forces in the field did not possess the necessary munitions to carry on an aggressive campaign, and that this was the main cause of the slow progress on the Isonzo. Machine-guns and heavy-calibre artillery were also lacking. To this was added the report of a shortage of coal, due to insufficient transportation facilities. Other disquieting rumours soon gathered strength, yet the Government vouchsafed no explanations, and the country was left in the dark as to the true circumstances.

It is doubtless true that the discontent rife in Italy was increased by the fact that the war was going against the Allies. In October Italy declared war on Bulgaria, and still the long-expected declaration of war against Germany was once again postponed. The position of Italy had grown increasingly difficult. In France and Great Britain it was not easily forgotten that for thirty-three years Italy had been allied to the Central Empires, and that the treaty of alliance with Germany had not been denounced. In Paris and London it could not be understood why Italy had not declared war on Germany. No temporising excuses were accepted. At home there was an increasing number of Italians who were strongly dissatisfied with Italy's ambiguous position. At this time the cry arose for greater solidarity among the Allies. Italy must co-operate more closely with the Allies, both militarily and politically.

On December 1, the day of the opening of the Chamber, Baron Sonnino, in the course of a speech

on Italy's foreign relations, announced that Italy had formally adhered to the Pact of London, pledging herself not to sign a separate peace. This was a first step in the right direction. About this time Italy arranged to make use of the German ships interned in Italian ports, "to be paid for after the war," in order to relieve the shortage of tonnage which was daily growing more acute.

The year 1915 closed with the country in a state of restless uneasiness. The Government had failed to come forward with a clear-cut statement of the situation. Though the integrity of Sonnino and Salandra was above reproach, their methods had done much to leave doubts in men's minds as to Italy's aims and intentions.

The military situation in the Near East was causing serious concern to the Allies. The Austro-German armies under von Mackensen had swept across the Balkans; Serbia had been crushed and the Austrian forces were now directing their energies to the conquering of Montenegro and Albania. Their advance was not long delayed. On January 12 (1916) the news reached Rome that Cetinje had fallen in the hands of the Austrians, and that the Montenegrins were retreating towards the Albanian coast. On January 28, the Italian forces occupied Durazzo. It was now decided to rescue the Serbian army, which had retreated through Albania to the coast, as well as the scattered forces of the Montenegrins, together with the civilian population which had fled before the invaders. This task was intrusted to the Italian navy. The work was beset with great peril. Enemy submarines infested the Adriatic, yet the undertaking

was successfully carried out. The Serbian armies, estimated at over 50,000 men, were transported to Corfu. The sick and wounded, as well as the civilian population, were taken to Italy; stores and supplies were taken over to Albania; Italian troops were transported; in all 250,000 men and 10,000 horses, with supplies, etc., were safely carried. Italy had fulfilled the task intrusted to her with remarkable ability. Her forces held on at Durazzo until the town was completely evacuated, and then only retired on Avlona, which they continued to hold. Notwithstanding Italy's admirable work of rescue in Albania, the rumour soon spread that Italy was in part to blame for the defeats of the Allies in the Balkans, as she had refused to send a force to Salonika to co-operate with the French and British. No consideration was taken of the fact that Italy had first to protect her own battle-line, and that she could spare no men or guns for a far-distant expedition.

But the effort to secure close co-operation among the Allies was now being systematically carried out. In February M. Briand, the French Premier, came to Rome to pave the way for the politico-military conference of the Allies which was to take place the following month in Paris. Here, on March 27, M. Salandra, Baron Sonnino, and General Cadorna for the first time came in personal, official contact with the representatives of the Allied Governments. Henceforth Italy was to act in close co-operation with her Allies in all matters, whether diplomatic, military, or economic. The effect of this conference was of great value in co-ordinating closely the joint efforts of the Allies. Exchanges of official visits also took place be-

tween Great Britain and Italy. General Cadorna visited London; Mr. Asquith came to Rome and paid his respects to King Victor Emmanuel at the Italian front. The relations between Italy and her Allies now entered upon a new phase of friendliness and mutual confidence. Italy no longer was isolated in the war, fighting her own battles unaided; she had linked her fortunes with those of the Allies, yet retained her liberty of action. In the words of Baron Sonnino, who, speaking in the Chamber on April 16, declared:

“Our aim is simple: to fight with all our strength in the common cause, at the same time protecting the supreme, vital interests of the nation.”

The steps towards a closer co-operation with the Allies had greatly strengthened the Government, but the question of declaring war against Germany still hung like a dark cloud over the horizon. It has often been suggested that Italian statesmen are fond of dallying with equivocal situations, and that in their desire to appear crafty, their diplomacy often becomes entangled in the woof of their own weaving. It is impossible as yet to determine whether the Salandra Government aimed purposely to continue its semi-friendly relations with Germany or whether it was afraid to break off entirely with Germany, in view of the strong pro-German sentiments which still existed in Italy. The disasters which had befallen Allied arms in the eastern theatre of war—the conquest of Poland and much Russian territory, of Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania—the Titan blows which the German armies were striking at Verdun

made it appear desirable to many Italians not to provoke a war with Germany, who still loomed all-powerful. The Government at all events continued its course unchanged. The Interventionist members of the Chamber were now consolidated into a *bloc* of 140 members under the leadership of M. Bissolati, the brilliant Socialist Deputy who at the outbreak of the war had volunteered for active services, and was a sergeant in an Alpini battalion. They had hoped for a reconstruction of the Cabinet which would lead to a more vigorous prosecution of the war. But M. Bissolati was unwilling to precipitate a crisis. He counselled patience and prudence, and urged his followers not to upset the Government, even though he himself would have been the first to welcome the declaration of an energetic policy in the prosecution of the war. On the other hand, the Official Socialists, who numbered 36 members of the Chamber, were still solidly opposed to the war, and daily voiced embittered criticisms of the Government for having dragged Italy into the conflict. At the same time the important group of Germanophiles, who had numerous supporters throughout Italy, frankly stated that though Italy's declaration of war against Austria was justified and justifiable, to declare war on Germany would be an act of wholly unwarranted aggression.

ON the battle-fields of the Isonzo, with the return of spring, activity was being renewed. The German onslaught at Verdun, which the French were heroically withstanding, had brought to the fore more insistently than ever the cry for unity of action on all the fronts. Some even went so far as to suggest that Italy should

send an expeditionary force to France. But the Italian Higher Command knew that in the near future it would need all its available strength. However, a heavy bombardment was opened along the Isonzo, and though no general assault took place, this diversion had a salutary effect, and stopped the Austrians from transporting artillery to France.

The reason why the Italians were unable to assist the French at this time soon was made known. During the winter months the Austrians had been slowly concentrating a considerable force in the Trentino. Spurred on by Austria's recent successes in the Balkans, General Conrad could not resist the temptation of putting into execution his long-matured plan for the invasion of Italy. There can be no doubt that it seemed certain that with due caution, adequate preparation, and sufficient effectives both in men and guns, the project would succeed. The prospect was alluring. Russia was, at this time, so it was believed within the Central Empires, wholly *hors de combat*, and before she could take the field again it was proposed to break through the Italian defenses in the Trentino, pour into the Italian plain, and thus getting in behind General Cadorna's main forces operating on the Isonzo, crush the armies of Italy by one swift stroke. Once the Austrians were in the Venetian plain, they were confident that Italy would be ready to sue for peace.

A glance at the map will readily show that this "Napoleonic" plan of campaign offered many chances of success. The Italian forces had pushed northward, up through the chaotic valley systems which converge on Trent, without much regard for the defensive

strength of their positions. They held a line, in the sector which was to be the scene of the great battle, running roughly from a point a little south of Rovereto, north of the Col Santo, supported by the Pasubio, which has an altitude of 7,353 feet, then following the old Italian frontier line across the Valle Maggio and the Val Sugana to the Monte Collo, northwest of Borgo. For nearly a year the Italians had been carrying on an offensive campaign, and as the enemy had never counter-attacked in force, the result was that in certain sectors the Italians had neglected to strengthen their positions as adequately as would have been desirable. The rumours of an impending Austrian offensive were current as early as March, but as time wore on and the enemy made no move, whatever apprehensions there may have been were quieted, more particularly so as the Italian General Staff had learned of the great offensive preparations of the Russians, in their southern sector, and they could not believe that Austria would dare to weaken her Eastern front.

The young Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, the Heir Apparent of the Hapsburg throne,<sup>1</sup> arrived in Trent to take command in person of the invading forces; while General Conrad hovered in the background, retouching his strategy and amending his tactics. Fifteen divisions, totalling 350,000 men, the picked troops of the Dual Monarchy, were gathered here for this great undertaking. The most powerful big guns which Austria possessed had been brought from remote confines of the Empire and beyond, and were now concentrated along the short sector of the

<sup>1</sup> The present Emperor Charles I.

battle-line, stretching from the Val Sugana to the Val Lagarina. Here forty-five great 12-inch howitzers from the Skodawerke, which had reduced Liége, Antwerp, and Laon in the West, Novo Georgievsk, Ivangorod, and Brest Litovsk in the East, the most powerful, easily handled heavy-calibre guns that have been used in this war, were disposed along the Alpine plateaux, ready to move forward and batter down all resistance. There were, furthermore, at least six of the monster German 420-mm. guns, and as many more long-range 15-inch naval guns, to say nothing of the smaller calibres. It is estimated that over 2,000 pieces of artillery were massed along a short front, extending not much over 22 miles—that is to say nearly 100 guns to the mile, or one gun every 20 yards. Great reserves of munitions were piled up, and it was soon evident that the *Strafexpedition* or “punitive expedition,” as the Austrians termed their proposed offensive, was to be carried out on a formidable scale. Everything was done to arouse the enthusiasm of the polyglot divisions of the Hapsburg realm. The beauties of the rich Venetian plain were extolled, and it was noisily proclaimed that this was to be the final offensive, and that the crushing of the Italians would bring about the end of the war.

During the last week in April, General Cadorna, after making a tour of inspection of the Trentino defenses, took up his headquarters with the First Army, commanded by General Brusati,<sup>1</sup> which held what was to be the centre of the battle-line; as it was

<sup>1</sup> General Brusati was removed from his command of the First Army at the opening of the Austrian offensive and was retired from the army a few weeks later.

evident that the General commanding here had made insufficient provision in the event of a strong attack, the Commander-in-Chief set about to remedy the defective defenses. The Italian lines in the Trentino were at best ill-suited to hold up an assault pushed home with the vigour which modern artillery has made possible. The valleys leading into the Italian plain radiate, fan-like, from Trent as a centre. The Austrians could choose any of these six valleys as a channel to pour into the plain. The Italian lines of defense were isolated and only poorly provided with lateral communications. General Cadorna expected a violent attack, but had not counted on the tremendous battering ram of shells which crumpled the Italian advance positions when the bombardment opened on May 14. The attack began with a general bombardment along the whole front from the Val Guidicaria to the Adriatic, and was of peculiar violence at Monfalcone. But it was soon evident that the Austrian Command was well informed as to the weakest link in the Italian trench line, and concentrated its greatest efforts there. It was along the sector between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana that the main attack developed. Prolonged bombardments of unprecedented violence were followed up by massed infantry attacks, driven home with great skill. The co-ordination of the Austrian artillery fire was admirable, and in no battle of the European War had artillery been used more efficaciously, and at the same time more flexibly in delivering its full force where most effective.

The Austrian blow was well aimed, and it would be useless to deny that Italy reeled under the on-

slaught. The Italian troops were forced slowly but continuously backward. Step by step the Austrian armies advanced under the cover of their big guns, which were moved forward with unusual celerity. The Italians were compelled to evacuate their advance positions. Their lines of communication were seriously disturbed by the Austrian long-distance fire. Austrian shells were now dropping ten miles behind the Italian first-line trenches. Italian towns and villages, which had hitherto been immune from the destruction of war, were razed to the ground by the great Austrian shells which fell thickly on the Asiago and Asiero plateaux. A great stream of refugees, with their goods and chattels and flocks of goats and cattle, hurried to safety in the plain, as the highlands of the fertile Sette Comuni now came within the range of battle. The Italians fought everywhere with unusual courage and determination, but it was impossible to withstand the deadly enemy shell fire. Along this sector there were few bomb-proof dugouts, few shelters, and to hold out beyond a certain limit meant an unnecessary and needless sacrifice of life. The task of checking the advance was further hampered by the lack of an adequate number of guns. The Austrians continued to advance. Thereupon General Cadorna decided to withdraw his centre, to the south of the Posina torrent, in order to consolidate his position. This manœuvre meant the abandonment of much valuable territory, but there was no alternative, as the Italians were still outnumbered four to one both in men and guns. The Austrians were now pouring down from the heights, and the Italians had no time to dig themselves in. Trench-warfare was abandoned. Great

masses of troops were manœuvring in the open. The battle raged on the mountain tops and in the valleys. On the heights the contending armies were fighting in the snow; in the valleys the heat and dust of the Italian mid-May days was suffocating.

The operations of withdrawal, which now brought the battle-line several miles beyond the old Italian boundary into Italy, were successfully carried out by May 22. The Austrian attack had now slackened, but it was only a temporary lull in the battle, which was to be resumed with renewed fury within a very few days. In fact by the 24th, the Austrians' onslaught on the left centre was renewed with increasing violence. There seemed to be no shortage in the Austrian supply of shells, of which the expenditure had been prodigious. The Italian resistance was now beginning to stiffen, yet the situation was still precarious. On the right centre the enemy was pressing steadily onward; he had crossed the Posina and was pushing southward. To the east in the Altipiano dei Sette Comuni, the Italians were compelled to evacuate its chief centre, Asiago. The fighting continued desperately. Only three miles of highland country lay between the Austrians and the Italian plain. Already General Cadorna had made provision for the constitution of a new army for the defense of Venetia. The organising capacity of the Italian General Staff was here put to a supreme test. Notwithstanding the great battle that was being fought in the highlands, in less than ten days, centring around Vicenza, a complete army of 500,000 men with mule and motor transport columns, field kitchens, sanitary corps, as well as its full complement both of men and guns was assembled ready for

action, and during all this time a steady stream of reinforcements, munitions, and supplies was being despatched to the troops in action.

On the evening of June 1, it seemed as though the Austrian invasion of Italy had succeeded. Only two short miles lay between the Austrians and the plain. In massed formation the enemy came on resolutely, to break down the last remaining barrier. Blow upon blow, well aimed and carried out with astonishing valour and great courage, was directed at these last Italian defenses, but General Cadorna's men had been ordered to die in their positions, rather than give ground. The hour had struck for Italy to show her mettle, and it found the Italians ready. The attacks of the Austrians had not slackened; they had the advantage of *terrain* as well as a superiority in artillery, yet the Italians held on. It would be impossible to recount even fragmentarily the heroic fighting of those early June days. It was not one battle but a hundred battles fused into one terrible struggle. The Austrians stood on the heights looking down into the Italian plain. Before them lay the rich cities of Venetia: Vicenza, Bassano, Padua; even Venice and the Adriatic could be faintly discerned through the haze. Sixty-six invasions have been launched into Italy since the days of Rome, and of these only nine had failed. Would this invasion, the most carefully planned and executed, as well as the greatest of them all, succeed? For a week the decision hung in the balance. Again and again, with sledge-hammer blows, the massed columns of the Austrian infantry advanced to the attack and broke against the Italian lines. The Italians were still com-

pelled to give ground, but at no point were they obliged to surrender an important position.

By June 3 General Cadorna, who throughout the fortnight of fighting had not sought to deceive the country as to the gravity of the situation, was able to announce that the imminent danger of invasion had passed. The fighting still continued with unabated fury. The Austrians renewed their onslaught, and the Italians now fought with increased stubbornness. The great army which had been mobilised for the defense of the plain was now sent forward to take part in the battle in the highlands. The Austrians, seeing their prize eluding them, fought with desperation. The Italians throughout the second and third weeks in June had to meet repeated assaults, executed with great gallantry and skill. But the tide had begun to turn. The mastery of battle now lay with the Italians, but the Austrians would not concede defeat. They poured an unending stream of shells on the Italian lines; their attacks were still pushed home with vigour. The Italians suffered terrible losses. In some brigades as high as 60 per cent of the *cadres*, including officers, were wiped out.

The Italians from all over the peninsula had vied with each other in indomitable courage to turn the tide of invasion. The early onslaughts were stayed by the Sicilians; the Ligurians, the Calabrians, the Sardinian troops, all had a part in the fierce fighting. But the greatest share of the terrific struggle fell to the *Alpini* battalions. They won immortal glory in the defense of the last lines of trenches against which the invading armies stormed in vain, and when the current of battle turned and the Italians, on June 25,

began to drive the Austrians before them the *Alpini* were in the vanguard of every assault and blasted open the road which made possible the advance of General Cadorna's main forces.

During the last week in June the Austrians began to retire. The Italians were now in a position to move forward. The fighting was difficult. The Austrians withdrew slowly, destroying the towns and villages in their path, but they held on stubbornly to the heights, and were only driven out after hot fighting. The Italians were now taking numbers of prisoners, and gathering in many guns, stores, and other booty abandoned by the enemy.

By the first week in July the great battle of the Trentino had come to an end. The Austrians still held a line, roughly from about three to seven miles in advance of their former positions before the beginning of the offensive, and they dug themselves in firmly in their new positions, but the great objective of the offensive had failed miserably. Italy was saved from invasion, but, more than this, the great battle had given the Italian troops a renewed and greater confidence in themselves, and the world at large who were informed of the prowess of the Italians could not fail to be impressed by the greatness of this achievement. No other battle of the European War, with the possible exception of the assault on the fortress of Verdun, brought forth a more potently concentrated mass of artillery on so short a frontal sector. Even the defense of Verdun presented no such difficult problem as that which faced the defending armies in the Trentino when the Austrian attack was once launched.

It has been suggested that had not General Brusilof early in June initiated his great drive in the East, which was to sweep the Russians rapidly through the Bukowina, and thus prevented new forces from being despatched to the Trentino, the Austrian attack here would have succeeded. It cannot be denied that the Russian thrust in the East was of timely assistance, but this can in no way detract from the greatness of the Italian exploit. General Cadorna had won a great victory, the significance of which is not even to-day fully appreciated. He did more than merely to stem an invasion; he proclaimed Italian unity on the battlefield. Here for the first time in the history of the Italian people, Italians from all parts of the peninsula, from the North, the South, the mountains, and the plain, had a share in the fighting, and acquitted themselves in a manner worthy of the highest admiration.

While Italy was in the throes of the greatest battle of her war, with the Austrians pushing onward, another crisis arose within her boundaries which was precipitated by this event. The discontent with the Salandra Government had steadily grown during the spring months, though it was kept in check by a desire not to appear disunited in face of the enemy. When the Chamber reopened on June 6, it was evident that unless M. Salandra departed radically from his attitude of aloofness he would soon be in open conflict with the Chamber, which would lead to his downfall. The Chamber was in a restless frame of mind. The Government had maintained absolute silence regarding the military situation in the Trentino, and insisted on pursuing routine business. The Chamber

bowed to the demand and passed financial bills in rapid succession without discussion. Thereupon M. Salandra, in demanding a vote of confidence on June 10, made a reference to the war which may have been the truth, but which, under the circumstances, was decidedly tactless. In speaking of the defensive positions of the Trentino and the Austrian offensive, he remarked:

“We must manfully recognise that had the positions been better prepared and better defended, these positions would have at least held out longer.”

Here was an open criticism of the Italian Higher Command which, though it was not directed against General Cadorna personally, but rather against General Brusati, spoken by the head of the Government in so grave a moment, could only be interpreted as an accusation. It was evident that M. Salandra was sincere when he spoke, and that he did not wish to give the country mere sentimental bombast, but it was also patent that he was tired of the struggle with a recalcitrant Parliament, and that if he had to fall it would be by his own hand rather than by that of another. As was inevitable, the Government motion for a vote of confidence was defeated; two days later M. Salandra announced his resignation. The men who had compassed his overthrow did so actuated by the most diverse motives; the Official Socialists and Giolittians because he had led the country into war; the Interventionists because he had not prosecuted the war with sufficient vigour.

The King, who for a year had been living uninterruptedly at the front and had personally visited

all the zones and sectors of his long and varied battle-line, was obliged to return to select a new Premier. Though M. Salandra had by his lack of *souplesse* alienated the sympathy of many, he, nevertheless, was still strong in the country, and the King was unwilling that he should not remain at his post at the head of a larger, more representative Ministry. But apparently M. Salandra wished to retire. The Interventionists loudly clamoured for a National Ministry which would take firm hold of the business of waging war with greater zeal and energy. After due consultations M. Boselli, the dean of Italian Deputies, was intrusted with the formation of a "National Cabinet." It was a difficult task. It was held desirable to have Baron Sonnino remain at the Foreign Office, but he was unwilling to do so unless M. Salandra also remained in the Cabinet. Baron Sonnino's objections were finally overcome, and after some delays, on June 18, the composition of the National Ministry was announced.

The new Ministry had been increased in size from 13 to 19 members, in order to include in so far as possible the representatives of all Parliamentary groups. Here for the first time we find a Catholic and a Republican with a portfolio in the same Cabinet, which also included a Socialist, M. Bissolati, the leader of the Interventionists. The Salandra Ministry thus came to an end, and the new National Ministry took up the reins of power. M. Salandra's name, however, stands in high honour in his country; he played a leading part in the work of constructing the new Cabinet. For the first time in many years the name of Giolitti was not openly mentioned, though he re-

turned to Rome from his home in Piedmont about this time, for the first time in nearly a year.

M. Boselli, though seventy-eight years of age, with an unquenchable optimism assumed the responsibilities of government, and was soon to give proof that the National Ministry was to keep its pledge to prosecute the war with full energy.

While the ministerial crisis may be regarded as an affair of internal politics, the attention of the world was soon to be centred on Italy's battle-line. General Cadorna, though busy parrying the Austrian blow in the Trentino with his left hand, when the danger of invasion had passed set to work immediately to prepare for his own advance in the East. With the guns still thundering in the Trentino, and with the Italians still keeping the enemy busily engaged there, the great final assault against the Podgora and the Monte Sabotino was launched. The onslaught was irresistible. The Italians drove the enemy before them, cleared the heights which dominated Gorizia, crossed the Isonzo, captured the city, and by August 14, ten days after this great offensive thrust had begun, they had pushed their line forward along the Carso and firmly held Gorizia. These operations netted the Italians not only a great gain of territory, including the city of Gorizia, which next to Trieste is the largest city of *Italia irredenta*, but 18,758 Austrian prisoners, including 393 officers, and 32 large-calibre guns, besides great quantities of munitions, machine-guns, rifles, etc.

This was but the first of a series of vigorous offensives which General Cadorna was to carry out on the Carso front, extending from Gorizia southward. Towards the middle of September another movement was

initiated here, which gained for the Italians several important positions, including San Grado and some 4,000 prisoners. This was quickly followed by a third and even more powerful blow, which straightened out the Italian lines which had by this time eaten deep into the Carso plateau. In a furious surprise attack, developed October 10, the Italians were able to take nearly 8,000 prisoners. But General Cadorna would give the enemy no respite, and three weeks later, during the first days of November, he launched another assault along this same front, which, though tenaciously opposed, left 8,982 prisoners in his hands, besides guns and war *matériel* of all sorts, making in all over 40,000 Austrian prisoners, including 1,008 officers taken by the Italians during three months' fighting on the Carso front.

Everywhere along the whole Italian front the enemy is on the defensive. Though the Austrians still hold a small segment of Italian territory along the Trentino front, and make occasional offensive sallies, they are being each day more closely invested, and with the return of spring may be expected to be driven out. But the eyes of all Italy are turned towards the Carso front. Here by a series of hard, well-directed blows, the Italians have forged ahead and will continue to do so. Trieste at the present writing lies not much more than twelve miles beyond the Italian advance positions. The enveloping movement which General Cadorna is executing it is hoped will spare Trieste from destruction, at the same time placing it safely within Italian hands, as the troops push ahead towards Istria to complete the task of "redemption" of the northeastern Adriatic.

In the Balkan war zone Italy is pursuing consis-

tently her new plan of an energetic prosecution of the war, not merely by sending a strong force to co-operate with the Allied armies assembled at Salonika, but has undertaken the task of opening a road across Epirus to form a junction with the Allied armies, pushing northward into Serbia. During the first week in October (1916), it was announced that a considerable Italian force had landed at Santi Quaranta, north of the island of Corfu, and was proceeding rapidly northward towards the lake of Prespa across the Albanian frontier where it had come in contact with the Allied forces.

The unity of front is now becoming a reality. Italy is closely co-operating with the Allies in the conduct of the campaign, and though great obstacles still remain to be surmounted, the Italian people look forward with full confidence in their armies to attain the principal object of their participation in the war; the redemption of the Trentino and the Italian lands of the Eastern Adriatic.

It would be too dogmatic an explanation of the decisive step the new National Ministry was to take in regard to its relations with Germany to state that it spontaneously declared war on Germany. The preparation for this event had been slowly and covertly proceeding under the Salandra Government. One by one the bonds which bound Italy to Germany had been severed. The process was perhaps over-cautious, and during many months kept Italy in a false position. It must, however, be recalled that it was a current belief among many Italians, during the greater part of the first year of their war, that inasmuch as the entire Italian economic structure rested on Ger-

man foundations, a drastic severing of all connection with Germany would inevitably lead to a catastrophe. But when the Italians realised that they could carry on their industrial and commercial life as well, if not better, alone than under German tutelage, they proceeded patiently and thoroughly to eliminate German influence and control.

Italy throughout her conduct of foreign affairs since August, 1914, had shown a marked capacity for safeguarding her paramount interests and for visualising clearly her national needs. Her policy has been strikingly free from rash and immature decisions. When Italy was ready, and not before, she followed to its logical end the other great object for her entry into the war—the emancipation of Italy from German control.

Therefore the declaration of war against Germany on August 28, 1916, came as no great surprise in Italy. The justifications for the step were not lacking. Germany had from the outset of hostilities furnished great assistance to her Austrian ally in the campaign against Italy. During the recent offensive in the Trentino German guns and German shells contributed largely to the success which the Austrians were able to obtain. But further than this, Germany had broken her agreement entered into with Italy in May, 1915, and had stopped the payment of pensions due to Italian workmen. But these excuses were a mere formality embodied in the official declaration of war. The real cause lay deeper. Italy had thrown in her lot with the nations who were opposing the spread of Pan-Germanism. Italy had for twenty years lived under its influence, and knows more thoroughly than

any of the other belligerents the dangers to national independence to which this vassalage may lead. To emancipate herself from German influence, to become a free and powerful agent in the affairs of the world, is one of the chief underlying causes for the Italian declaration of war on Germany.

Whatever may have been the motives of the Government in openly breaking off all connections with Germany, the declaration of war was to prove an important step towards the increase of Italian prestige and independence. Italy was now to be received on terms of intimacy, confidence, and equality by the Allied Powers. The Quadruple Alliance was a *fait accompli*. The last ties which bound Italy formally to Germany were severed. Henceforth no loyal Italian could maintain friendly relations with Germany without being a traitor to his country.

For the people of Italy the future has much in store. The pathway to a Greater Italy lies open. By pursuing the cautious, clear-sighted, constructive policy which Baron Sonnino has so consistently followed it would appear probable that the "greater destinies" of Italy are on the eve of fulfilment. The apparent elimination of Greece from the participation in the affairs of the Ægean and the Adriatic has greatly simplified a problem the solution of which would have caused much vexation. Italy may now assert openly, without undue clandestine bickering, her claims to a share of dominance in the eastern Ægean. Serbia, for the time being, no longer exists as an independent State. It would be premature to predict an immediate and vigorous revival of Pan-Serb as-

pirations. The drain of the present struggle will have been too great for the Serbs to reassert any unreasonable claims to national expansion, in the immediate future. Italy at all events can afford to be magnanimous towards her stricken neighbour in the Eastern Adriatic.

Is it too soon to speak of victory?

Whatever may be the decision arrived at on the field of battle, whatever may be the fate that befalls Italian arms, Italy has already won a great victory. For she is fighting not solely for the aggrandisement of her territory nor the increase of her wealth: she is fighting for the greatness of her national soul; not exalted by any chimerical idealism, not in pursuit of some high-sounding phrasemaker's catchword such as "humanity" or "civilisation," but as an upholder of the right of nationhood she is helping to bring once again peace, security, and liberty to Europe.



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
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